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“[T]he rule “collect truth for truth’s sake” may be justified when the truth is unchanging;
but when the system is not completely isolated from its surroundings, and is undergoing
secular changes, the collection of truth is futile, for it will not keep. ”
Ashby (1958)
iii
Abstract
The application of Bayesian techniques to the study and computational modelling
of biological systems is one of the most remarkable advances in the natural and
cognitive sciences over the last 50 years. More recently, it has been proposed that
Bayesian frameworks are not only useful for building descriptive models of bio-
logical functions, but that living systems themselves can be seen as Bayesian (in-
ference) machines. On this view, the statistical tools more traditionally used to ac-
count for data in biology, neuroscience and psychology, are now used to model the
mechanisms underlying functions and properties of living systems as if the systems
themselves were the ones “calculating” those probabilities following Bayesian infer-
ence schemes. The free energy principle (FEP) is a framework proposed in light of
this paradigm shift, advocating the minimisation of variational free energy, a proxy
for sensory surprisal, as a general computational principle for biological systems.
More intuitively and under some simplifying assumptions, the minimisation of vari-
ational free energy reduces, for an agent, to the minimisation of prediction errors on
sensory input. Initially proposed as a candidate unifying theory of brain function-
ing, the FEP was later extended to encompass hypotheses on the origins of life, and
is nowadays discussed in the cognitive science community for its possible implica-
tions for theories of the mind. In particular, one of the most popular process theories
derived from the FEP, active inference, describes a biologically plausible algorithmic
implementation of this principle with several repercussions on our understanding
of cognition.
In this thesis, I will focus on the role of this process theory for action and per-
ception. In active inference, the two of them are combined in a closed sensorimotor
loop as co-dependent processes of minimisation of a single loss function, variational
free energy, with respect to different sets of variables. Building on this, I will sug-
gest that some of the core ideas of active inference are best seen in terms of enactive,
embodied, extended and embedded (4E) theories, in contrast to the majority of the
literature emphasising its apparent connections to more traditional, computational,
accounts of the mind. In particular, I will develop this argument by focusing on
some proposals central to 4E approaches: (a) the non-brain-centric nature of cogni-
tive processes, (b) the lack of explicit representations of the world, (c) the coupling of
agent-environment systems and (d) the necessity of real-time feedback signals from
the environment. Under the FEP formulation, I will present a series of case studies
with mainly two objectives in mind: 1) to conceptually analyse and reframe these
4E ideas in the context of active inference, arguing for the advantages of their for-
malisation in a more general probabilistic (Bayesian) framework and, 2) to present
new mathematical models and agent-based implementations of some of the concep-
tual connections between Bayesian inference frameworks and 4E proposals, largely
missing in the literature.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
A deep paradigm shift is affecting studies of biological and cognitive systems: the
popular Bayesian frameworks previously used to only descriptively model natural
phenomena, are now proposed as mechanistic explanations of the systems them-
selves. This conceptual move is quite radical: from applying inferential models to
datasets without necessarily investigating the underlying mechanisms generating
such observations, to thinking about agents as the ones performing inference on
their sensory stimuli in order to handle uncertain environments and noisy informa-
tion. In this light, Bayesian inference processes are thought to be implemented by
the agents themselves with scientists simply describing how agents naturally ac-
count for their incoming sensations.
The Bayesian brain hypothesis, predictive coding, the free energy principle and
active inference are increasingly popular ideas describing biological functions that
claim to unify our understanding of life and cognition within a general mathemati-
cal framework derived from information and control theory, statistical physics and
machine learning (Dayan et al., 1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Bogacz, 2017; Buckley
et al., 2017). The free energy principle (FEP), in particular, is proposed as a unify-
ing framework for the natural and cognitive sciences, with many of the other the-
ories and ideas emerging as special cases/corollaries (Friston, 2010b). According
to the FEP, living systems must minimise the surprisal (Tribus, 1961), or information
content/self-information, of their sensory states (Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006;
Friston, 2010b; Friston, 2012), while meeting their normative constraints (Friston,
Thornton, and Clark, 2012; Barto, Mirolli, and Baldassarre, 2013; Clark, 2013). This
surprisal is an information theoretical quantity measuring how implausible a state is:
frequent states have low surprisal while less frequent ones have high surprisal. Nor-
mativity is invoked to describe value together with this notion of frequency, which
ought to be based on the specific needs of an agent (Friston, Thornton, and Clark,
2012; Barto, Mirolli, and Baldassarre, 2013). For instance, low surprisal states for
fish, e.g., to be in water, should not have the same information content for birds.
Following this, biological systems are described tautologically as the ones that can
frequently occupy a set of states that allow them to exist. Surprisal minimisation, as
we will see more in detail in the following chapters, cannot be directly implemented
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in practice due to the intractability of integrals over continuous spaces of sensory in-
puts and their hidden states in the world. A possible approximation entails the use
of variational free energy to provide a proxy for surprisal: by minimising a known
quantity, variational free energy (hence the name: free energy principle), a system
can effectively reduce the surprisal of its sensations. Active inference (Friston, Dau-
nizeau, and Kiebel, 2009; Friston et al., 2010a), an extension of predictive coding
models of the cortex (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Spratling,
2017), rests on the minimisation of variational free energy, implementing an optimi-
sation scheme that defines a set of processes suggested as possible descriptions of
perception, action, learning and attention among others (Friston, Kilner, and Harri-
son, 2006; Friston et al., 2010a; Feldman and Friston, 2010; Friston, 2010b).
Most of the proposals advanced by the FEP have insofar focused on brain sci-
ences with a structured framework based on Marr’s architecture (Marr, 1982) (see
Fig. 1.1), outlining why, how and what brains exactly ought to do (Friston, 2008a;
Parr and Friston, 2018c). The FEP, however, is proposed to describe and provide
new interpretations on several aspects of living creatures beyond brains (Friston,
2012; Friston, 2013), and therefore Marr’s architecture is, in this case, adopted as a
frame of reference for models of biological systems more in general. In this frame-
work, the minimisation of surprisal (through the minimisation of variational free
energy) stands at the computational level (Friston, 2010b; Friston, 2012; Friston,
2013). Process theories such as predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston
and Kiebel, 2009c) and active inference (Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel, 2009; Fris-
ton et al., 2010a), based on models such as the Laplace (neural) code (Friston, 2008a;
Friston et al., 2012; Buckley et al., 2017) are thought to be, respectively, algorithms
and encodings that can perform surprisal minimisation in a biological plausible way
(Aitchison and Lengyel, 2017). Some proposals on the specific neural mechanisms
implementing these algorithms at the lowest level, specifically in terms of neural
architectures, have then been advanced for instance in Friston (2008a), Friston and
Kiebel (2009b), Bastos et al. (2012), Isomura, Kotani, and Jimbo (2015), Isomura and
Friston (2018), and Keller and Mrsic-Flogel (2018), but the exact mechanisms remain
unclear. This thesis focuses on a combination of the computational and algorith-
mic levels just described, and in particular on new interpretations of perception and
action suggested by active inference.
The origins of the free energy principle can be traced back to a set of ideas devel-
oped in a variety of different fields. One of the most popular perspectives associates
the FEP to the notion of “unconscious inference” developed by Helmholtz in the
19th century (Helmholtz, 1867), however see Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld
(2018). On this view, perception is best thought of as the inference of the most likely
causes for a particular observed stimulus via a combination of top-down generated
hypotheses and bottom-up error correction processes (Gregory, 1980; Lee and Mum-
ford, 2003). This is then described in more detail using models of predictive coding
in the cortex (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005a; Spratling, 2017), equivalent to
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FIGURE 1.1: Marr’s levels of analysis. In his celebrated architecture,
Marr proposed to study a system implementing different levels of
analysis. In A) we see an example, studying an organism requires an
understanding of the reasons behind its behaviour (Q: Why does it
behave this way? A: To fly), the rules specifying the way it behaves
(Q: What does it do to fly? A: It flaps its wings) and the mechanisms
by which these rules are implemented in the physical world (Q: How
does the flapping work? A: Via the use of feathers). In B) we see that
these processes are however not disconnected and a complete model
should include several cycles of investigation including more specific
constraints emerging from the connection of different questions. In
C), we report the trend in the neurosciences, as highlighted by the
authors of Krakauer et al. (2017).
Reproduced from (Krakauer et al., 2017) with permission from Else-
vier Inc.
surprisal minimisation under a set of biologically plausible assumptions (Friston
and Kiebel, 2009c). Following this idea, accounts of action (Friston, Daunizeau, and
Kiebel, 2009; Friston et al., 2010a; Friston, 2011) and other cognitive functions (Fris-
ton, 2010b; Feldman and Friston, 2010) are derived as extensions of the core scheme
based on Helmholtzian ideas of (unconscious) inference.
A second proposal outlined by Seth (2014b), suggests that the roots of the FEP can
(also) be found in last-century cybernetics approaches to the study of living systems,
and in particular brains (Ashby, 1957; Wiener, 1961). This view, providing a funda-
mental shift in the interpretation of the FEP, is especially relevant for the themes
developed in this thesis. Following Seth, in fact, the FEP does not describe how an
agent builds accurate and precise world models, but rather a methodology focusing
on ideas of homeostasis and control (Ashby, 1960), teleology (Rosenblueth, Wiener,
and Bigelow, 1943), autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980) and ecological psychol-
ogy (Gibson, 1979). In particular, homeostasis is here used in the Ashbyan sense of
maintenance of “essential variables” within boundaries for the survival of an agent
(Ashby, 1960). Teleological models (i.e., models defining the purpose of a system)
are loosely based on the idea of regulation against external disturbances from the en-
vironment via negative feedback mechanisms (Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow,
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Computation
Algorithm
Implementation
1
2
3
LEVELS
Minimise surprisal/

variational free energy
Active inference/

predictive coding
?
FIGURE 1.2: Marr’s levels of analysis for the FEP. The computational
levels entails the minimisation of sensory surprisal, approximated by
the minimisation of variational free energy. The most prominent pro-
posals of an algorithmic or process theory are active inference and
predictive coding. At the implementation level we find mostly “evi-
dence consistent with” predictive coding architectures but clear evi-
dence is still lacking (see also Chapter 8).
The image is reproduced from nataliej. "Seagull 5". 23
September 2006. Online image. Flikr. 8 January 2019.
www.flickr.com/photos/nataliejohnson/252782639/.
1943) that require an agent to be a good model of such disturbances (Ashby, 1957;
Conant and Ashby, 1970; Francis and Wonham, 1976; Sontag, 2003). These two ideas
are deeply intertwined and revolve around a different notion of “world model”, a
model inspired by Conant and Ashby, 1970 and only meant to guarantee survival
through homeostatic regulation, not necessarily carrying any objective description
of the physical world useful to anyone but the agent itself. As suggested in Bru-
ineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld (2018), the FEP is also clearly inspired by ideas of
autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980) as shown in Friston (2013), and affordances
in ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979), see for instance Linson et al. (2018). The for-
mer highlights possible connections to 4E theories of cognition, down to the origins
of life (Friston, 2013; Friston et al., 2015). The latter sees Gibsonian affordances as
a natural source of inspiration for ideas emphasising agent-environment coupling,
and concepts such as Umwelt (Clark, 1998) and niche construction (Odling-Smee,
Laland, and Feldman, 2003; Bruineberg et al., 2018).
Historically, the cognitive science community has adopted different mathemat-
ical formalisms for the study of cognition. Often these formalisms have also been
proposed as metaphors of the underlying cognitive processes themselves: infor-
mation theory for computational/representational accounts (McCulloch and Pitts,
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1943; Marr, 1982; Fodor, 1983) and dynamical systems theory for work in 4E (En-
active, Embodied, Extended and Embedded) theories (Braitenberg, 1986; Brooks,
1991a; Beer, 1997; Clark, 1998; Van Gelder, 1998). Traditionally, computational the-
ories have paid little attention to closed loop dynamics in agent-environment cou-
pled systems (Clark, 1998), while dynamical systems proponents have not generally
tackled more “cognitive-demanding” problems generalising reflex-based behaviour
using mappings of statistical regularities (Clark and Thornton, 1997). In this thesis,
I will argue that the FEP framework provides a unifying perspective of dynamical
systems and information/probability theory for the study of sensorimotor loops in
agents, complementing and possibly extending work such as Ashby (1958), Tishby
and Polani (2011), and Beer and Williams (2015). One of core themes driving this pro-
posal is what I consider a profound misconception about the use of Bayesian infer-
ence frameworks for the study of cognitive systems: the idea of inference to the best
explanation and its connections to Bayesian confirmation theory (Douven, 2017) and
the notion of analysis by synthesis (Neisser, 1967; Gregory, 1970; Dayan et al., 1995;
Yuille and Kersten, 2006). According to this view, inferential methods are primar-
ily processes of knowledge discovery. In Bayesian accounts of cognition, agents are
thus systems whose main purpose is to collect information from the world in order
to explain their sensations. This perspective is usually adopted in models of what I
will call passive agents from now on, systems whose goal is to generate an objective
understanding of their environment. The FEP and one of its related proposals in par-
ticular, predictive coding (Rao, 1999; Friston and Kiebel, 2009c), are often introduced
using the idea of passive agents fitting the more traditional, computational interpre-
tation of cognitive systems as having complex and precise world models (Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Hohwy, 2013). I will argue that ac-
tive inference on the other hand is more in line with 4E theories and with a definition
of agents as acting on the world rather explaining the world (Barandiaran, Di Paolo,
and Rohde, 2009; McGregor, 2017; Biehl, 2017). I will explain how the two ideas of
passive and active agents can, to some level, co-exist and sometimes be confused
due to the attempts made by the FEP to unify different (but dual, as explained in
Kalman (1960b), Mitter and Newton (2003), Kappen (2005), Todorov (2006), Todorov
(2008), and Todorov (2009b)) mathematical formalisms used for the study of cog-
nitive processes. On the one hand, the more dynamical-systems-oriented view of
(optimal) control theory accounts of action and on the other, the Bayesian inference
schemes adopted as models of perception. In the FEP formulation, it will become
clear that the more intuitive idea of inference to the best explanation is just one side
of the coin, and in particular that the teleological and normative interpretations of
agents’ behaviour inspired by ideas such as autopoiesis and homeostasis are consis-
tent with active inference, providing thus a more natural venue for studies of agency
and behaviour.
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1.1 Thesis contributions
With a few exceptions (Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel, 2009; Schwartenbeck et al.,
2015), existing implementations of the FEP have insofar focused on a very specific
notion of generative models for passive agents: models that represent and mirror the
environment, a representational stand-in for the physical world within the agent. It
has been suggested that this need not to be the case (Clark, 2015b; Clark, 2015a),
and that the FEP could be interpreted following 4E accounts of cognition (Clark,
2015b; Pezzulo et al., 2017; Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018; Kirchhoff,
2018; Allen and Friston, 2018). These suggestions, however, have provided no di-
rect computational implementations supporting the connections between the FEP
and core ideas of 4E cognition. In this light, the aim of this thesis is two-fold. On
a more conceptual level, I will discuss some specific connections between approx-
imate Bayesian inference/optimal control frameworks and 4E perspectives for the
study of cognition. My arguments will be based mainly on hypotheses regarding
perception and action as described by (Bayesian) inference and (optimal) control re-
spectively. The majority of 4E proposals are still based on frameworks relying on
(often small) deterministic dynamical systems that hardly scale up to capture more
complex features of biological or even artificial agents (Kirsh, 1991; Brooks, 1997).
On the other hand, the use of probabilistic and information theoretical frameworks
shows promising results for the study of different systems including noise (Longtin,
2003; Todorov, 2004; Faisal, Selen, and Wolpert, 2008), uncertainty (Griffiths et al.,
2010; Engel, Friston, and Kragic, 2016) and ambiguity (Knill and Pouget, 2004), but
often lacks any grounding of ideas such as embodiment, situatedness and coupling
with the environment (Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher, 2018).
The role of probabilistic and information theoretical frameworks for the study of
the mind constitutes a controversial topic in cognitive science, with work suggest-
ing that approaches such as the FEP are aligned with traditional, representationalist
views of cognition (Froese and Ikegami, 2013; Gładziejewski, 2016). Part of the cog-
nitive science community does not see this as a problem (Hohwy, 2013), while others
claim it is its main drawback (Gładziejewski, 2016; Zahavi, 2017). Others have ar-
gued that the FEP is more consistent with a 4E perspectives of cognition, claiming
that its strengths reside in generative models with no explicit representational fea-
tures (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018). A different perspective highlights
the potential of theories such as the FEP for the formalisation of “action-oriented”
views of cognition (Clark, 2015a; Clark, 2015b; Engel, Friston, and Kragic, 2016; Pez-
zulo et al., 2017; Allen and Friston, 2018), attempting to reconcile traditional views
and 4E theories on the ground of action as a central process for adaptive systems.
My work will support 4E views, suggesting at the same time that information and
probability theory can be useful frameworks to treat noise and uncertainty, without
necessarily bringing in representationalist arguments typical of cognitivist descrip-
tions of the mind.
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Making use of the mathematical relation between information theoretical and
dynamical/control-theoretical perspectives on cognitive processes, I will then pro-
vide models supporting the connections between the FEP and 4E theories by focus-
ing on definitions of sensorimotor loops where uncertainty and noise are key fea-
tures of the agent-environment dynamics. The implications of this relation remain
vastly unexplored with a few exceptions found for instance in Tishby and Polani
(2011) and Beer and Williams (2015). I will thus propose examples where the inte-
gration of these two mathematical formalisms sheds light on new interpretations of
cognitive systems, for instance the idea of perception and action as deeply entan-
gled functions of embodied and situated agents (Clark, 1998; Wilson, 2002; Beer and
Williams, 2015; Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandiaran, 2017). My contribution is set
out to extend the FEP to studies of sensorimotor loops in a 4E spirit, with new con-
crete proposals on issues arising in the 4E literature regarding the use of information
theoretical tools. In particular, in Chapter 4 I will provide an initial description of
the simplest sensorimotor loop under active inference to introduce the core ideas de-
veloped in later chapters. In Chapter 5 I will show how the FEP can formalise ideas
such as the importance of the dynamical coupling between an agent and its environ-
ment. Homeostatic regulation with minimal models of world dynamics will then be
introduced in Chapter 6. Finally, the non-modular nature of action and perception
will be discussed in Chapter 7.
1.1.1 Published work
Most of the work presented in this thesis was either published, submitted for pub-
lication or is currently in preparation for publication in collaboration with Christo-
pher Buckley. The list of manuscripts includes:
• “An active inference implementation of phototaxis” In: Proc. Eur. Conf. on
Artificial Life. 2017 (Baltieri and Buckley, 2017), presented in Chapter 5 with a
corrected notation
• “A probabilistic interpretation of PID controllers using active inference” In:
From Animals to Animats 15., 2018 (Baltieri and Buckley, 2018a), presented
and extended (see below) in Chapter 6
• “The modularity of action and perception revisited using control theory and
active inference” In: The 2018 Conference on Artificial Life: A Hybrid of the
European Conference on Artificial Life (ECAL) and the International Confer-
ence on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE) (Baltieri and
Buckley, 2018b), presented and extended (see below) in Chapter 7.
• “Nonmodular architectures of cognitive systems based on active inference”
(Baltieri and Buckley, 2019b), submitted to IJCNN (International Joint Confer-
ence on Neural Networks), presented and extended (see below) in Chapter 7
Chapter 1. Introduction 8
• “PID control as a process of active inference with linear generative models”
(Baltieri and Buckley, 2019c), expanding on Baltieri and Buckley (2018a) and
presented in Chapter 6, submitted for journal publication and now under re-
view
• “Modularity, the separation principle and active inference” (Baltieri and Buck-
ley, 2019a), expanding on Baltieri and Buckley (2018b) and Baltieri and Buckley
(2019b), presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 7
1.1.2 Limitations
Some of the major limitations will be initially pointed out here and re-elaborated in
the concluding chapter. This thesis focuses on formulations of the FEP and active in
continuous space and time that were developed mainly until 2011 and followed by
implementations of (PO)MDPs (Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes) in
discrete time, see for instance (Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012a; Friston
et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2015; Friston et al., 2017). The continuous time time formu-
lation adopted in this work makes use of a set of assumptions that greatly simplify
the variational treatment of Bayesian inference problems, see Friston et al. (2007),
Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau (2008), Friston et al. (2010b), and Buckley
et al. (2017), while for a more general treatment of variational methods in a Bayesian
context see Beal (2003) and Bishop (2006). The more technical aspects will be de-
veloped and discussed in the next chapters, however, I will point out some general
limitations here.
Firstly, this treatment only covers unimodal probability distributions due to the
Laplace assumption (Friston et al., 2007), approximating an unknown distribution
using a Gaussian form. This is sometimes introduced as a strength, proposing the
Laplace encoding as a plausible neural code based on the sufficient statistics of a
Gaussian density (Friston, 2009), but this hypothesis is not confirmed empirically.
We could extend this framework by using methods that can approximate multi-
modal distributions (similar to particle filters) under the same variational formu-
lation (Friston, 2008b), but their simulation is computationally expensive.
Secondly, while many authors (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2008a; Hohwy,
2013; Clark, 2013) stress the importance of hierarchical Bayesian models, especially
for (deep) models of perceptual processing, my focus is on minimal (1-layer) ar-
chitectures. It has also been suggested that hierarchical models can combine the
continuous and discrete time formulations of the FEP, , (Parr and Friston, 2018c),
providing more complete schemes for the treatment of mixed (continuous and dis-
crete) problems thought to arise in biological systems, typically in terms of contin-
uous inputs/outputs and discrete decision making processes. These aspects remain
largely unexplored in my work, focusing mostly on minimal (rather than complex
and hierarchical) accounts of behaviour.
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Lastly, the formulation I use in this thesis is essentially “model free”, in a rein-
forcement learning sense, since agents are already endowed with appropriate heuris-
tics that map actions to suitable outcomes towards a goal (see Chapter 3 and on-
wards). The agents implemented here can thus minimise a variational free en-
ergy functional with no dependences on future outcomes (Friston, Daunizeau, and
Kiebel, 2009; Friston, 2010b; Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012a), cf. the
discussion on inference approaches to control and behaviour in Kappen, Gómez,
and Opper (2012) and the subsequent POMPD’s expected free energy treatment pro-
posed in Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague (2012a) and Friston et al. (2015). In
this thesis, policies are built as sequences of independent actions obtained through
instantaneous minimisations of variational free energy. Considering the complex-
ity of formulating accounts of behaviour with time-dependent policies conditioned
on future (therefore hidden) states in continuous time, frameworks proposed since
2012 (Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012a) in terms of expected (Friston et
al., 2015) and generalised free energy (Parr and Friston, 2018a) are not included in
my presentation of the FEP. Such proposals include more general accounts of, for
instance, planning (Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012a; Friston et al., 2015))
and behaviour based on (epistemic) uncertainty minimisation (Friston et al., 2016a;
Parr and Friston, 2017) that are not (yet) developed for the continuous time formu-
lation of the FEP and thus will not be covered.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter I will briefly overview the 4E ideas central to this thesis. I will then
focus on the relationship between 4E theories and the cybernetics movement, in
particular on some of the approaches proposed for the study of homeostatic reg-
ulation, attempting to unify information and control theoretical notions of entropy
and control under a more general mathematical theory with implications for the
biological and cognitive sciences. This will (re)connect some of the mathematical
methodologies adopted by 4E approaches for the study of agents, and based on dy-
namical systems theory, to ideas of goal-directedness and teleology in a control- and
information-theoretic sense. To explore the FEP’s proposal to unify information, con-
trol and studies of natural systems under the 4E frameworks, I will specifically cover
action-perception loops. After discussing the most recent theories of perception and
action in the natural and cognitive sciences, including for instance the Bayesian brain
hypothesis, predictive coding/processing and optimal control, I will highlight their
individual differences and their conceptual connections to theories of estimation and
control. Finally, I will introduce the free energy principle, bringing together these
theories in a single framework. I will then discuss its most popular implementa-
tions, highlighting an extensive lack in the literature of models showing the possi-
ble connections between Bayesian/control theory approaches and 4E cognition. A
mathematical formulation of the FEP will then be the focus of the next chapter.
2.1 Embodied, enactive, extended and embedded (4E) cogni-
tion
In the last few decades, the cognitive sciences have seen an increasing number of ap-
proaches questioning the “classical sandwich” (Hurley, 2001) of the mind, the tradi-
tional proposal that perception, higher order cognitive functions such as modelling,
planning and memory, and action are implemented as a series of activities in a fun-
damentally sequential, feedforward fashion (Fodor, 1983), (see also Cisek (1999) for
a short but complete introduction to these topics). Many of these approaches imple-
ment ideas inspired by literature on 4E cognition, see for instance Varela, Thompson,
and Rosch (1991), Clark (1998), Pfeifer and Scheier (2001), Gallagher (2006), Di Paolo,
Buhrmann, and Barandiaran (2017), and Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher (2018) for
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extensive treatments and reviews. In an attempt to capture some of the central argu-
ments against the cognitivist approaches to the study of the mind, different areas are
included in the “4E” definition: embodied, enactive, extended and embedded theo-
ries. It is important to highlight that differences, and perhaps some incompatibilities
among these areas do exist, for instance on how strongly traditional ideas of rep-
resentations and computation are rejected or effectively (mildly) accepted (Newen,
De Bruin, and Gallagher, 2018). Crucially, however, all 4E approaches share an at-
tempt to abandon the “Cartesian theatre” (Dennett, 1993) metaphor of the mind:
a computational, brain centric allegory of mental processing that, 4E practitioners
suggest, needs to be re-evaluated under a different light (Newen, De Bruin, and Gal-
lagher, 2018). Some of the common principles in 4E theories include embodiment,
situatedness, feedback from the environment and a non-modular perspective of per-
ception, cognition and action (Clark, 1998; Pfeifer and Scheier, 2001; Wilson, 2002).
These ideas have been extensively explored in different research areas, including for
instance robotics, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, psychology, anthropol-
ogy, linguistics and artificial life, see Boden (2006) for an historical account of their
impact on different areas of cognitive science.
In this thesis, I will not attempt to give a full overview of 4E theories, but rather
focus on the mathematical treatments and implementations of some of their central
tenets, starting from how sensorimotor loops have been modelled in the 4E literature
so far, and proposing some new perspectives. The mathematical underpinnings of
4E approaches are heavily reliant on dynamical systems theory, due to a strong em-
phasis on the dynamical interaction of brain-body-environment architectures (Van
Gelder, 1998; Beer, 2008). Some of the most prominent models of agent-environment
systems include direct applications of dynamical systems theory (Beer, 1995; Beer,
1997; Beer, 2008), evolutionary robotics (Cliff, Husbands, and Harvey, 1993; Nolfi,
Floreano, and Floreano, 2000) and behaviour-based robotics (Brooks, 1986; Brooks,
1991a; Brooks, 1995). Alternative frameworks, and in particular I refer to (Shannon)
information theory (Shannon, 1948), are on the other hand often associated to infor-
mation processing and traditional cognitivist arguments promoting the metaphor of
the mind as a machine (Turing, 1937; McCulloch and Pitts, 1943; Boden, 2006). These
proposals, dating back to the work of Tuning (Turing, 1950; Boden, 2006), are usually
based on an interpretation of the mind as processing information on a Von Neumann
architecture (Neumann, 2012), including ideas such as memories, symbols, buffers,
logical gates, etc. (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943; Newell, Simon, et al., 1972; Fodor,
1983), and still constitute the dominant framework in the cognitive sciences. 4E
research rejects theories based on information processing metaphors, following the
idea that classical information theoretical measures, for instance mutual information
and entropy as originally defined by Shannon for communication problems (Shan-
non, 1948), inherently depend on the presence of abstract symbols. Furthermore, they
are based on atemporal definitions, failing to capture the intrinsically dynamic na-
ture of cognition. Information measures are still, nonetheless, normally used as tools
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for post-hoc analysis of different models (Pfeifer and Scheier, 2001).
2.1.1 The cybernetics roots of 4E
Many of the ideas in 4E theories are inspired by previous work in cybernetics (Wiener,
1961; Ashby, 1957) and influenced by approaches involving feedback, (ultra)stability,
closed-loop dynamics and circular causality (Froese and Stewart, 2010; Froese, 2010;
Froese, 2011; Villalobos, 2013), with influential examples such as Walter’s tortoises
(Walter, 1950) and Braitenberg’s vehicles (Braitenberg, 1986) (see however Maturana
(2011) for ideas claimed to be explicitly not inspired by cybernetics). In the cybernet-
ics movement, feedback loops and homeostatic control in agent-environment sys-
tems constituted a central area of research. Based on ideas of homeostatic control,
Ashby developed his “law of requisite variety” (Ashby, 1958), claiming that to sta-
bilise a system, a controller must have access to a number of states (at least) equal
to the number of states of the system to be controlled. In his work, then, Ashby
explicitly attempted to relate concepts of control and Shannon information theory
under the same mathematical formulation (Ashby, 1958). These efforts culminated
in the good regulator theorem (Conant and Ashby, 1970), claiming that “every good
regulator of a system must be a model of that system”: a controller must be a model
(in some broad sense) of the system being regulated. Since then, however, many of
these ideas have taken off independently (Boden, 2006). Information theory became
a central focus in the field that would then be called artificial intelligence, especially
GOFAI (Russell and Norvig, 2009). Control theory contributed, often indirectly, to
the development of ideas related to intrinsic homeostatic regulation, e.g., autopoiesis
(Maturana and Varela, 1980), relying on concepts of dynamical systems without ex-
trinsic value functions (however see once again Maturana (2011) and Maturana’s
stance on formal mathematical definitions). In parallel, control theory has also de-
veloped into modern optimal control theory (Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel,
1994) based on Pontryagin (Pontryagin et al., 1962) and Bellman (Bellman, 1957b)
formulations.
Control theory and information theory, heavily used by cybernetics researchers
in the last century, are nowadays however less popular in 4E models, often associ-
ating the definition of computational goals (cf. Marr’s architecture (Marr, 1982) and
Chapter 1) of a system to more traditional, symbolic accounts of cognitive science,
see Di Paolo (2005) and Villalobos (2013) for thorough discussions. In particular,
some of the conceptual inconsistencies between dynamical systems approaches to
cognition and optimal control accounts of behaviour often emerge from the use of
extrinsically defined value functions advocated in the latter (see Todorov (2006) and
Schaal, Mohajerian, and Ijspeert (2007) for discussions on this and related topics).
The presence of goals defined externally by an experimenter works against intrinsic
ideas of autonomy, adaptivity, individuation and in particular autopoiesis as origi-
nally formulated in Maturana and Varela (1980), rejecting the teleological approach
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described by Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow (1943). Following the original defi-
nition of autopoietic accounts of life and cognition, teleological frameworks (includ-
ing information and control theory) are seen as fundamentally symbolic, with a func-
tional role that can only be attributed by an external observer (Di Paolo, 2005). How-
ever the debate remains unsettled (Villalobos, 2013), especially considering more re-
cent descriptions of autopoiesis as “embodied teleology” (Weber and Varela, 2002)
by one of the original contributors, Varela, (together with Weber), a view not shared
by the other original author, Maturana, see for instance Maturana (2011)). This def-
inition can reintroduce the use of information and control metaphors for the study
of living systems in a 4E context, as argued in Villalobos (2013). In strong support
of the reconnection between cybernetics ideas and 4E cognition, the FEP proposes
also to replace extrinsic cost and value functions with intrinsic priors. On this view,
priors encode normative drives imposed by the minimisation of sensory surprisal in
order for an agent to exist, consistent with accounts of autopoiesis (Friston, 2013).
2.1.2 4E cognition and models of the environment
More recently, some of the ideas found in cybernetics, attempting to unify control
and information theory, have re-emerged in the field of stochastic optimal control,
where the problems of estimation and control of a system have been shown to share
a common mathematical background (Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994;
Todorov, 2008; Kappen, Gómez, and Opper, 2012). This unification is thought to
play an important role in the biological sciences, see for instance Sontag (2003). In
the study of living systems, while a sharp separation between a controller and the
system to control is not as clear, concepts such as the good regulator theorem and
its direct and more formal extension, the internal model principle (Francis and Won-
ham, 1976), are becoming established modelling frameworks. These methodologies
have been applied to the study of systems such as bacteria, e.g., E. Coli, where mech-
anisms of perfect adaptation explaining chemotaxis have been found in the bacteria’s
signal transduction pathway (Yi et al., 2000). Perfect adaptation, a popular term in
cellular and molecular biology, describes the ability of living systems and biochemi-
cal networks to adapt their response to the presence of external stimuli by returning
to a level of activity near the pre-stimulus baseline. Yi et al. (2000) showed that this
mechanism is equivalent to integral control (Åström, 1995), while Andrews, Yi, and
Iglesias (2006) used a Kalman filter, a classical estimation method, to determine the
properties of this “controller”, providing results remarkably consistent with experi-
mental data.
The revival of ideas on the unification of information and control theory has
also produced several new proposals for the study of sensorimotor loops more in
general, including for instance Ay et al. (2008), Tishby and Polani (2011), and Jung,
Polani, and Stone (2011). These results define new information theoretical measures
for agents-environment systems over temporal “channels”, considering possible dy-
namical correlations between variables of a agent-environment coupled system over
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time. All these proposals elegantly deal with one of the main drawbacks pointed out
by 4E approaches to cognition for information theory: the atemporality of informa-
tion measures defined for, initially, spatial channels.
Most of these ideas seem to clash with positions advocated by 4E research, es-
pecially the notion of a (possibly) symbolic “internal model” in the internal model
principle (Francis and Wonham, 1976) and in the good regulator theorem (Conant
and Ashby, 1970). While perhaps not solving the problem entirely, in this thesis I
will make an explicit distinction to define operationally the use I make of the words
“internal” and “model”. This distinction is based on the idea of a system either hav-
ing a model of the environment or a system being a model of the environment, see
also Seth and Tsakiris (2018) for a similar discussion. Having a model is the idea that
I associate to cognitivist accounts of the mind, a Cartesian theatre perspective where
a “model” exists as an independent and often abstract set of symbols that a system
manipulates to act on its environment. Being a model, on the other hand, highlights
the fact that a system’s very existence, properties and functions are in some way iso-
morphic to the environment (Conant and Ashby, 1970; Sontag, 2003; Friston, 2013)
and can be described by a scientist using a set of mathematical objects, i.e., a model. I
will avoid, as much as possible, the more confusing use of “internal”. In this thesis I
will focus on notions of systems being a model of their environment, leaving interest-
ing but more problematic developments often associated to ideas of having a model,
such as counterfactual thinking, allostasis, etc. (Seth and Tsakiris, 2018), for future
work. This simplification follows from my focus on minimal cognition and action-
perception loops with no higher order functions (although see Chapter 5 for the
implementation of a process thought to be close to attention (Feldman and Friston,
2010; Brown et al., 2013)). This choice is also consistent with the initial assumption
I made with regards to the study of simple behaviour based on homeostatic con-
trol with policies not depending on an agent’s future actions and observations (see
section 1.1.2).
2.2 Perception as inference (estimation)
An increasingly popular view in the cognitive sciences posits that brains are sys-
tems performing (Bayesian) inference and that perception is a process that can be
described using methods from classical estimation theory (Knill and Richards, 1996;
Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2005a; Friston, 2010b; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015b).
The main goal of estimation processes is to infer (or estimate) the hidden dynam-
ics of a system given a set of observations that are in general noisy or encoding uncer-
tainty, and a model of the underlying dynamics that also includes noise/uncertainty.
The idea of estimation can be historically traced back to Gauss and his method of
least squares used to infer parameters of the motion of celestial bodies in studies
Chapter 2. Background 15
of astronomy (Sorenson, 1970). Some tremendous advances came in the last cen-
tury, with the contributions of Fisher, i.e., maximum likelihood estimation, and Kol-
mogorov and Wiener, see again Sorenson (1970) for a review. A few years later,
the emergence of computing machines accelerated the popularisation of Kalman fil-
ters (Kalman, 1960b) as an iterative, computationally efficient extension of previous
methods (e.g., the Wiener filter, see Chen (2003)). At the same time, this digital rev-
olution promoted the use of new estimation methods based on large-scale sampling
techniques, i.e., Monte Carlo methods, to estimate static solutions of different prob-
lems. In the 90’s, these methods were then extended to sequential estimations of
dynamical systems, e.g., particle filters (for a review on sampling methods for esti-
mation see Chen (2003)).
In cognitive (neuro)science, the first connection with estimation theory can be
traced back to Helmholtz and his “unconscious inference” hypothesis depicting brains
as inference machines (Helmholtz, 1867). This hypothesis later inspired work on the
idea of perception as hypothesis testing (Neisser, 1967; Gregory, 1980) or “analysis
by synthesis", for a recent review see Yuille and Kersten (2006). On this view, the
emphasis of perceptual processes shifts from a purely bottom-up perspective of fea-
tures extraction (Marr, 1982) to a combination of bottom-up and top-down, genera-
tive streams of information combined in a cohesive process of error correction and
prediction update. A few decades later, this conceptual treatment was grounded
in models of the visual cortex, i.e., predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee
and Mumford, 2003). In this more explicit hypothesis, brains are thought to infer
the most likely causes of their sensory data, or rather to estimate the associations be-
tween unknown, latent or hidden variables and some observations1. These variables
are considered to be inherently ambiguous and uncertain: different circumstances
can, in fact, generate the same sensory input. In machine learning, the same set of
ideas was used in a now classical example, the Helmholtz machine (Dayan et al.,
1995). This connectionist method implements two different components, a recogni-
tion model and a generative model. The former attempts to estimate the most likely
hidden variables of the data provided to the network (i.e., the analogous of sensory
input for the brain) while the latter generates sequences of observations given the
current best estimates of said variables. In later formulations of predictive coding
models and based on this formulation, these two models are proposed to correspond
to two different types of cortical processing. More specifically, recognition models
can be seen as implementing bottom-up processes thought to represent increasingly
more complex statistically regularities and patterns in a hierarchical network. Gen-
erative models, on the other hand, generate fictitious observations in a top-down
fashion starting from a set of current best estimates of world variables (which are
1While a vast majority of the literature on predictive coding/free energy principle assumes that
Bayesian frameworks allow to infer the causal structure of some given observations, see for example
Clark (2013), Hohwy (2014), and Parr and Friston (2018b), in this thesis I adopt a Pearlian stance,
objecting to this notion of causality and to the fact that Bayesian frameworks can ever be used for the
study of a meaningful notion of causality (Pearl, 2001).
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updated over time by the recognition model). The predictions produced via top-
down generative processes are then compared to the real sensory input stream and
their mismatch error is used as a mechanism of self-supervision to assess the quality
of the bottom-up inferred variables and internally generated sensations. The min-
imisation of this error thus constitutes a way to improve the estimates of incoming
data. In the context of predictive coding models in neuroscience, this minimisation
is then associated to processes of perception, or perceptual inference.
Many of these ideas fall, nowadays, under umbrella terms such as predictive
coding, predictive processing, Bayesian brain hypothesis and the free energy prin-
ciple. While all of them share some common background, they generally differ in
some important aspects. In the remainder of this section I will attempt to clarify
the terminology adopted in different research areas while also reviewing some of
the most influential work inspired by these ideas. The free energy principle will
be the only one treated separately at the end of the chapter, since it constitutes the
conceptual and mathematical basis of the following chapters.
2.2.1 The Bayesian Brain hypothesis
The hypothesis that the brain represents the latent variables of an uncertain world
in a probabilistic and Bayes optimal manner to guide actions and behaviour has
become dominant in the last 20 years. Bayesian methods have, in fact, proved to
be extremely powerful in modelling various aspects of brain functions and motor
control (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Rao et al., 2002; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Körding
and Wolpert, 2006; Doya, 2007; Griffiths, Kemp, and Tenenbaum, 2008; Griffiths et
al., 2010; Penny, 2012). The Bayesian brain hypothesis promotes the idea that brain
functions may be described using Bayes optimal computation. This computation is
thought to implement processes of probabilistic inference, providing an appropriate
set of methodologies to describe biological systems that live in an uncertain world
perceived through noisy receptors. Bayesian schemes can be seen as implemented
on different levels, from spike trains at a neuronal level to coding in neural circuits
and up to behaviour at a systemic level (for a review see Doya (2007)). The focus here
is on the latter, given its possible interpretations for global theories of cognition.
Bayes’ theorem provides, in this context, an elegant and optimal (Robert, 2007)
way of explaining inferential processes. To briefly introduce the general concept, I
will readapt an example from Knill and Pouget (2004) combined with an idea from
Lee and Mumford (2003). Suppose a person is trying to estimate what object X = x
(e.g., a glass) she is looking at, given visual cues V = v, where x and v represent
specific values of random variables X and V , see Fig. 2.1. In Bayesian terms, this is
equivalent to finding the conditional probability p(x|v), that can be expressed using
Bayes theorem as:
p(x|v) = p(v|x)p(x)
p(v)
(2.1)
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Object 
(e.g., a glass)
Sensory input 
(e.g. visual cues)
X
V
FIGURE 2.1: A simple example of Bayesian estimation. A simpli-
fied Bayesian network describing sensory input V , e.g., visual cues,
(conditionally) dependent on observed objects in the world X , e.g., a
glass.
where p(x|v) is called posterior density, p(v|x) is defined as the likelihood of the
observation V = v given an object X = x and p(x) is the prior probability of value
X = x before observations are taken into account. p(v) is the marginal likelihood
or model evidence and can be seen as a normalising factor that ensures that the
posterior is expressed on the [0, 1] interval.
Object 
(e.g., a glass)
Sensory input 
(e.g. visual cues)
X1
V
Position  
(e.g., on the table, 
in the middle)
X2
FIGURE 2.2: A simple example of hierarchical Bayesian estimation.
A simplified Bayesian network with multiple layers describing sen-
sory input V , e.g., visual cues, (conditionally) dependent on observed
objects in the worldX1, e.g., a glass, (conditionally) dependent on the
position of the objects X2, e.g., on the table, in the middle.
Several studies reported in Lee and Mumford (2003), Knill and Pouget (2004),
Körding (2007), and Griffiths et al. (2010) and references therein suggest that Bayesian
optimality criteria may provide relevant insights on the mechanisms driving differ-
ent accounts of biological functions. The above example, while potentially useful
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to grasp the general idea behind Bayes theorem, lacks however any hint regarding
possible implementations in real systems. In the same way, the “Bayesian brain hy-
pothesis” constitutes a general principle for the investigation of cognitive aspects
of living system in light of criteria of Bayesian optimality, but is overall agnostic
on the exact algorithmic and implementational details, cf. Marr (1982). In practice,
the majority of the models based on this hypothesis relies on hierarchical architec-
tures (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2008a), implementing
message passing algorithms over different layers, e.g., belief propagation (Bishop,
2006), expectation propagation (Minka, 2001) or the wake-sleep algorithm (Hinton
et al., 1995; Tishby, Pereira, and Bialek, 1999). Hierarchical structures, in this context,
lend themselves to implementations where Bayes’ theorem is applied between lay-
ers under a Markov property, see for instance the previously discussed Helmholtz
machine (Dayan et al., 1995). Bottleneck levels (layers with fewer nodes compared
to the ones below), in particular, become crucial in this picture since they implement
effective inference processes by imposing constraints on data compression (Hinton
and Zemel, 1994). As a simple example of hierarchy, although with no real compres-
sion, we could extend the previous problem on the estimation of an observed object.
In this case, we could include a second, higher layer with a new random variable
X2 that encodes the position of the object represented now by the random variable
X1 (previously X). Subscripts show different layers in the hierarchy, with layer 2 at
the top level. In this case, an agent could try to estimate the variable at the highest
layer X2 with a posterior calculated in two steps, see Fig. 2.2. At the first layer of
this simple network, the posterior for X1 becomes
p(x1|v, x2) = p(v|x1, x2)p(x1, x2)
p(v)
(2.2)
Thanks to the Markov assumption that guarantees conditional independence on
non-contiguous layers, observations do not depend on all possible higher levels,
but just on the one directly above. In other words, we assume that an observation
V = v (statistically) depends only on the observed object X1 = x1, not directly on its
position X2 = x2. Given this assumption, the likelihood reduces to
p(v|x1, x2) = p(v|x1) (2.3)
The joint prior on X1, X2 can be conditioned and rewritten as
p(x1, x2) = p(x1|x2)p(x2) (2.4)
with the prior about the variable on the second layer p(x2) disappearing if we as-
sume that no a-priori knowledge on the glass’ location is available, i.e., we have no
a priori knowledge of where it is, i.e., we have a flat prior. The posterior at the first
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layer then reduces to
p(x1|v, x2) = p(v|x1)p(x1|x2)
p(v)
(2.5)
where we initially assumed a flat distribution p(x2) and where the remaining prior
p(x1|x2) is equal to likelihood used for the inversion of x2 at the layer above. As-
suming, once again, a Markov property between layers we get in fact
p(x2|x1) = p(x1|x2)p(x2)
p(x1)
(2.6)
With this small example, we can see some of the basic concepts behind hierarchical
implementations of the Bayesian computation implied by the Bayesian brain hy-
pothesis. The posterior p(x1|v, x2) on layer 1 is constrained by observations V = v
from below, and by the best estimates of X2 = x2 from above. In the simple iterative
Bayesian update process proposed here, the posterior p(x1|v, x2) becomes the prior
p(x1|x2) in the next iteration and is used as a constraint for the inference of X2 = x2
at the layer above, where it represents the likelihood of “observing” variable X1 be-
fore new observations are available. Higher layers thus act as prior constraints on
lower ones by providing the best guesses of states at lower levels.
While this scheme offers an elegant implementation of Bayesian schemes, severe
limitations arise when considering exact methods for Bayesian inference in more
complicated problems. The process is, in fact, often analytically intractable (Bishop,
2006), since the computation of the marginal likelihood (i.e., the normalisation fac-
tor in Bayes theorem) for complex and especially continuous random variables is
rarely feasible. Many approximations have been proposed in the literature which
rely on either deterministic or stochastic methods. Stochastic methods are based on
Monte Carlo sampling, see for instance Markov Chain Monte Carlo/particle filtering
(Chen, 2003; Bishop, 2006), and while very effective, they need a considerable load
of computation that brains and biological systems more in general may not be able
to provide, especially in dynamic/fast-paced scenarios (Ashby, 1958)2. Determin-
istic approximations provide a computationally cheap solution, with more biologi-
cally plausible implementations. At the same time however, these approximations
provide lower quality solutions. Variational methods (MacKay, 2003; Beal, 2003;
Bishop, 2006) are among the most popular choices for deterministic approximations
and are behind the formulation of the free energy principle (see Chapter 3).
It is often assumed that other terminologies, especially predictive coding and
predictive processing, are deeply intertwined if not exact synonyms of the Bayesian
brain hypothesis but, as some recent work pointed out, this is more confusing than
helpful since Bayesian accounts of cognition are not necessarily tied to the algorith-
mic implementation proposed by predictive coding, see the separation of computa-
tional and algorithmic levels in Chapter 1 and discussions in Thornton (2016) and
2See Sanborn and Chater (2016) for a different perspective.
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Aitchison and Lengyel (2017).
2.2.2 Predictive coding
Predictive coding (PC) is arguably the most ambiguous term mentioned in the litera-
ture, and as shown in Spratling (2017), its exact meaning is clearly context-dependent.
Even within the same field (e.g., neuroscience), the terminology is still sometimes
confusing due to the different background of some research ideas. Originally de-
veloped in signal processing (Makhoul, 1975), PC is a methodology used to define
a compression algorithm that allows signal reconstruction with a limited amount
of parameters. While the underlying principles still survive in definitions of PC in
neuroscience, the signal processing version of predictive coding has roots in linear
time series analysis and doesn’t provide, for instance, a precision (inverse variance)-
weighted mechanism typical of the probabilistic/state-space derivation (Spratling,
2017).
In neuroscience, PC has been used to label different hypotheses. Dynamic predic-
tive coding is an application of the original definition derived from signal processing
to research on the retina (Srinivasan, Laughlin, and Dubs, 1982; Hosoya, Baccus, and
Meister, 2005). Models of dynamic predictive coding mainly focus on physiological
implementations of PC in the retina, and their underlying computational principles
are subsumed by later models (Huang and Rao, 2011). Rao and Ballard’s model (Rao
and Ballard, 1999), arguably the most popular theory of PC in neuroscience nowa-
days, suggests a functional hypothesis of predictive coding mapping to feedforward
and feedback connections in the visual system. This model also popularised the idea
of “perception as hypothesis testing” (Gregory, 1980) with a biologically plausible
algorithmic implementation. Spratling’s model (Spratling, 2008) is an adaptation
of Rao and Ballard’s PC to include ideas of biased competition theories of cortical
function, essentially replacing the prediction errors’ formulation of Rao and Ballard
with a mechanism of modulation (division and multiplication) of new (visual) stim-
uli. Spratling’s work provides a different and interesting angle on mechanisms of
(visual) attention, proposing different hypotheses about possible physiological im-
plementation of these models in the brain. Another different implementation related
to predictive coding is then proposed in models of Hierarchical Temporal Memory
(HTM) (George and Hawkins, 2009; McCall and Franklin, 2013; Kneller and Thorn-
ton, 2015; Cowley et al., 2018). HTM constitutes a theory of cortical functioning in
the neocortex based on the concept of cortical columns. Insofar, this framework has
received less attention in the biological sciences given its focus on artificial neural
networks and machine learning applications, emphasising the practical advantages
of models claimed to be more biologically plausible. Considering my focus on free
energy minimisation schemes and their potential implications for cognitive systems
at the computational and algorithmic levels, proposals of different biological im-
plementations will not be considered in the remainder of the thesis. Following the
suggestion that the free energy principle (introduced in more detail at the end of
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this chapter and in the next one) recapitulates previous formulations of predictive
coding, and under simplifying assumptions is formally equivalent to the formula-
tion by Rao and Ballard (Friston and Kiebel, 2009c), my work will have however
implications for Rao and Ballard’s proposal.
According to Rao and Ballard’s functional model, the visual cortex combines
bottom-up and top-down information processes through feedforward and feedback
connections between cortical areas in a hierarchical structure (Felleman and Van,
1991; Mumford, 1992), see also later applications to auditory (Baldeweg, 2006) and
the motor cortices (Shipp, Adams, and Friston, 2013; Adams, Shipp, and Friston,
2013). On this view, feedback connections carry top-down predictions from higher
cortical areas via a generative model of incoming sensations. Bottom-up connec-
tions, on the other hand, convey feedforward prediction errors, i.e., the difference
between sensory input and the predictions generated by the cortex, to higher re-
gions in order to update and improve future predictions, cf. the Helmholtz machine
(Dayan et al., 1995). Similarly to the more traditional definition of predictive cod-
ing in signal processing, in Rao and Ballard’s model the (sensory) input is never
actually delivered to higher areas. These areas only receive prediction errors, repre-
senting the residual/unaccounted/unexplained data, which are used to improve fu-
ture predictions in order to minimise these errors. Following this model, it has then
been suggested that perception (or perceptual inference) is the process enacting the
minimisation of such prediction errors (Friston, 2005a; Friston and Kiebel, 2009c).
Under this hypothesis, minimising prediction errors implies the presence of appro-
priate generative models producing increasingly accurate predictions of incoming
sensations, or in terms of signal processing, that the input data can be successfully
reconstructed using the (top-down) information stored in a model by minimising
the residual error of yet-to-be accounted data.
Rao and Ballard’s model thus presents a large amount of ideas later adopted
in the literature to account for and possibly explain perception. It also serves as
a first implementation of a mathematical model (i.e., an artificial neural network)
to describe functions in the cortex as a combination of top-down and bottom-up
information processing. A major limitation, however, is the focus on perception
with a lack of immediate links to accounts of action and behaviour even in more
recent proposals (Huang and Rao, 2011; Spratling, 2016).
2.2.3 Predictive Processing
Predictive processing (PP) is a label proposed in Clark (2013) where he suggests that
“...rather than resting with the more common usage “predictive coding”
I mean to highlight the fact that what distinguishes the target approaches
is not simply the use of the data compression strategy known as predic-
tive coding. Rather, it is the use of that strategy in the special context
of hierarchical systems deploying probabilistic generative models. Such
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systems exhibit powerful forms of learning and are able flexibly to com-
bine top-down and bottom-up flows of information within a multilayer
cascade.”
PP is essentially an umbrella term for approaches emphasising the presence of pre-
dictive mechanisms related to predictive coding schemes in neuroscience, and to the
original algorithm in signal processing, holding however no specific assumption re-
garding their implementation (Rao and Ballard, Spratling, HTM, etc.). The definition
given by Clark is based on probabilistic accounts of cognitive functions and, specif-
ically, on (deep) hierarchical Bayesian models, even if hierarchies are not strictly
necessary for the instantiation of predictive coding models (see the remaining chap-
ters). In his definition of PP, Clark refers to predictive coding mainly as the signal
processing compression strategy. As mentioned in Spratling (2017) however, in Rao
and Ballard’s model PC is already depicted as the hierarchical probabilistic model of
information flow in the visual cortex, extending the original algorithm from digital
signal processing to a fully probabilist formulation with precision-weighted predic-
tion errors. One could say that Rao and Ballard’s definition already captures Clark’s
proposal, but “predictive processing” represents nonetheless a useful label to avoid
confusion with PC as an algorithm for data compression. Clark also seems to explic-
itly address learning as a distinctive trait of probabilistic generative models in hier-
archical systems. While most certainly true in several contexts, I personally think
that the word “inference” might have been more appropriate here. In my view, the
most basic way of combining top-down and bottom-up flows of information stems
from appropriate (Bayesian) inference processes (cf. Kalman filtering), while learn-
ing need only be invoked for more complex problems.
Clark’s definition differs in some fundamental ways from the free energy prin-
ciple. This principle is connected to a set of ideas (proposed to be) connected to the
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics of self organisation and homeostasis for
biological systems. Similar ideas are then applied to the formulation of brain the-
ories, in particular the minimisation of variational free energy, which only under
simplifying assumptions reduces to predictive coding schemes. The definition of PP
lacks, in this sense, an underlying interpretation in terms of statistical mechanics and
focuses instead on proposals of the brain as a Bayesian inference machine, closer to
Helmholtz’ hypothesis and work of analysis by synthesis. A significant contribution
of Clark is however, the attempt of building a bridge between Bayesian models and
4E theories of cognition that is especially crucial in my work. In his work, he makes a
distinction between a perception-centric interpretation of PP, what he defines as con-
servative predictive processing (CPP), and an action-oriented (Clark, 1998) reading
of the same ideas, radical predictive processing (RPP) (Clark, 2015a).
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Conservative predictive processing
Conservative predictive processing (CPP) is a reinterpretation of classical concepts
of perception as entirely guided by external stimuli, with no direct role for behaviour.
It largely corresponds to initial models of predictive coding for perception (Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2005a) and ideas following these first
attempts (Huang and Rao, 2011; Hohwy, 2013; Spratling, 2016). There is, nonethe-
less, a clear distinction with the more traditional purely bottom-up models of per-
ception (Marr, 1982) since predictive coding suggests that top-down signals are cru-
cial in defining perceptual processes. However, these signals are only produced for
the sake of improving the estimate, or (perceptual) inference, of incoming signals.
CPP rests on models of perception, while behaviour and motor control are often not
considered. When they are, they are simply subsumed by the main goal of estimat-
ing the latent states of sensory observations, building generative models capturing
the complexity of the environment. Agents in this case are described as “perception
machines" (i.e., passive agents, see Chapter 1) whose only job is to capture and en-
code the richness and complexity of their environment. This creates a GOFAI-like
reasoning system that allows an agent to simulate sophisticated cognitive tasks on
an internal (generative) model that, essentially, mirrors the world. The only true
novelty introduced by PP interpretations is the explicit use of top-down information
flows in its generative models, inspired by predictive coding accounts of cortical
activity. In this interpretation, PP is thought to be a scheme for the construction
of very accurate and meticulous world models that serve higher purposes such as
planning, attention and decision-making. Action is vicariously implemented based
on powerful and accurate models of the environment that can be seen as detached
from the world itself. The external milieu is essentially only used during the initial
construction of internal models, assuming it is possible to encode all of the prop-
erties needed to plan and perform tasks whenever an agent requires it. As long as
enough complexity is captured by the internal representations, interactions with the
environment are not central.
Radical Predictive Processing (RPP)
Radical predictive processing (RPP) turns this passive approach around in an at-
tempt to meet ideas closer to action-oriented mechanisms more popular in 4E theo-
ries of cognition (Engel, Friston, and Kragic, 2016). Effective generative models are
the ones that allow agents to achieve their goals rather than the ones exhaustively
encoding information about the world. Agents are, once again, seen as teleological
systems (Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow, 1943), rather than as problem solvers
(Newell, Simon, et al., 1972). “Good enough" (Loeb, 2012), parsimonious models
should be preferred over more accurate and costly ones since they can make pre-
dictions that allow purposeful behaviour, which in this case is central to the general
description of an agent (see the complexity-accuracy trade-off in Chapter 3 and the
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model in Chapter 5). Rich models are often very hard to build/learn, using a con-
siderable amount of effort and resources, e.g., energy and time. Furthermore, in a
fast-paced environment complex but slow world models may affect the coupling
of agent-environment systems, while simpler but faster “heuristics” may effectively
maintain their dynamics (Ashby, 1958).
In RPP, “models” may even entail some form of systematic misrepresentation
(Wiese, 2016) or a severely limited objective understanding of the world dynamics
as in Chapter 5, as long as these are ecologically useful in some sense, cf. Umwelt
(Clark, 1998). In his work, Clark tries to connect RPP to 4E theories of cognition
suggesting that RPP models have little to share with sophisticated classical interpre-
tations of cognition having the brain in the driving seat (cf. CPP). Different levels of
accuracy may affect the role of the brain, that in some cases can be secondary to tele-
ological functions emerging purely from dynamical interactions with the environ-
ment (see Chapter 5). This may still not be sufficient to meet some of more radical
interpretations of 4E cognitive science (e.g., Maturana and Varela (1980), Chemero
(2011), and Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher (2018)), where the concept of models
for an agent is entirely banned, but it certainly offers an alternative way of consid-
ering agents being (Bayesian) models of their environment. Agents do not need to
be mirrors of the world to define any useful interaction with it. On the contrary,
generative models can, and in most cases should, include simple heuristics that only
make sense in agent-environment coupled systems, see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
2.3 Action as control
In the last few decades, hypotheses inspired by control theory have emerged as
dominant theories of action in neuroscience (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahra-
mani, 2000; Todorov, 2004; Scott, 2004; Körding and Wolpert, 2006; Körding, 2007;
Franklin and Wolpert, 2011; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, and Flanagan, 2011). In this light,
motor control and behaviour are seen as processes of regulating variables to a target
(Powers, 1973).
The problem of regulating variables to a desired state is an ancient one, but its
formalisation is relatively recent. Maxwell provided one of the first formal treat-
ments of the problem with direct applications to the control of valves in steam en-
gines, and in particular for the Watt-governor (that in Maxwell analysis was defined
as a moderator rather than a governor since the torque was proportional to speed er-
ror rather than its integral (Maxwell, 1868)). The problem of control is common
to many different research areas, from economics to biology, engineering, robotics
etc. and is thus historically defined in slightly different ways. Control theory as a
field is also a combination of knowledge acquired in different areas of application
and therefore hard to comprehensively describe. For the purposes of this thesis, I
will give only a brief overview of the fundamental phases that have defined rad-
ically different approaches to control theory (e.g., classic and optimal/stochastic)
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and their applications to the natural sciences. I will then describe specific examples
of some modern attempts to unify information and control theory that are especially
relevant for comparisons with the free energy principle in the natural sciences and
introduced at the end of this chapter.
2.3.1 Classical control
Classical control is mostly concerned with linear time-invariant (LTI) systems, often
in a single-input single-output (SISO) set up. Some simple applications include, for
instance, thermostats (regulating the temperature of a system) or cruise controllers
(regulating the velocity of a system). The focus on LTI models was mostly due to
technical reasons, since at the time most of the regulation techniques were devel-
oped (roughly from 1800’s to 1900-40’s), computers were still not available and en-
gineers performed their calculations on paper. Controllers were thus mostly built
using heuristic methods, strongly relying on testing with post-hoc analysis of dif-
ferent attempts usually carried out using frequency domain techniques, checking
for the stability of a solution with Laplace/Fourier transforms, pole placement and
the Nyquist criterion among others (Åström and Murray, 2010). One of the core
ideas introduced in classical approaches is the concept of negative feedback, defin-
ing control based on a signal fed back into a system to reduce fluctuations of the
variable to be controlled. This idea directly connects to homeostasis in the biological
science, as classically formulated by Bernard and Cannon and influenced the early
cybernetics movement (Wiener, 1961; Ashby, 1957) and consequently frameworks
such as perceptual control theory (Powers, 1973; Carver and Scheier, 1981), directly
inspiring PP and the FEP (Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). Particularly relevant to my work
is one of the most popular methodologies extensively developed at the inception of
control theory in the last century: Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) control, see
especially Chapter 6. This method (especially the integral term) was first analysed
by Maxwell, who sought the necessity of the integral action for problems of steam
regulation in governors (Maxwell, 1868), but was further developed and extensively
applied much later on, when better design methods emerged. This controller builds
on the core negative feedback component of classical control but extends it by pro-
ducing an output control signal depending not only on the (negative) error between
the target and the true value of a variable (here called the “proportional” term),
but also on its temporal integral and derivative. The integral part essentially deals
with steady state errors produced by unknown external disturbances (Sontag, 2003),
while the derivative term regulates the fluctuations of the error that can arise during
the control process (Åström and Murray, 2010). PID control is gaining popularity
nowadays in the context of systems biology, where this mechanism has been found
in different living systems as a simple heuristic for robust homeostatic regulation or
“perfect adaptation” (Yi et al., 2000; Sontag, 2003; Chevalier et al., 2018) and in neu-
roscience/psychology as an extension of the traditional delta-rule/Rescorla-Wagner
model (Ritz et al., 2018), see Chapter 6.
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2.3.2 Optimal control
With the advent of the digital age, new methods became soon popular, given their
mathematical formulation easily implemented on computing machines. Modern op-
timal control theory originated in 1950-60’s with the mathematical formalisations by
Pontryagin (Pontryagin et al., 1962) and Bellman (Bellman, 1957b). Connections to
classical mechanics and to work by Hamilton and Jacobi among others (Todorov,
2006; Sussmann and Willems, 1997), however, place its historical roots a few cen-
turies earlier. Optimal control defines the problem of finding a policy (i.e., a se-
quence of actions) for a given system or agent that optimises a criterion describing
a certain goal for the system. As this simple definition already implies, optimal con-
trol deals with problems that are generally more complex than the ones tackled by
classical control theory. Solutions to these problems can define in fact policies rather
than single independent actions, dealing with time-dependent trajectories towards
a goal. Actions in the classical control sense can, in this light, be seen as essentially
time-independent since they are not contingent on actions taken in the future and
their consequences on future observations. For example, solving a level of a Mario
game requires the main character to take different actions over time that generate
non-trivial outcomes in the future. Deciding on a single action at a time, only based
on current world states, will soon lead our character to certain demise. In this case,
one needs to consider the actions taken possibly far into the future to complete a
level. A thermostat on the other hand, will simply decrease the temperature if it’s
too hot and increase it if it’s too cold, following the same heuristic rule over time
and with states far ahead in the future generally not influencing actions of the here
and now. By using Bellman (for discrete time problems) or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(for continuous time problems) equations, the optimal policy for a problem is deter-
mined through Bellman’s optimality principle and the associated iterative Dynamic
Programming formulation (Todorov, 2006), defining the so-called value or cost-to-
go function (i.e., the optimal criterion to optimise). Bellman’s approach is also well
known for the curse of dimensionality since the Dynamic Programming method re-
quires computing the objective function for each combination of values, making the
problem practically infeasible in highly dimensional spaces (Bellman, 1957b). Pon-
tryagin principle, on the other hand, is not afflicted by the same problem and can be
seen as a generalisation of variational methods from classical mechanics (thus also
the the connections of optimal control to work by Hamilton and Jacobi (Todorov,
2006)). Its generalisation to real-world problems with stochastic components, unlike
Bellman’s formulation, remains however more problematic (Todorov, 2006).
Following the especially popular optimal control view in the natural sciences,
organisms are often depicted as minimising a cost function (i.e., an optimality cri-
terion) over time, representing a measure of performance for the achievement of a
certain goal. For instance, smooth reaching hand movements can be described by the
minimisation of a cost function based on the rate of change of acceleration, or jerk, of
hand movements (Franklin and Wolpert, 2011). One of the main limitations of this
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approach is however the lack of tools to deal with noise and uncertainty, inherent
properties of real-world problems.
2.3.3 Stochastic optimal control
In his pioneering work, Bellman also defined the basis for the formulation of the
stochastic version of the optimal control problem (Bellman, 1957a), starting what is
now known as stochastic optimal control (Åström, 1970; Anderson and Moore, 1990;
Stengel, 1994; Todorov, 2006; Kappen, 2011). This formulation emphasises the fun-
damental probabilistic nature of optimal control/decision making problems, with
outcomes that are (at least partially) stochastic and not under a system’s direct con-
trol. The dynamic programming formulation can still be applied to this case, but as
pointed out previously, Pontryagin principle is mostly limited to deterministic prob-
lems. As previously mentioned, the field of control theory includes the contribution
of different research areas and in particular for stochastic optimal control, of esti-
mation and information theory due to the probabilistic formulation of the problem.
Work by Kalman (Kalman, 1960c) vastly contributed to the field, with the definition
of properties such as observability and controllability of a system, the former ex-
pressing the degree to which states can be estimated from noisy observations, and
the second one representing the degree of control of a system given when different
manipulations are applied. Kalman first noticed also that his newly defined filter
was the dual problem of a well known example in linear optimal control theory: the
linear quadratic regulator (LQR) (Kalman, 1960b), with both problems based on the
solution of Riccati equations. In Chapter 7 I will discuss some of the possible im-
plications of this finding for the cognitive sciences. In particular, the definition of
the linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) method and the so-called separation principle of
control theory, central to applications of (stochastic) optimal control to neuroscience
(Todorov and Jordan, 2002; Todorov, 2004; Scott, 2004), will have non-trivial impli-
cations for some principles of 4E proposals. The free energy principle itself strongly
relies on this duality and brings it to the realms of neuroscience and cognitive science
with a set of hypotheses generated from empirical studies (see, again, Chapter 7).
In (stochastic) optimal control, assumptions on the nature of the problem at hand
lead to the use of different cost functions for the construction of different control
policies (i.e., sequences of actions) towards a goal. One of the most fundamental
distinctions with repercussions on the natural sciences is the one between classes
of cost functions in control theory (Todorov, 2004; Ahissar and Assa, 2016; Buckley
and Toyoizumi, 2018). This distinction is based on the absence/presence of real-time
feedback from the environment, defining open and closed-loop control respectively,
see (Åström and Murray, 2010) for an introduction. Open-loop control methods rely
on complex internal models that accurately mimic the external dynamics includ-
ing the effects of feedback, and allow for pure internal feedforward planning. In
this type of control models, perceptual processes can be ascribed to the transduction
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of sensory input into some internal (e.g., neural) representation and are often de-
picted as estimators or forward models-estimators pairs (see section 2.2). These rep-
resentations produce then (motor) actions via a fixed, pre-programmed, controller
(Todorov, 2004) or inverse model (Jordan, 1996; Kawato, 1999) that does not take
into account feedback from the environment. The sequential nature of estimation-
modelling (planning)-control is consistent with the traditional classical sandwich
of cognitive science, where estimation and control are processes encapsulated into
separate modules used in sequential order, and the effects of feedback from the en-
vironment are though to be deterministic, slow and stable enough to be successfully
modelled internally. Closed-loop control is based on the same modules used in the
open-loop case (i.e., estimators and controllers) but includes, in contrast, fast-paced
feedback from the environment. This allows such framework to elegantly tackle dif-
ferent sources of noise, internal fluctuations and uncertainties (Todorov and Jordan,
2002; Todorov, 2004; Åström and Murray, 2010; Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston, 2015;
Ahissar and Assa, 2016; Buckley and Toyoizumi, 2018) although its performances
in presence of delays are still under scrutiny (Jordan, 1996; Franklin and Wolpert,
2011). Closed-loop control appears to be closer to 4E views because of the presence
of a real-time feedback mechanism that highlights the crucial dynamic interactions
of a system with its environment and the insufficiency of purely feedforward mod-
els. We however will argue that the most common implementations of closed-loop
optimal control are still more consistent with the traditional, sequential, view of ac-
tion and perception mainly due to ideas based on the separation principle of control
theory (Stengel, 1994), introduced and discussed in Chapter 7. In other research ar-
eas such as artificial life, adhering more closely to 4E ideas, different models provide
examples where this separation is not assumed, not present or at least not easily de-
tectable/found (Beer, 2003; Iizuka and Ikegami, 2004; Harvey et al., 2005; Di Paolo
and Iizuka, 2008).
2.3.4 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) provides a complementary perspective to optimal con-
trol methods, bringing together a long tradition of studies in psychology and animal
learning including work by Pavlov, Thorndike and Skinner among others (Pavlonian
conditioning, the law of effect and operant conditioning) and the optimal control
formulations summarised above (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In their simplest form,
models of reinforcement learning can be seen as defined for the same problem tack-
led by (stochastic) optimal control: to determine the optimal policy for a system
having some goal. A major difference between RL and (stochastic) optimal con-
trol lies in the fact that the latter does not deal with the problem of learning: it is
generally assumed that all parameters of the model of the system to regulate are
available (see however Kappen (2011) for a more generous definition of learning,
describing what I define here as inference+learning). Optimal control heavily relies
on the formulation of dual control problems in the context of (partially) unknown
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processes by Feldbaum in the 1960’s, defining the exploration-exploitation dilemma
for control theory (Wittenmark, 1995). Since no analytical, general solution to this
problem exists, optimal control methods use simple heuristics such as the iteration
of estimation and control phases to generate approximate but well understood solu-
tions (Kappen, 2011). Reinforcement learning, on the other hand, adopts in general a
position closer to adaptive control (Kappen, 2011), looking for a solution by trial-and-
error, learning and inferring properties of a system by repeating the same task as if
time and number of trials were not a constraint (Sutton and Barto, 1998) and unlike
dual control, where knowledge about a system must be acquired while attempting
to regulate it. The approach adopted by most optimal control methods focuses on
the definition of analytical solutions to the control problem, having thus limited ap-
plications since this mathematical tractability often imposes strong constraints, e.g.,
linearity. Standard RL, on the other hand, is less concerned with analytical solu-
tions and provides a more general set of tools for dealing with real-world problems
where conditions of observability and controllability (Kalman, 1960a) cannot be ver-
ified and agents simply have to find the best (even if heuristic) policy. In particular, if
full observability of a system is not available or if some of the parameters of the sys-
tem to control are unknown, RL provides a set of methodologies that can be used in
such cases, from policy-iteration or value-iteration, to Q-learning, SARSA, etc. (Kael-
bling, Littman, and Moore, 1996; Sutton and Barto, 1998). These approaches belong
to the class of methods defined as model-free reinforcement learning, in contrast to
a series of other methods falling nowadays under the name of model-based (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). While the details of the different proposals are not especially rel-
evant for the remainder of this thesis, this distinction is important as it resonates
with a similar difference in approaches to the definition of the free energy principle,
denominated “agency-free” and “agency-based” respectively (Friston, Samothrakis,
and Montague, 2012a) or “belief-free” and “belief-based” in (Friston et al., 2016a).
Model-free approaches in reinforcement learning refer to the set of methodologies
where agents simply accumulate information regarding valuable states by trial-and-
error and use these heuristic knowledge of valuable (explored) states to construct
policies. Model-based methods, on the other hand, attempt to build (i.e., learn) a
model of the state transition probabilities and of the value function to determine
policies with a candidate model of the world dynamics that can also work for un-
explored states (Kaelbling, Littman, and Moore, 1996). Model-free methods can be
associated to agency-free formulations of the free energy principle and the examples
provided in this thesis can be seen in this context. In the models implemented here
however, there is no explicit trial-and-error phase, with generative models either al-
ready encoding the relevant properties about the policy as priors provided by the
experimenter, or representing trivial time-independent policies (e.g., a thermostat)
as discussed in section 1.1.2. An example of the former can be found, for instance, in
Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel (2009) (see also the discussion of this model later in
the chapter), while the latter can be seen essentially in all of the implementations in
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the following chapters. Model-based methods are more aligned with an extension
of the free energy framework, incorporating an account of expected variational free
energy minimisation on future and yet-to-be seen observations, and explicit distri-
butions over (hidden) control states in the future with state transition probabilities
that can be inferred for more complex problems (Friston et al., 2015; Friston et al.,
2016a; Friston et al., 2017). As explained in section 1.1.2 however, this is not be
treated in this thesis.
2.3.5 Other relevant approaches to control
Several other approaches to problems of control have also been proposed in the lit-
erature. In this section I will present a brief overview of only but a few examples us-
ing information theoretical definitions for control, including specifically: KL-control,
empowerment, homeokinesis and predictive information.
KL-control KL-control (Kappen, Gómez, and Opper, 2012) defines a class of con-
trol problems formulated as the minimisation of a Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kull-
back and Leibler, 1951; Bishop, 2006). This minimisation is aimed at decreasing the
deviation of a probability distribution p representing the controlled dynamics of a
system, i.e., the system regulated by a specified controller, from a distribution q
representing the uncontrolled dynamics of a system, i.e., a distribution of the sys-
tem in its desired state with no actions/forces (i.e., , control) applied. The body of
work covered by KL-control, see also Todorov (2008), Todorov (2009b), and Todorov
(2009a), is largely overlapping with the more general definition of expected free en-
ergy (Friston et al., 2015) and time-dependent policies, thought to generalise KL-
control among other approaches (Friston et al., 2017). This method lies, therefore,
outside the scope of what I cover, as discussed in section 1.1.2. Furthermore, while
KL-control provides a better framework for time-dependent policies, these approaches
heavily rely on discrete time systems and thus are crucially different from the ones
used in this thesis.
Empowerment Empowerment is a measure defining the ability, or “power”, of an
agent to knowingly change its environment (Salge, Glackin, and Polani, 2014). It
is defined as the Shannon channel capacity of, i.e., the maximisation of mutual in-
formation between, an agent’s actuators states and its sensations in the future (i.e.,
the consequences of its actions). It was initially described for discrete-time systems
(Klyubin, Polani, and Nehaniv, 2005a; Klyubin, Polani, and Nehaniv, 2005b) and
later extended for the continuous-time case (Jung, Polani, and Stone, 2011). One of
the main features of this approach is the definition of a candidate intrinsic motiva-
tion for biological agents: to maximise empowerment. The possible implications
cover hypotheses in evolutionary theory, behavioural studies and AI implementa-
tions (Salge, Glackin, and Polani, 2014). This constitutes an advantage over the for-
mulation of the free energy principle used in this thesis, since the minimisation of
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surprisal alone generates time-independent policies that do not, effectively, take into
account the effects of actions on future states as discussed in section 1.1.2 and Kap-
pen, Gómez, and Opper (2012) and Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague (2012a). On
the other hand, the framework based on expected free energy extension can be com-
pared to empowerment (Biehl et al., 2018), with the two theories providing different
candidate intrinsic motivations: maximisation of empowerment vs. minimisation
of expected free energy. This comparison remains also outside the scope of my work.
Furthermore, the computation of empowerment is known to be particularly complex
and hardly scalable due to the combinatorial complexity of states in grid worlds in
discrete space and time proposals and, in the continuous-time formulation, due to
Monte Carlo approximations (Jung, Polani, and Stone, 2011).
Homeokinesis Homeokinesis is a generalisation of the classic notion of homeosta-
sis, where the target is not stasis, i.e., , a fixed or steady state, but rather kinesis, i.e., ,
an equilibrium kinematic regime of a system and its constituents with the environ-
ment (Der, Steinmetz, and Pasemann, 1999; Der and Martius, 2012). This approach
defines adaptive behaviour via the minimisation of an error function representing
how well a system can predict the consequences of its own actions. To avoid trivial
solutions, “do nothing” (cf. the dark-room problem in Chapter 4), the error func-
tion includes also a drive to maximise the sensitivity of an agent’s sensory system,
such that its actions can “destabilise” the world to introduce novel observations. In
robotics and artificial life, the notion of homeokinesis has been proposed as a prin-
ciple for the emergence of (intrinsically motivated) complex behaviour in artificial,
and possibly biological agents (Der and Martius, 2012). Homeokinesis introduces a
notion of prediction error minimisation similar to the one adopted by the free energy
principle and can be seen as closely related to a dynamical systems interpretation of
the FEP (see Chapter 6). However, until the introduction of predictive information
(see below), this framework lacked the flexibility afforded by the mathematical for-
mulations adopted by the FEP (e.g., information/probability theory).
Predictive information Predictive information is a measure of the correlation be-
tween past and future of a variable, more specifically their mutual information (Bialek,
Nemenman, and Tishby, 2001). In the context of adaptive systems, it is proposed to
quantify the total information of past experience that can be used to predict future
events, i.e., , how much past observations help in the prediction of future ones. The
intuition of predictability of future observations behind predictive information is
similar to the one introduced by homeokinesis, and the two frameworks have been
shown to be formally connected Ay et al., 2008. As in the case of empowerment,
predictive information has also been proposed as a possible intrinsic motivation (Ay
et al., 2012; Biehl et al., 2018). Similarly to empowerment, predictive information of-
fers a broader perspective on adaptive behaviour when compared to the formulation
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of the free energy principle adopted here, which in itself offers no effective imple-
mentation of intrinsic motivation mechanisms (see also discussion on dark room in
Little and Sommer (2013)), defining essentially just “reflex-based” or “agency-free”
agents (Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012a). As with the previously dis-
cussed measures, a better comparison could be introduced with the expected free
energy formulation (Friston et al., 2015; Friston et al., 2017) but once again, this will
not be covered in this thesis. See Biehl et al. (2018) for discussion on these ideas.
2.4 The Free Energy Principle (FEP)
Initially proposed by Friston, Kilner, and Harrison (2006) and further discussed in
a series of papers including (Friston, 2009; Friston, 2010b; Friston, 2012; Friston et
al., 2015; Friston et al., 2016a; Friston et al., 2017), the free energy principle (FEP) is
proposed as a unifying brain theory with roots in thermodynamics and statistical
mechanics. According to the FEP, and following Schrödinger classical idea of ne-
gentropy (Schrödinger, 1944), biological systems only exist far from thermodynamic
equilibrium and in some way manage to self-organise and maintain a certain level of
order through homeostatic regulation. The way this is portrayed in Friston’s work
implies that such systems try to minimise the Shannon (information) entropy of their
sensory input which would keep thermodynamic entropy within boundaries (Sen-
gupta, Stemmler, and Friston, 2013; De Ridder, Vanneste, and Freeman, 2014). The
brain is thought to be one such system and the information entropy is in this case
defined as the uncertainty of sensory input (Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006).
In this thesis, I will only tackle the implications of the FEP in the realm of cog-
nitive (neuro)science, trying to place them in the context of ideas reviewed so far in
this chapter. Some of the hypotheses formulated under the FEP, for instance simu-
lations of self-organising systems (Friston, 2013; Friston et al., 2015), will not be part
of my presentation. A full mathematical derivation of the FEP following Buckley et
al. (2017) and discussing some extra matters related to Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and
Daunizeau (2008), Friston (2008b), Friston (2008a), and Friston et al. (2010b) is then
presented in the next chapter, as a methodological background for the presentation
of my results further in this thesis.
As I will show in Chapter 3, under simplifying assumptions, mainly the Laplace
encoding (Buckley et al., 2017), the FEP reduces to predictive coding as proposed by
Rao and Ballard (Rao and Ballard, 1999) and discussed earlier in this chapter (see
also Friston and Kiebel (2009c)). One of the main contributions of the FEP is then the
extension of predictive coding models to accounts of action. The introduction of “ac-
tive inference" (Friston, 2009; Friston et al., 2010a) represents in fact a way to unify
perception and action in a cohesive mathematical framework where differences be-
tween the two of them almost vanish.
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2.4.1 Active inference
If perceptual inference implies that models can be updated to better infer the world,
active inference (Friston, 2009; Friston et al., 2010a) suggests also that acting on the
environment may change it so to be better described by a given model. Active infer-
ence, in fact, introduces a second way in which prediction error, or variational free
energy, could be minimised. In more traditional views of predictive coding, percep-
tion is the only process contributing to the minimisation of prediction errors. On this
view, an agent can only update predictions of its generative model to explain the en-
vironmental causes of those errors and in doing so, the errors will be explained away.
Active inference introduces, in this context, a way for agents to change the signals
representing sensory input to better fit their predictions. Agents thus actively inter-
act with the environment to produce sensations that generative models can predict.
Behaviour is generated through interactions with the world that are defined in terms
that are consistent with the perceptual account of the FEP. Motor commands are ex-
plained as predictions generated by the same generative model at a proprioceptive
level compared with actual proprioceptive input (Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and
Friston, 2013).
2.4.2 Active inference agents
The free energy principle is a relatively recent approach proposed for the study of
cognition and as such, only a relatively small number of models, especially agent-
based ones, have been implemented for the investigation of the claims made in its
formulation. As a proposal for a general theory of brain functioning, most of the
models developed under the FEP or that can be considered aligned with it, are based
on implementations of predictive coding models of cortical functions, for example in
the visual (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Spratling, 2008), auditory
(Baldeweg, 2006) or the motor cortices (Shipp, Adams, and Friston, 2013; Adams,
Shipp, and Friston, 2013). These models are largely focused on explanations and hy-
potheses regarding information processing in the cortex and as such, they emphasise
possible implications for perception and are mostly concerned with building accu-
rate (although mostly functional) descriptions of cortical activity. In line with these
models and the FEP/active inference proposal more in general, the emerging field of
computational psychiatry also attempts to follow a similar route, in this case for the
mechanistic investigation of psychiatric disorders (Montague et al., 2012; Stephan
and Mathys, 2014). My focus in this project is however on building synthetic agents
and thus will be radically different, although working within the same mathematical
framework. Some of the examples of agent-based models based on the FEP are here
reviewed, in particular solutions to the mountain car problem proposed by Friston
and two implementations of novel systems, the linebot and the infotropic machine.
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The mountain car problem
In a series of papers (Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel, 2009; Friston, 2010b; Friston
et al., 2010a; Friston and Ao, 2012; Friston, Adams, and Montague, 2012; Friston,
Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012a), active inference is proposed for the solution
of a classical control problem in reinforcement learning, commonly referred to as
“mountain car" or "park on a hill" problem (Sutton and Barto, 1998). The agent is
in this case a car that needs to drive up one of the two sides of a steep valley after
having been placed at the bottom valley. Its actuators are however under-powered,
so that even at full throttle the car cannot get out on either side. By going full throttle
in one direction first, the car can instead gain enough momentum and swing up to
the opposite side. The solution is considered non-trivial since the agent needs to first
get away from the target location to be able to reach it later on.
Most of the implementations proposed by Friston focus on the definition of ac-
tive inference solutions to this task, often redefining some of the several different
methods used in reinforcement learning to solve the problem. This redefinition en-
tails, essentially, the use of priors on a target location (cf. KL-control, discussed ear-
lier) instead of using value functions as in classic model-free reinforcement learning
(Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel, 2009). It is claimed that this approach generalises
classical model-free reinforcement learning algorithms and optimal control formula-
tions (Friston and Ao, 2012) by replacing value functions with ad-hoc priors and thus
avoiding backward induction typical of path integral approaches defining value as
a function of future states. It is also argued that “itinerant" as opposed to “fixed"
policies, the latter typical of reinforcement learning set ups, can be implemented in
active inference thanks to the formulation of state-space models in generalised co-
ordinates of motion, see Chapter 3. These policies generalise fixed target points by
implementing, essentially, “target trajectories” (see Chapter 6) and allow for the def-
inition of chaotic behaviour and exploration/foraging similar to what is found in
insects (Friston, Adams, and Montague, 2012). While interesting for its generalisa-
tions of fixed target states, this formulation is deeply problematic since it assumes
pre-existing knowledge of appropriate policies that can be effectively implemented
by an agent (Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel, 2009; Friston and Ao, 2012). Friston of-
ten argues that these policies emerge on longer (evolutionary) time-scales (Friston,
2010a; Friston and Ao, 2012) but, practically, this nativist proposal doesn’t explain
how they came about if not in terms of tautological and self-referential arguments
of the kind: if they didn’t, such systems wouldn’t be there to begin with. Moreover,
most of these implementations assume a very deep isomorphism between the phys-
ical laws of the (virtual) world defined as generative process, and the agent’s encoding
of such mechanisms, i.e., the generative model. From a detailed analysis of all the cited
papers implementing solutions to the mountain car problem under active inference,
I then propose to group solutions based on three different approaches for which I
highlight features and limitations.
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Ad-hoc environments In Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel (2009) and Friston et al.
(2010a), the agent is placed in a ad-hoc environment built specifically for training
and explicitly called “controlled environment". This simulated environment imple-
ments a generative process, the set of physical laws describing the environment,
different from the ones adopted in the original problem formulation. These laws are
found independently by the experimenter (Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel, 2009) via
a minimisation of a KL divergence between desired and controller environments, as
in KL-control (Kappen, Gómez, and Opper, 2012). Effectively, this method solves
the task independently and outside of the simulation, and is used for the purpose
of an initial phase of (supervised) training. Once the expected behaviour is learnt
in this fictitious environment and encoded by the agent in terms of priors, the same
agent is then placed back into the original simulated world where it acts based on
these now fixed (and strong) priors. It remains unclear how the problem could be
solved without such “controlled environment”, as defined by the authors. Using this
approach, in fact, the authors effectively built the optimal environment for training
which clearly takes away much of the burden from the agent as admittedly stated in
Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel (2009): “...it could be said that we have done all the
hard work in creating a controlled environment; in the sense that this specifies an
optimum policy, given a desired equilibrium density (i.e., , value function of states).
This may be true but the key point here is that the agent does not need to optimise a
policy...".
Complex itinerant policies In Friston (2010b) and Friston and Ao (2012), the au-
thors show an example of itinerant policies in generalised coordinates of motion. In
Friston (2010b) an agent is provided with a prior that essentially encodes a belief in a
world with “negative friction” away from its target outside the valley. The car thus
explores the environment in an attempt to constantly increase its acceleration and
velocity due to its beliefs about the effects of a (fictitious) negative friction. To do
so, it will start moving from side to side: the only way to implement beliefs about a
force essentially pushing it around, and eventually reach the target position where
the prior encodes instead a strong friction in order to stop the car. A smart initialisa-
tion of the position of the car halfway up the hill ensures then the initial movement
and a prompt solution to the problem. In Friston and Ao (2012), the authors im-
plement a time-dependent constraint in analogy to “satiety”, simulating goals that
are interesting for the agent only for a limited time and thus promoting exploration,
solving the mountain car problem indirectly. The agent wants to get out of the val-
ley but gets stuck on one side, satiety decreases after a short time and changes the
prior/desire to make the opposite side more interesting and allowing the car to gain
momentum by going full throttle into the opposite direction. Satiety then increases,
making all states equally attractive and thus forcing the agent to explore as many of
them as possible, which will quickly make satiety go down once again, etc.. A new
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cycle will thus start, with the car attracted by an itinerant fixed point that periodi-
cally appears/disappears. As pointed out previously, it remains unclear to imagine
how both these complex prior beliefs, negative friction and satiety, would emerge
from simple interactions of an agent with the environment. More experiments could
shed light on this idea, prescribing some mechanisms of learning with almost no
initial knowledge available as in standard model-free reinforcement learning (Sut-
ton and Barto, 1998). In Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague (2012a) the authors
attempt to bypass this problem by assuming that learning must be supervised with
ad-hoc pre-built environments playing the role of teachers and perfect representa-
tions of the world learnt by an agent, as previously done in Friston, Daunizeau, and
Kiebel (2009) and Friston et al. (2010a). The authors state: “One might ask where
these worlds come from. The answer is that they are created by teachers, parents
and conspecifics. In robotics and engineering, the equivalent learning requires the
agent to be shown how to perform a task” (Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague,
2012a). However this can only account for supervised learning, imitation, which
represents but one possible way agents can learn about their milieu. This perspec-
tive is shared in various areas of machine learning and robotics but it certainly does
not help defining mechanisms by which systems learn to actively interact with the
environment without explicit, external supervision.
POMDP implementations In Friston, Adams, and Montague (2012) and Friston,
Samothrakis, and Montague (2012a), the focus shifts towards discrete implemen-
tations of the problem showing the formal equivalence between optimal control
in Partially Observable Markov Decision Problems (POMDP) and active inference
processes. In these papers, the authors show that given a target location (outside
the valley) and a set of transition/output matrices implementing how states change
over time with different actions and how these related to observations, the optimi-
sation process can be cast as Bayesian inference. However, once again the agent is
equipped with an accurate generative model with transition/output matrices mir-
roring the actual description of the mountain car problem. The presence of known
transition/output matrices allows to bypass the problem of learning complicated
priors replacing value functions and defining a model over which policies are de-
termined. In continuous-times set ups, this formulation remains ill-defined and it
is not very clear how the same process could be implemented in a computation-
ally affordable way. As some of the same authors suggest, this formulation may
be complementary to the continuous one adopted in this thesis (Parr and Friston,
2018c), proposing that decision making problems are, perhaps, intrinsically discrete
in nature and only peripheral functions/reflexive behaviour need to be modelled as
continuous.
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The linebot
The “linebot" is an agent-based model inspired by the FEP proposed in McGregor,
Baltieri, and Buckley (2015). An agent moves in a one dimensional toroidal world
with a source of chemical whose concentration decays away from the position it is
placed. The agent is provided with one sensor that provides a single bit of informa-
tion, namely high or low reading of the chemical with a probability proportional to
its concentration. The agent is implemented with a desire system that represents its
preference to settle down at a specified position with an appropriate concentration
for its own survival. The task is made hard by the fact that the agent starts with no
information about its own location, information that can only be inferred by moving
and sensing different levels of the chemical. On top of that, the line world presented
in McGregor, Baltieri, and Buckley (2015) implements a symmetrical spatial decay,
meaning that pairs of different positions will give the same probabilistic encoding of
the sensory reading. The space is discretised in order to allow a simplified but well-
defined behaviour by this agent, moving in its environment by fixed spatial units.
Within the same unit, the chemical level is kept constant.
Following this set up, a series of simulations were presented mainly for didac-
tic purposes in order to investigate different aspects of the FEP. The example is also
simple enough to allow exact Bayesian inference, compared in one of the simula-
tions to the variational approximation used by the FEP. Some other approximations
are, however, not considered (mainly the Laplace assumption, see Chapter 3). The
authors, in this case, proceed with the minimisation of variational free energy by
exhaustive computation of probabilities of all possible states and actions, making
scalability an issue (simulations on a 3-by-3 two dimensional grid took already a
few hours). While extremely useful for initial exploratory research, in this set up
there is thus little room for the implementation of more complex behaviours. In
the continuous case, to make the optimisation tractable, assumptions such as the
Laplace encoding are usually included, together with gradient descent methods for
the efficient optimisation of the free energy functional (Buckley et al., 2017). In the
discrete case (extending the formulation to expected free energy), the equations for
the minimisation of free energy are either determined analytically (Friston et al.,
2015) or follow the same idea of gradient descents (Friston et al., 2017). Further-
more, the linebot in McGregor, Baltieri, and Buckley (2015) implements a genera-
tive model faithfully encoding the generative process/laws of the environment. A
different example comes from my MSc dissertation (Baltieri, 2014), where I made
explicit assumptions about an agent having limited resources, building a factorised
hierarchical generative model of the environment, showing that even with simpler
encodings this agent can still find its position in the environment. My work at the
time did not, however, implement behaviour through active inference, having just
some simple ad-hoc rule for moving towards the target, rendering those simulations
not comparable to results presented in this thesis.
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The infotropic machine
The infotropic machine is a model proposed by Thornton (2016). “Infotropic" is the
definition given to characterise information seeking systems (Thornton, 2014). The
author’s approach is rooted in information theory and provides a different set of ini-
tial assumptions with respect to other PP/FEP agent systems. In this work, Bayesian
computations are not explicitly involved, although one could argue that some of
the agent’s functions can be interpreted under a Bayesian framework anyway. As
an example implementation, the author provides an implementation of Braitenberg
vehicle 3a “permanent love" (Braitenberg, 1986), described as a hierarchical predic-
tion machine. This vehicle approaches the source of the stimulus (light or chemical)
while slowing down, stopping at the source, as in the classical formulation. The in-
fotropic version of this vehicle implements a controller that essentially predicts the
permanent love behaviour through the application of hierarchical message passing
in a network of nodes computing a newly defined information measure: information
payoff. This quantity is proposed as an alternative to the KL divergence typically
used in variational inference schemes (see Chapter 3) to measure the informational
value of a prediction, and its maximisation as an alternative to the minimisation of
variational free energy. As in the case of the KL divergence, information payoff is
also not a metric, since it is defined on the interval [−1, 1], but unlike the KL mea-
sure, well explained in information geometrical terms for Riemann manifolds with
a Fisher metric (Amari, 2016), it remains unclear how information payoff would be-
have, in general, over a probability space.
As stated by the author, some of the components presented in other PP/FEP
frameworks are missing, namely: error units, feedforward error signals and preci-
sions. The author then raises a few important questions regarding the necessity of
such components. For instance even if different sub-populations of neurons have
been empirically confirmed, the architecture describing error units as physically
separate from prediction units (c.f. deep and superficial pyramidal cells in Friston
(2008a)) remains largely an hypothesis. It is also unclear what feedforward and feed-
back signals exactly convey (Spratling, 2013; Spratling, 2017), with the more popu-
lar implementation by Rao and Ballard representing at most a functional model of
cortical processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999), over which some hypotheses on neuro-
physiological implementations have been formulated, see for instance Bastos et al.
(2012) and Keller and Mrsic-Flogel (2018). On the other hand, the dismissal of pre-
cisions is something that I consider more problematic. Precisions, in the FEP frame-
work, represent a weighting mechanism for prediction errors that assigns a level of
confidence based on estimates of external noise and internal fluctuations, and pri-
ors/desires. Thornton (2016) suggests to combine precisions with the very quantity
they should provide a weight for, in this case not prediction errors but informational
value units. He specifically argues that: “A prediction error calculated with zero
confidence translates into an informational value of zero bits, for example." (Thorn-
ton, 2016). He then proposes that his definition of information payoff captures both
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concepts into a single measure. However this seems to miss out on a few impor-
tant matters. For instance, the fact that some non-zero prediction errors may simply
be non-zero and that only their weights vary over time (Brown et al., 2013), intro-
ducing thus more degrees of freedom. More in general, generative models can be
multivariate and can present correlations between different variables than are well
captured by precisions (inverse COvariances matrices). The author’s interpretation
may be relevant in a univariate case or in multivariate scenarios with uncorrelated
variables, but the argument needs further investigation.
Other models
Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague (2012a) and Friston et al. (2015) introduced an
extension of the FEP that includes beliefs about control states, fictitious actions, that
are inferred by minimising expected free energy in the future. Unlike the formula-
tion used in this project, in this more general framework activities like planning can
emerge while inferring states of the world. In this set up, the agent’s beliefs get re-
fined with more incoming information (reducing epistemic uncertainty), allowing
then the optimisation of policies to afford the minimisation of expected free energy
about the future. Thanks to this approach, the authors suggest that they can for-
mulate planning and the exploration/exploitation trade-off as emerging from the
minimisation of expected free energy. It is also claimed that this trade-off can be
“solved” (“Formally speaking, we resolve the exploration-exploitation dilemma by
endowing agents with prior beliefs that they will minimize the expected free energy
of future outcomes.” Friston et al. (2015)) but effectively, agents are simply provided
with appropriate priors under which this dilemma is already “solved”. Over the
last few years, several agent-based models have been implemented under this ex-
tended formulation. For example, Friston et al. (2015) show a virtual rat moving in a
T-shaped maze. The rat is initially placed between the two upper arms of the maze.
To find a reward in one of the arms, the rat needs to move back to the lower end of T-
maze and acquire information about the reward’s position, placed in one of the other
two arms. The work presented in this paper is very promising since it tries to explain
planning in terms of inference via the minimisation of expected free energy, extend-
ing work such as Attias (2003) and Botvinick and Toussaint (2012). The generative
model, and especially the priors, are still largely provided but the authors suggest
ways of dealing with the more general problem of learning by including an intrinsic
drive to explore to solve epistemic uncertainty. The extension of this framework in
terms of expectations of variational free energy, as pointed out in the Introduction,
lies outside the scope of this thesis but constitutes, nonetheless, an interesting venue
for future research. Some interesting directions include, for instance, an integration
of the discrete expected free energy formulation and the continuous one (Parr and
Friston, 2018c) and its meaning for theories of intrinsic motivation (Biehl et al., 2018).
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Friston’s group proposed also other models that are sometimes referred as agents
but that effectively lack some of the commonly features of agent-based models, es-
pecially the presence of a clear and distinctive “environment” as separate from an
entity defined as “agent” (Barandiaran, Di Paolo, and Rohde, 2009). Examples of this
kind include work on Lorenz attractors, one of simplest models of chaotic systems
(Friston et al., 2010a; Friston and Ao, 2012). A hierarchy of Lorenz attractors is also
then implemented to model the inference of hidden properties in birdsongs (Kiebel,
Daunizeau, and Friston, 2008; Friston and Kiebel, 2009a). An interesting point for
this thesis is nonetheless found in Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel (2009), where the
authors built an “agent” whose generative model is represented by a Lorenz attrac-
tor, interacting with a “world” described by dynamics that simply settle to equilib-
rium over time, i.e., no chaotic behaviour. Strong prior beliefs by the agent attempt-
ing to impose chaotic behaviour on the environment through the injection of input
(i.e., action) in the dynamical system governing the dynamics of the world, allow
this “world” to behave like a Lorenz attractor itself. While stretching the definition
of agent-environment systems, this implementation represents one of the few ex-
amples (the other one found in Schwartenbeck et al. (2015)) where active inference
is specifically applied in the context of coupled dynamical systems (a generative
model and a generative process, “agent” and “environment”) that are different in
some nontrivial way, with one of them effectively driving the dynamics of the other
(see also Chapter 5).
Some other implementations (Friston, 2013; Friston et al., 2015), again led by
Friston’s group, focus on hypotheses of self-organisation formulated under the FEP
and give examples of how protocells might have formed out of very simple physical
and chemical interactions in ways consistent with the FEP. Since this part of the
theory is not discussed here, the “agents” implemented in this line of research will
also not be examined.
2.5 Conclusion
Embodied, enactive, embedded and extended (4E) theories of the mind highlight
the importance of sensorimotor loops, the presence of feedback from the environ-
ment, the distributed nature of cognition and a lack of explicit symbolic manip-
ulations in agents. In this chapter I gave an overview of some of these ideas in
light of cybernetics proposals for the study teleological systems as if they were con-
trollers/regulators, emerging for example in Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow (1943)
and Conant and Ashby (1970), that inspired some core ideas of 4E theories. I also
discussed then some potential limitations of the explicit connection I make between
4E and cybernetics, operationalising my definition of model for an agent. Some
areas of 4E theories seem to reject ideas deeply rooted in (optimal) control and espe-
cially work on teleology (Di Paolo, 2005; Froese and Ziemke, 2009) as addressed in
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow (1943), thought to be problematic because of the
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presence of extrinsic ideas such as value. In the formulation of the free energy princi-
ple however, value is replaced by the minimisation of sensory surprisal proposed to
implement intrinsic drives (in the form of priors) for different living systems (Fris-
ton, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Friston, 2010b; Friston, 2012).
Using this point to support investigations of the FEP within 4E views in the next
chapters, I then extensively reviewed some of the most prominent modern theories
of action and perception, placing them in the context of control and estimation the-
ory. In particular, from the inception of optimal control theory in the last century,
control theorists and engineers have sought to study problems of regulation using a
combination of estimation or inference and control (Åström, 1970; Stengel, 1994). The
former is proposed to identify and recover features of systems to be regulated in the
absence of direct observations of relevant variables, the latter to build effective regu-
lators once enough information on the system to control is available. In the cognitive
sciences, similar approaches are nowadays proposed with the goal to describe and
potentially explain processes of perception as inference and action as (optimal) control.
The core of this chapter reviewed these proposals in detail and set the ground for a
conceptual introduction of the free energy principle and active inference. The free
energy principle was thus briefly explained, highlighting in particular its attempt
to unify theories of perception as inference and action as control in the cognitive
sciences where the two lines of research are still fundamentally disjoint. In the re-
mainder of the chapter, I then considered in detail several agent-based models pro-
posed in the literature under the free energy principle and that can be compared to
the models that I will introduce later in the thesis, especially in my attempt to make
explicit connections to 4E theories. A full presentation of the FEP must include the
necessary mathematical tools and is thus provided in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Methods
3.1 A mathematical formulation of the free energy principle
The free energy principle rests on the idea that all biological systems must avoid
dispersion in order to survive. In thermodynamics, entropy represents the degree of
energy dispersal of a system, and following the second law, the entropy of a thermo-
dynamically closed system cannot, on average, decrease over time. According to the
FEP, living systems can only exist by resisting the effects of, i.e., (locally) minimis-
ing, entropy (Friston, 2012; Friston, 2013; Ramstead, Badcock, and Friston, 2017), an
idea inspired by Shröedinger’s inception of negentropy production to describe life
(Schrödinger, 1944) and previous ideas by Clausius, Kelvin and Boltzmann among
others (Boltzmann, 1974). The argument initially built on the second law is then
better framed in terms of the fluctuation theorems for non-equilibrium thermody-
namics: for open, dissipative systems (cf. closed ones for the second law), entropy
can locally decrease with a certain probability, see for instance (Evans and Searles,
2002). Since direct measures of entropy in a thermodynamic sense are not accessible
by an agent, the FEP proposes in its place the minimisation of information or Shan-
non (differential) entropy of the states ψ perceived by an agent (De Ridder, Vanneste,
and Freeman, 2014), defined as:
H(ψ) = −
∫
ψ
p(ψ) ln p(ψ) dψ (3.1)
By decreasing the number of states it observes and thus the Shannon entropy of
its observations, it is claimed that an agent also reduces the number of the physi-
cal states it can physically occupy, i.e., the agent minimises its own thermodynamic
entropy by staying in a limited amount of states where only a limited amount of ob-
servations are available (Sengupta, Stemmler, and Friston, 2013)1. The information
entropy of observations ψ itself is also not directly accessible by an agent, since it re-
quires an integration over the ensemble of all the possible observed variables. With
an ergodic assumption (Friston, 2012), equating the integration over an ensemble
with an integration over time (i.e., the mean of the ensemble is equal to the average
1This connection appears problematic and will be discussed in the general Conclusions.
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over time), however
H(ψ) = −
∫
ψ
p(ψ) ln p(ψ) dψ = − 1
T
∫ T
0
p(ψ) ln p(ψ) dt (3.2)
The free energy principle attempts to capture the existence of living systems in terms
of global, pullback attractors in ergodic random dynamical systems with trajectories
not undergoing phase transitions that would disrupt an agent, changing its descrip-
tion or worse, causing its death (Friston and Ao, 2012; Friston, 2012; Colombo and
Wright, 2018). An intuitive example of this idea comes from homeostatic regulation
of living systems and the maintenance of their essential variables within boundaries
(Ashby, 1957). Following the ergodic assumption in equation (3.2), the (differential)
entropy is now equal to the time average of surprisal, or self-information:
− ln p(ψ) (3.3)
All the measures defined so far omit, for simplicity, a conditional on the probabil-
ity of states ψ: in the more general, Bayesian, case one should in fact write them
as depending on a model or agent m (Robert, 2007; Friston, Thornton, and Clark,
2012; Barto, Mirolli, and Baldassarre, 2013). Intuitively, agents can share the same
observations ψ but the description of the associated surprisal should be different:
conditions of low surprisal for a fish, which express the set of states for its survival
such as being in water, are not the same for a tiger, an oak tree or a bird, see also
Kolchinsky and Wolpert (2018) for a review on ideas regarding the semantics or
value of information. The more complete form of surprisal is thus defined as:
− ln p(ψ|m) (3.4)
but the conditional on m will mostly be omitted to simplify the notation. Under the
free energy principle, biological systems must minimise their sensory surprisal over
time. This minimisation is however intractable in any practical scenario, surprisal
can in fact be seen as the negative log-model evidence or negative log-marginal like-
lihood of observations ψ, where the marginal likelihood is defined as:
p(ψ) =
∫
ϑ
p(ψ, ϑ) dϑ (3.5)
This integral is defined over all possible hidden (i.e., unobserved) states, inputs
(sometimes referred to as “causes”) and parameters/hyperparameters ϑ of obser-
vations ψ (see table 3.1). In many cases, the marginalisation is intractable since the
latent space of ϑ can be high dimensional or the distribution can have a complex
(analytical) form. In statistical mechanics, an approximation under variational for-
mulations transforms this into an optimisation problem. The approximation goes
by several names, including variational Bayes and ensemble learning (Hinton and
Zemel, 1994; Dayan et al., 1995; Beal, 2003; MacKay, 2003; Wainwright, Jordan, et
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al., 2008; Bishop, 2006), and constitutes the mathematical basis of the free energy
principle. Using variational Bayes, surprisal can be decomposed into (Bishop, 2006):
− ln p(ψ) = F −DKL(q(ϑ) || p(ϑ|ψ)) (3.6)
where
DKL(q(ϑ) || p(ϑ|ψ)) =
∫
q(ϑ) ln
q(ϑ)
p(ϑ|ψ) dϑ (3.7)
and
F ≡
∫
q(ϑ) ln
q(ϑ)
p(ϑ, ψ)
dϑ (3.8)
In equation (3.7) we define the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (Kullback and Leibler,
1951; Bishop, 2006), also known as relative entropy or information gain, an asymmet-
rical non-negative measure of the difference between two probability distributions.
In this case, the two distributions are p(ϑ|ψ), the posterior distribution specifying the
probability of hidden states, inputs and (hyper)parameters ϑ given observations ψ,
and q(ϑ), a variational or recognition density. The latter, q(ϑ), is introduced with the
idea of approximating the former, p(ϑ|ψ), which is defined using Bayes theorem and
therefore depends on the marginal likelihood, making it intractable. This approx-
imation entails the use of a simpler, known distribution q(ϑ) in order to minimise
the difference between q(ϑ) and p(ϑ|ψ) through the KL divergence: when the differ-
ence is zero (the divergence is always non-negative), q(ϑ) is a perfect description of
p(ϑ|ψ). From the point of view of an agent, the process is proposed to be analogous:
to explain the hidden states, inputs and (hyper)parameters of sensations, p(ϑ|ψ),
by approximating the posterior with a known distribution, q(ϑ). The other term,
F , is defined in equation (3.8) and for its mathematical analogies with Helmholtz
free energy in thermodynamics, it is named variational free energy (Friston, Trujillo-
Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Friston, 2008a; Friston et al., 2010b; Buckley et al.,
2017), or (negative) evidence lower bound in machine learning (Bishop, 2006). Fol-
lowing Jensen’s inequality, specifying that the KL divergence is always non-negative
(Bishop, 2006), we get that:
DKL(q(ϑ) || p(ϑ|ψ)) ≥ 0⇒ F ≥ − ln p(ψ) (3.9)
thus defining variational free energy as an upper bound to surprisal, since by min-
imisingF we are guaranteed to minimise− ln p(ψ). The divergenceDKL(q(ϑ)||p(ϑ|ψ))
expresses the fact that the more we know about hidden states, inputs and (hy-
per)parameters ϑ of observations ψ, the more we minimise the surprise of observa-
tions ψ since good approximations q(ϑ) to the true posterior p(ϑ|ψ) make the diver-
gence go to zero. If we knew exactly the hidden states, inputs and (hyper)parameters
ϑ, such that q(ϑ) = p(ϑ|ψ), thenDKL(q(ϑ) ||p(ϑ|ψ)) = 0 and following equation (3.8),
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we would have direct access to the surprisal since − ln p(ψ) = F .
The free energy F can also be rewritten in two alternative forms, providing dif-
ferent interpretations on its minimisation. The first one specifies F as
F =
∫
q(ϑ) ln
q(ϑ)
p(ϑ, ψ)
dϑ =
∫
q(ϑ) ln
q(ϑ)
p(ϑ)
dϑ−
∫
q(ϑ) ln p(ψ|ϑ dϑ)
= DKL(q(ϑ) || p(ϑ))− Eq
[
ln p(ψ|ϑ)] (3.10)
where the first term represents a measure of model complexity (cf. “Occam factor”
(MacKay, 2003)) under a variational approximation generalising indexes such as the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). With Gaussian/Laplace assumptions, as we
will see later, this complexity term reduces to the number of degrees of freedom
of a model (Bishop, 2006). This definition is also related to Bayesian surprise (Itti
and Baldi, 2009), as the difference between the variational density (i.e., the approx-
imate posterior, cf. the real posterior in Bayesian surprise) and the prior on hidden
states, inputs and parameters/hyperparameters, or the degrees of freedom of a sys-
tem adopting a specific variational density. The second term expresses an accuracy
measure in terms of the (negative) expected log-likelihood of the observations ψ.
Under this decomposition, we can see that minimising variational free energy is
equivalent to minimising the complexity of a model while maximising its accuracy
(Daunizeau, 2017). The second form expresses variational free energy as
F =
∫
q(ϑ) ln
q(ϑ)
p(ϑ, ψ)
dϑ =
∫
q(ϑ)
(− ln p(ϑ, ψ)) dϑ+ ∫ q(ϑ) ln q(ϑ) dϑ =
= Eq
[− ln p(ψ, ϑ)]−H(q(ψ)) (3.11)
where the last term is the negative Shannon entropy of the observations and the first
one can be seen, in analogy with formulations in thermodynamics (see also the Max-
Ent principle in Jaynes (1957a) and Jaynes (1957b)), as an “energy” term averaged
over the variational density q(ϑ). This last formulation is then usually adopted for
the definition of process theories that can provide algorithmic implementations for
the minimisation of free energy, such as predictive coding (Friston and Kiebel, 2009c)
and active inference (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Friston, 2008a;
Buckley et al., 2017).
3.1.1 The generative density
To evaluate the variational free energy F for a system, we must formalise a genera-
tive density p(ϑ, ψ) and a recognition density q(ϑ) specific to an agent. Starting from
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the former, we define a generative model formulated as a one dimensional gener-
alised state-space model (Friston, 2008a):
x˙ = x′ = f(x, v) + w
x˙′ = x′′ = fx(x, v)x′ + fv(x, v)v′ + w′
x˙′′ = x′′′ = fx(x, v)x′′ + fv(x, v)v′′ + w′′
...
ψ = g(x, v) + z
ψ′ = gx(x, v)x′ + gv(x, v)v′ + z′
ψ′′ = gx(x, v)x′′ + gv(x, v)v′′ + z′′
... (3.12)
where ψ are the observations and where we expand ϑ = {x, v, θ, γ}, defining x as the
hidden states and v as the exogenous inputs, while θ and γ, parameters and hyperpa-
rameters of g(·) and f(·), are still not explicitly represented here for simplicity and in-
troduced later. Functions g(·) and f(·) map hidden states/inputs to observations and
the dynamics of hidden states/inputs respectively. The prime signs, e.g., x′, x′′, x′′′
are used to define the generalised state of a variable. Generalised coordinates of mo-
tion are introduced to represent more general non-Markovian continuous stochastic
processes (Stratonovich, 1967; Jazwinski, 1970; Friston, 2008a). Non-Markovian pro-
cesses drop the assumption made in Ito’s formulation of stochastic calculus, where
the autocorrelation of a stochastic process can be seen as a delta function, represent-
ing discrete jumps (Jazwinski, 1970; Fox, 1987). Active inference schemes on the
other hand, adopt a Stratonovich interpretation (Stratonovich, 1967), with smooth,
continuous stochastic variables having finite, non-zero autocorrelation functions. In
this light, random processes can be described as analytic (i.e., differentiable) and be-
come better approximations of real-world (weakly) coloured noise (Fox, 1987; Van
Kampen, 1992; Klöden and Platen, 1992; Friston, 2008a). With this formulation, it is
then possible to define higher “orders of motion”, or embedding orders, that encode,
altogether, a trajectory for each of the variables used in this formulation. One could
think of them as quantities conveying information about “velocity” (e.g., (·)′), “accel-
eration” (e.g., (·)′′), etc. for each variable. For practical purposes, in equation (3.12)
we’ve also taken a local linearity approximation on higher embedding orders sup-
pressing nonlinear terms as suggested in (Friston, 2008a; Buckley et al., 2017) (i.e.,
ignoring high-order derivatives such as gxx(x, v), fxx(x, v), gxxx(x, v), fxxx(x, v), . . . ).
We introduce then a more compact form:
x˜′ = f(x˜, v˜) + w˜
ψ˜ = g(x˜, v˜) + z˜ (3.13)
Chapter 3. Methods 47
where the tilde sign (e.g., ψ˜) summarises the generalised state, a variable and its
higher orders of motion (e.g., ψ˜ = {ψ,ψ′, ψ′′, . . . }). The stochastic model in equa-
tion (3.12) can then be described in terms of a generative density where we make
now explicit the dependence on variables θ, γ:
P (ψ˜, x˜, v˜, θ, γ) = P (ψ˜|x˜, v˜, θ, γ)P (x˜, v˜, θ, γ). (3.14)
P (ψ|x, v; θ, γ) is a likelihood function describing the measurement law in equation (3.13),
while the prior P (x˜, v˜; θ, γ) describes the system’s dynamics. In this formulation, we
assume that parameters θ and hyperparameters γ can, in the most general case, be
represented as time-varying quantities on a slower time scale, defining θ as parame-
ters coupling hidden states and inputs to hidden states dynamics and observations,
and hyperparameters γ as encoding properties of random fluctuations w˜ and noise
z˜. In practice, it is often assumed that these quantities are (nearly) static variables,
allowing for equation (3.14) to be expressed as
P (ψ˜, x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = P (ψ˜|x˜, v˜; θ, γ)P (x˜, v˜; θ, γ) (3.15)
using semicolons to highlight the fact that θ, γ are not random variables and don’t
change over time (or at least not as quickly as x˜, v˜) and that the conditional de-
pendence does not apply to these variables. For most of the example applications
presented in this thesis, I will use the simplified formulation in equation (3.15), but
in Chapter 6 it will be crucial to consider (slowly) time-varying hyperparameters as
represented in equation (3.14).
3.1.2 The variational density
At this stage, Friston proposes three different mathematical formulations incorpo-
rating different combinations of two approximations on the variational density q(ϑ):
• a mean-field partition of the unknowns ϑ based on their time scale, short
for rapidly changing hidden states x and inputs v, longer for fixed or slowly
changing parameters and hyperparameters θ, γ (Friston, 2008a; Buckley et al.,
2017) and
• a Laplace assumption constraining the form of the variational density to a
Gaussian q(ϑ) (Beal, 2003; Friston et al., 2007).
These three approaches go by the names of Dynamic Expectation Maximisation
(DEM) (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008), Variational filtering (VF)
(Friston, 2008b) and Generalised filtering (GF) (Friston et al., 2010b).
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Dynamic Expectation Maximisation (DEM)
Dynamic Expectation Maximisation (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008)
is a general variational framework for the estimation of unknown variables in a dy-
namical context. DEM combines a mean-field approximation on the set of unknown
variables and a Laplace approximation of the generative density p(ψ, ϑ) using a
Gaussian form for the variational density q(ϑ) (Beal, 2003; Friston et al., 2007). With
a mean-field partition of variables based on a separation of different time-scales, the
set of slowly changing parameters and hyperparameters are treated as condition-
ally independent with respect to hidden states and inputs of a stochastic dynamical
system. In this light, while hidden states and inputs minimise the variational free en-
ergy, parameters and hyperparameters are assumed to minimise the path integral of
the free energy since they are “fixed” for a long time scale. In DEM, this path integral
is explicitly calculated and its results stored, with estimates of hidden states and in-
puts computed after each new observation, while parameters and hyperparameters
are optimised only after a suitable amount of steps have been integrated and enough
(model) evidence accumulated (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008).
The standard Laplace assumption approximates a distribution with a Gaussian
density, meaning that only mean and variance (for a univariate case, otherwise the
covariance matrix) need to be determined since they constitute a set of sufficient
statistics. By finding the MAP estimate (i.e., the mode of a distribution), equal to
the mean for Gaussian densities, and using a Taylor expansion around the mode,
the variance is then analytically determined as the Hessian of an energy function
(MacKay, 2003) evaluated at the mode (MacKay, 2003; Beal, 2003; Bishop, 2006;
Friston et al., 2007; Särkkä, 2013). Traditionally, the Laplace method has been used
in machine learning and statistics in an “offline” fashion, i.e., by first finding the
mode of an available set of observations (ψ), and only then applying the approxi-
mation. The Laplace method generates a Gaussian distribution (rather than a point
estimate, like MLE or MAP (Beal, 2003)) approximating an interval around the point
with highest density of a distribution, i.e., its mode. Since it relies on MAP esti-
mates however, it also suffers from the same weaknesses, mainly the problem that
the mode may be representing the peak but not the mass of a distribution (Beal,
2003; Bishop, 2006). In DEM, the Laplace approximation is applied “online”, fitting
a Gaussian distribution around the local estimate of the mode updated over time
while new observations are introduced (Penny, Kiebel, and Friston, 2006; Friston
et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2017). This allows the tracking of the mode of a distri-
bution encoding time-varying dynamics, see the case for active inference where the
distribution of observations ψ can be updated by an agent through action. With the
optimal variance computed analytically, the minimisation of variational free energy
is then reduced to a process of minimisation with respect to means/modes of the
Laplace-approximated free energy updated, usually, via gradient descent (Friston,
Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008). However, this application of the Laplace as-
sumption remains somewhat unclear in Friston’s work, since the Laplace method is
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a good approximation only around the peak (MAP) of a distribution (MacKay, 2003;
Bishop, 2006), a condition met only when the free energy is minimised by finding the
optimal mean/mode of the approximate distribution. The “online” approximation
proposed by Friston is, in this sense, not as clearly defined as the more traditional
applications of the Laplace method, and its behaviour is less clear during its updates
over time and away from equilibrium (see also section 3.1.3).
DEM can be seen as an extension of the Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algo-
rithm (Baum and Eagon, 1967; Dempster, Laird, and Rubin, 1977) to handle stochas-
tic rather than deterministic (i.e., known) dynamics with no fluctuations, and of
Kalman filtering (Kalman, 1960b; Kalman and Bucy, 1961) to extend the estimation
process to inputs (inputs), parameters and hyperparameters in generalised coor-
dinates of motion with no Markov assumptions on random variables. DEM ap-
proaches are thought to generalise also the combined efforts of Kalman filtering
and parameters estimation through EM such as the ones proposed by Roweis and
Ghahramani (2001) and Beal (2003) with the introduction of generalised coordinates
of motion for the treatment of coloured noise, although in principle one can re-
write coloured noise as an auto-regressive (AR) process with an explicit treatment of
stochastic variables still based on white noise where Kalman filtering theory applies
(Friston, 2008a; Chui and Chen, 2017).
Variational filtering (VF)
Variational filtering generalises DEM by dropping the Laplace assumption, and thus
extending the variational approximation to multimodal distributions in a dynamic
context among others. VF gives a different perspective on stochastic approaches to
the approximation of the posterior distribution p(ϑ|ψ). These approaches, usually
based on sequential Monte Carlo sampling procedures, or particle filters, approxi-
mate a distribution by sampling a set of “particles” or candidate solutions from an
approximate distribution of the posterior (Chen, 2003; Doucet and Johansen, 2009).
These particles are then used to estimate the expected value of the observations (for
each particle) and by comparing those expectations to the true observations. Pa-
rameters of the candidate approximate distribution are then updated based on the
deviation or error of these particles from true observations. The most popular im-
plementations also include a re-sampling step where particles with a low probability
are regularly replaced by new ones from an updated version of the approximate pos-
terior. By introducing a formulation in generalised coordinates of motion, VF drops
the Markov assumption of particle filters, constraining the particles trajectories in
the phase space with assumptions on higher embedding orders. This ensemble of
candidate solutions then converges towards the true solution under the assumption
that the dynamics of the observations ψ are slower than the ones of the optimisation
process (i.e., a gradient descent procedure) (Friston, 2008b). The re-sampling phase,
often used for practical purposes of fast convergence in particle filters, is thus unnec-
essary in variational filtering approaches since trajectories of the particles are better
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guided by constraints on their generalised motion (Friston, 2008b). As its Markovian
counterpart however, VF is a computationally expensive procedure, which makes it
potentially implausible for biological implementations, however see Sanborn and
Chater (2016) for a different perspective on sampling methods in the brain.
Generalised filtering (GF)
Generalised filtering maintains a Laplace approximation of the posterior but drops
the mean-field approximation based on time scales separation, allowing for condi-
tional dependence between parameters/hyperparameters and hiddens states/inputs
(Friston et al., 2010b). The main difference with DEM is that the integration of the
variational free energy necessary to accommodate the minimisation of “fixed” pa-
rameters and hyperparameters is carried out implicitly in this case. Rather than
minimising slowly changing variables by accumulating evidence over time and op-
timise these variables after a number of observations, GF approximates this process
via a second order minimisation with respect to free energy, rather than a first order
one on its path integral. The main assumption is that the variational free energy
is smooth for changes of parameters and hyperparameters (Friston et al., 2010b),
in some ways similar to the separation of times scales of DEM but less restrictive
(e.g., no offline phase). For the derivation of an algorithmic implementation of vari-
ational free energy minimisation, i.e., active inference, in the remainder of the thesis
I will focus on approaches implementing a Laplace approximation of the variational
density, DEM and GF. The differences will be minimal until the optimisation of pa-
rameters and hyperparameters is considered (see Chapter 6), and in that case my
agent-based models will make use of the GF formulation.
3.1.3 The Laplace assumption
Following the derivation in Buckley et al. (2017), we introduce a variational Gaus-
sian approximation (Opper and Archambeau, 2009) and assume that the recognition
density, q(ϑ), is Gaussian with mean µ and variance ς2
q(ϑ) ≡ N (ϑ;µ, ς2) = 1
Z
exp(E) (3.16)
where
Z ≡
√
2piς2 E(ϑ) ≡ (ϑ− µ)
2
2ς2
(3.17)
After defining the variational energy (Friston et al., 2007)
E(ϑ, ψ) ≡ − ln p(ϑ, ψ) (3.18)
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the variational free energy in equation (3.11) can be expressed as
F =
∫
q(ϑ)
(− ln p(ϑ, ψ)) dϑ+ ∫ q(ϑ) ln q(ϑ) dϑ =∫
q(ϑ)
(
E(ϑ, ψ)
)
dϑ+
∫
q(ϑ)(− lnZ − E(ϑ)) dϑ (3.19)
where, for simplicity, we momentarily dropped the use of generalised coordinates,
i.e., ϑ˜, ψ˜. The second integral in equation (3.19) can be evaluated analytically, in
particular the first part reduces to∫
q(ϑ)(− lnZ) dϑ = −
∫
q(ϑ) ln
(√
2piς2
)
dϑ = − ln
(√
2piς2
)
= −1
2
ln(2piς2)
(3.20)
since the factor Z does not depend on ϑ and the integral of the variational density
q(ϑ) over ϑ is 1. The second term of the second integral can be manipulated into∫
q(ϑ)(−E(ϑ)) dϑ =
∫
q(ϑ)(−(ϑ− µ)
2
2ς2
) dϑ = − 1
2ς2
∫
q(ϑ)(ϑ− µ)2 dϑ = −1
2
(3.21)
and the integral is in this case equivalent to the definition of the variance ς .
According to the traditional Laplace or saddle-point (MacKay, 2003) method, to
solve the first integral in equation (3.19), one approximates the generative density
with a Taylor expansion around its MAP estimate ϑˆ up to second order (i.e., a Gaus-
sian approximation) (Beal, 2003)
E(ϑ, ψ) ≈ E(ϑˆ, ψ) + (ϑ− ϑˆ) ∂E
∂ϑ
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=ϑˆ
+
(ϑ− ϑˆ)2
2
∂2E
∂ϑ2
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=ϑˆ
(3.22)
where terms of order O(ϑ3) are dropped. If we assume that the MAP estimate is
known, then the variational density q(ϑ) will be centred around this peak (Bishop,
2006),
ϑˆ = µ (3.23)
I will use µ from now on for consistency with work such as Friston et al. (2007),
Daunizeau (2017), and Buckley et al. (2017), in place of ϑˆ, used in the more tradi-
tional statistics/machine learning literature to represent MLE/MAP estimates. We
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can then replace this expression into the first integral of equation (3.19), giving∫
q(ϑ)
(
E(ϑ, ψ)
)
dϑ =
=
∫
q(ϑ)
(
E(µ, ψ) + (ϑ− µ) ∂E
∂ϑ
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
+
1
2
(ϑ− µ)2 ∂
2E
∂ϑ2
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
)
dϑ =
= E(µ, ψ) +
∂E
∂ϑ
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
∫
q(ϑ)(ϑ− µ) + 1
2
∂2E
∂ϑ2
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
∫
q(ϑ)(ϑ− µ)2 (3.24)
and since we are considering a MAP estimate ϑˆ (= µ) of E(ϑ, ψ), the first derivative
of the variational energy evaluated at the MAP estimate is zero
∂E
∂ϑ
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
= 0 (3.25)
leaving only the first and the third term plus the expressions derived from solving
analytically the negative entropy part of equation (3.19)
F = E(µ, ψ) +
1
2
(
∂2E
∂ϑ2
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
ς2 − ln(2piς2)− 1
)
(3.26)
where we used once again the definition of the variance ς2 to simplify the last term
of the Taylor expansion. In the standard Laplace approximation (Azevedo-Filho
and Shachter, 1994), one can then find an explicit form for the variance ς2 in equa-
tion (3.26) by differentiating F with respect to ς2 and obtain
δF
δς2
= 0 =⇒ ς2 =
(
∂2E
∂ϑ2
∣∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
)−1
= ς¯2 (3.27)
where ς¯2 represents the optimal variance evaluated at the MAP estimated and only
with respect to hyperparameters, ϑ = {γ}. After replacing ς2 = ς¯2, the variational
free energy is then reduced to the sum of the variational energy evaluated at the
mode of the generative density (i.e., the MAP estimate) and a term that can be cal-
culated analytically using the variational energy E(µ, ψ) at the mode (and will thus
be normally dropped in our implementations, making F ≈ E)
F = E(µ, ψ)− 1
2
ln(2piς¯2) ≈ E(µ, ψ) = − ln p(µ, ψ) (3.28)
The method implemented by Friston (Penny, Kiebel, and Friston, 2006; Friston et al.,
2007) diverges in some ways from the traditional Laplace approximation. The pro-
posal of an online version of the Laplace method (also called variational Laplace
(Daunizeau, 2017)) implies that the MAP estimate is not readily available as as-
sumed after equation (3.22) but rather, inferred as new data becomes available (e.g.,
an agent perceiving the world over time). This implies that equation (3.24) is true
only at the MAP estimate (Daunizeau, 2017) and not necessarily accurate away from
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it, e.g., during the inference phase of the MAP estimate or if the peak of the genera-
tive density changes over time due to an agent’s actions on the world. Friston et al.
(2007) suggested that the over-reliance on MAP estimates (the main weakness of the
Laplace approximation (Beal, 2003)) is bypassed by the online version thanks to a
factorised variational formulation that fits a Gaussian to the generative density after
each new data point is introduced and for each set of variables within ϑ in the case of
a mean-field approximation. Rather than relying on a post hoc point estimate of the
MAP of a density where all data is available, the online Laplace method is claimed to
better approximate the mass of a distribution using MAP estimations of each set of
variables as constraints for the other (MAP) estimates, instead of relying on the infer-
ence of a single mode for the generative density, see the mean-field-induced factori-
sation in Friston et al. (2007) and Daunizeau (2017). In generalised filtering however,
these constraints are removed since the mean field approximation is dropped (Fris-
ton et al., 2010b), suggesting that the “variational” approximation (almost) reduces
to a standard Laplace approximation once the variational free energy is minimised
(Opper and Archambeau, 2009). In both cases, the optimal variance ς¯2 described
in equation (3.27) is accurate only at the peak of the generative density, requiring
a more complex formulation away from it. As explicitly shown by Buckley et al.
(2017), the derivation proposed by Friston et al. (2007) and Friston, Trujillo-Barreto,
and Daunizeau (2008) simply drops the first derivative of the variational energy ob-
tained from a Taylor expansion around the peak as shown in equation (3.25) (only
true at the MAP estimate), following the traditional offline Laplace method. This
may be due to the fact that the effects of the first term of the Taylor expansion are
relatively small away from the peak, but it remains unclear how disruptive this as-
sumption for the online Laplace approximation really is. Future work should thus
address the details of this approach, crucial also for the SPM methodologies in neu-
roimaging analysis (Penny, Kiebel, and Friston, 2006). In this thesis I will simply
assume that online Laplace is a good approximation of the offline version. To high-
light the fact that this is a different variation of the Laplace method, I will however
use a slightly different notation for equation (3.28):
F ≈ − ln p(µ, ψ) = − ln p(ϑ, ψ)
∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
(3.29)
showing that the approximate equality is exactly true only for the MAP estimate
ϑ = ϑˆ(= µ).
3.1.4 The Laplace-encoded variational free energy
Starting from the variational free energy in equation (3.28), expanding ϑ in terms of
hidden states, inputs, parameters and hyperparameters, reintroducing generalised
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coordinate of motion and not including terms treated as constants during the min-
imisation process (i.e., the ones depending on the optimal variance ς¯2) we get
F ≈ − ln p(ψ˜, x˜, v˜, θ, γ)
∣∣∣
ϑ˜=µ˜
(3.30)
where ϑ˜ = µ˜ represents the fact that the generative density P (ψ˜, x˜, v˜, θ, γ) will be ap-
proximated by a Gaussian distribution centred around the MAP estimates ˜ˆϑ = µ˜ of ϑ˜
following the online Laplace method explained above. Diverging from the extensive
review found in Buckley et al. (2017), I will write an expression for the variational
free energy based on a treatment of – all – unknown quantities ϑ as random variables
approximated under the Laplace assumption. In Buckley et al. (2017), the authors
use this assumption only on hidden states x and inputs v, essentially following a
formulation based on DEM (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008), see also
the paragraph on DEM above. This derivation simplifies the representation of vari-
ables θ and γ, reported effectively as fixed parameters in Buckley et al. (2017) and in
much of the work presented here (Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 7), but needs
to be generalised for time-varying parameters and hyperparameters as in the case of
the implementation presented in Chapter 6.
For convenience, from now on I will assume that random variables z˜ and w˜ are
zero-mean Gaussian with precision matrices (inverse covariances) Πz˜,Πw˜
z˜ ∼ N (z˜; 0,Πz˜)
w˜ ∼ N (w˜; 0,Πw˜) (3.31)
in equation (3.13), meaning that the likelihood and prior in equation (3.14) are also
Gaussian. Notice that in this case we defined precision matrices even for a univariate
case because of the presence of extra embedding orders of motion that effectively
increase the number of variables. Dropping momentarily the use of generalised co-
ordinates for simplicity, we will assume that piz and piw represent elements on the
main diagonals of their respective precision matrices. Likelihood and prior in equa-
tion (3.14) can then be explicitly written as
P (ψ|x, v, θ, γ) = 1√
2piσ2z
exp
(
−(ψ − g(x, v, θ))2
2σ2z
)
P (x, v, θ, γ) =
1√
2piσ2w
exp
(
−(x′ − f(x, v, θ))2
2σ2w
)
. (3.32)
When substituted in equation (3.30) and evaluated at ϑ = µ, i.e., x = µx, v = µv, θ =
µθ, γ = µγ , the variational free energy can be expressed as:
F ≈ 1
2
[
µpiz
(
ψ − g(µx, µv, µθ)
)2
+ µpiw
(
x′ − f(µx, µv, µθ)
)2 − ln(µpizµpiw)] (3.33)
Expected precisions µpi (or more in general µΠ˜) are used instead of µγ or µ˜γ since
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the latter represent a simple re-parametrisation of precisions introduced later for the
optimisation of these variables. Explicit precision-weighted prediction errors for θ, γ
are not introduced, unlike Friston (2008a) where predictions specify also prior expec-
tations on parameters and hyperparameters, to keep the formulation more manage-
able. For implementations in most of the later chapters, I will use θ, γ, highlighting
that these parameters and hyperparameters are fixed quantities in my models, and
only in Chapter 6 I will specifically shift to a representation of the sufficient statistics
for hyperparameters µγ˜ when they will be optimised.
It is also important to highlight that the assumption in equation (3.31), even if
common in derivations of the FEP (see for instance Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and
Daunizeau (2008) and Buckley et al. (2017)), de facto renders the variational approx-
imation exact. Since both the variational and generative densities are now Gaussian,
the variational approach simply transforms a problem of inference into an optimi-
sation problem (Daunizeau, 2017). One could thus, in principle, find analytically
the optimal variational density to approximate the generative density whenever the
problem is tractable or use alternative, arguably simpler, methods. It may then look
redundant to consider variational approaches. However, one of the strengths of the
variational approach lies in the fact that one could define any form for the genera-
tive density and still use variational formulations/Laplace approximation for their
computational efficiency (Bishop, 2006), even if the quality of the approximation
may deteriorate quickly for increasingly complex (e.g., multimodal) distributions.
The variational formulation would be the same for any distribution and could be
implemented with hierarchical models using even discrete distributions at higher
layers, see Parr and Friston (2018c) for example, acting as probability integral trans-
forms for lower ones, thus extending its application beyond Gaussian distributions
(Friston, 2008a). For these reasons, I will focus on variational formulations for their
generality, even if simpler methods could in some cases be applied.
3.2 The minimisation of variational free energy
With the expression in equation (3.33), it is now possible to define explicitly the
minimisation scheme for the variational free energy under the Laplace assumption.
Given the set of unknowns ϑ, different processes can be implemented based on the
minimisation of the free energy functional with respect to hidden states, inputs,
parameters and hyperparameters, and most importantly action (introduced later).
These processes are usually based on (stochastic) gradient descent procedures, find-
ing the minimum of a function(al), the variational free energy in our case, by fol-
lowing the steepest direction defined by the gradient (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and
Daunizeau, 2008). At the moment, the choice of using a gradient descent appears
somewhat arbitrary and motivated mainly by the simplicity of the method (Kim,
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2018). More in general one could apply other methods, either augmenting the gra-
dient descent with extra terms such as in Adagrad, Adadelta, Adam, etc., see for in-
stance Ahmadi and Tani (2018), or by using different approaches such as in Baltieri
(2014). On the other hand, the Fokker-Planck formulation of solutions following
simple Langevin dynamics proposed in Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau
(2008) and Friston (2008b) strongly resonates with work such as Mandt, Hoffman,
and Blei (2016) and Chaudhari and Soatto (2018) in machine learning and Seifert
(2012) in (stochastic) thermodynamics, suggesting that stochastic gradient descent
methods can be seen as a process of approximate Bayesian inference themselves (and
therefore optimal given different sets of constraints, or priors) if analysed from the
perspective of variational calculus. In support of gradient descent methods, Jordan,
Kinderlehrer, and Otto (1998) also proposed variational formulations for solutions to
the Fokker Plank equation in statistical mechanics, essentially based on a steepest or
gradient descent principle. In this thesis I will follow the gradient descent idea pro-
posed by standard implementations of the FEP and discuss only this minimisation
procedure from here onwards. As we will see, this choice is especially interesting
since it maps to pre-existing methods including system identification techniques,
estimation procedures, deconvolution (see Friston (2008a) for a review) and control
(see Chapter 6).
This minimisation, implemented for different sets of variables, has been sug-
gested to describe and account of cognitive processes, such as perception, action,
learning and attention. Inspired by existing proposals regarding, for instance, per-
ception as inference and action as optimal control, the minimisation of variational
free energy as been proposed as a general computational principle of cognitive func-
tions, as suggested from a review of the literature in Chapter 2.
3.2.1 Perception
Following Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau (2008) and Friston (2008a), the
optimisation of the (Laplace-encoded) variational free energy with respect to ex-
pected hidden states µ˜x and expected inputs µ˜v can be interpreted as estimation
or perception:
˙˜µx = Dµ˜x − ∂F
∂µ˜x
(3.34)
˙˜µv = Dµ˜v − ∂F
∂µ˜v
(3.35)
These sets of equations (the tilde collapses all orders of motion to a single term for
convenience, so each equation is in itself a system of equations) include extra terms
Dµ˜x, Dµ˜v to represent the “mode of the motion” (also the mean for Gaussian vari-
ables) in the minimisation of variables in generalised coordinates of motion (Friston,
2008a; Buckley et al., 2017; Kim, 2018), with D as a differential operator “shifting”
the order of motion of µ˜x, µ˜v such that Dµ˜x = µ˜′x and Dµ˜v = µ˜′v. More intuitively,
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since we are now minimising the components of a generalised state representing a
trajectory rather than a static state, variables are in a moving framework of reference
in the state-space, and the minimisation is achieved for ˙˜µx = µ˜′x, ˙˜µv = µ˜′v rather than
for ˙˜µx = 0, ˙˜µv = 0 (which would assume that the mode of the motion is zero, as in
standard state-space formulations with Markov assumptions). In all the implemen-
tations included in this thesis, expected inputs µ˜v are not updated and considered
as fixed for the purposes of building effective controllers. The presence of a minimi-
sation with respect to µ˜v highlights however the already mentioned generalisation
of Kalman filters, which in their most basic form are unable to recover inputs or “
causes” from observations. For specific discussions on this last point see Friston,
Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau (2008) where a comparison of the DEM algorithm
and other approaches, including Kalman filtering, sheds light on their similarities
and differences.
3.2.2 Action
In active inference, action is described as a problem of optimal control that essen-
tially mirrors perception by changing observations ψ˜ to better match expected hid-
den states µ˜x. This process is based on the general assumption that, from the per-
spective of an agent, observations ψ are affected by actions a (ψ is a function of a,
ψ(a)), and that this is the only thing an agent can be sure of. Action is thus cast as:
a˙ = −∂F
∂a
= −∂F
∂ψ˜
∂ψ˜
∂a
(3.36)
This assumption is proposed in order to bypass a well known problem of inverse
models for motor systems and control theory more generally, the redundancy of ef-
fective movements (Bernstein, 1967; Sporns and Edelman, 1993; Franklin and Wolpert,
2011). Finding the action or policy (a sequence of actions) responsible for some ob-
servation by inverting a forward model (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000), i.e., working out the effects of the action/policy on hidden states and in-
puts generating the observations, can easily generate an ill-posed problem: a one-to-
many mapping between a single observation and the set of all possible actions that
could have generated. In active inference, this inverse model is decomposed into
two sub-problems based on the presence of an intrinsic (bodily) and an extrinsic
(environmental) frames of reference (Friston, 2011). In the intrinsic frame, it is pro-
posed that a large portion of the control problem can be solved by predicting propri-
oceptive sensations2 in the same way exteroceptive3 ones are, by using observations
and a generative model of their dynamics to generate estimates of their state. The
2Proprioception is the sense of position and movement of different parts of our body, as seen in
Chapter 4.
3Exteroception captures perceptual modalities at the interface with the environment: vision, touch,
olfaction, taste and audition.
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problem in extrinsic coordinates is solved by finding simple, heuristic mappings be-
tween proprioceptive estimates and observations that can be trivially implemented
as low-level reflexes. With this separation, the heavy lifting is performed by a gen-
erative model, now also producing predictions of proprioceptive states, while the
extrinsic problem in the form of reflex arcs is thought to be “solved” by agents over
an evolutionary scale (Friston et al., 2010a), in the same way reflexes are not “learnt”
during development but are assumed to be developed by a phylogeny over several
generations. This interpretation is heavily reliant on proprioception, often implicitly
studied and assumed to exist only in complex life forms. However, the idea of sim-
ple reflexes driving behaviour can also be relevant to simpler organisms, with “pro-
prioceptive predictions” that could be ascribed to even simple chemical networks
triggering a reflex, such as tumbling in bacteria. For example in Yi et al. (2000) and
Andrews, Yi, and Iglesias (2006), the chemical network is effectively implementing
an integral control mechanism, which I derive in terms of active inference in Chap-
ter 6.
One could also argue that equation (3.36) is still fundamentally an inverse model
(i.e., finding the correct action for a desired output), but unlike more traditional
approaches, active inference does not involve a mapping from hidden states x˜ to
actions a, since it is cast in terms of sensory data ψ˜ directly. The problem is thus
reduced from a mapping between unknown hidden states and actions, to a mapping
between known observations ψ˜ and actions a, see Fig. 16 in Friston et al. (2010a). This
implementation also resonates with sensorimotor accounts of agent-environment
systems where action is fundamentally grounded in an extrinsic frame of reference
(Buhrmann and Di Paolo, 2014), i.e., the real world (ψ˜), rather than in a intrinsic
one in terms of hidden states (x˜) to be inferred first by inverting an internal forward
model. The connection to classic frameworks of optimal control can also be read-
ily recovered if one assumes that knowledge of the mapping between actions a and
hidden states x is known, rewriting equation (3.36) as:
a˙ = −∂F
∂a
= − ∂F
∂µ˜x
∂µ˜x
∂a
(3.37)
3.2.3 Learning
Learning is described as the minimisation of the path integral of variational free en-
ergy, or free action, with respect to parameters θ, encoding slowly changing proper-
ties of the coupling between hidden states/inputs and hidden states dynamics/observations
(Friston, 2008a; Friston, 2010b; Buckley et al., 2017). For processes of learning, one
can assume that parameters θ are fixed using a mean field approximation, see DEM
(Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008) and paragraph above. Alternatively,
these parameters can be represented as slowly changing (random variables) with re-
spect do hidden states and inputs even if a formal separation of time scales is not
assumed (no mean field approximation, see GF (Friston et al., 2010b) and above).
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In this case I will proceed by applying the methodology proposed by Generalised
Filtering, specifying instantaneous changes on the curvature of expected parameters
with respect to variational free energy (i.e., GF) rather than first order updates with
respect to explicit calculations of free action (i.e., DEM):
µ¨θ = − ∂F
∂µθ
(3.38)
This equation is presented for completeness but in the remainder of the thesis never
effectively used since all of my work mainly focuses on action and perception pro-
cesses and only in one case on the role of precision hyperparameters optimisation
presented next.
3.2.4 Attention
Attention mechanisms (Friston, 2010b; Feldman and Friston, 2010) are suggested to
be closely related to the optimisation of precisions pi of both sensory and system
random variables z and w. In equation (3.33), these precisions effectively modulate
different prediction errors. “Attention” is in this case thought to be the process that
regulates the optimisation of other variables (hidden states, inputs and parameters)
by updating weights in the Laplace-encoded free energy reduced to a weighted sum
of different prediction error terms. “Attending” to some information, perhaps one
modality (e.g., vision) over a second one (e.g., proprioception) is, according to this
hypothesis, represented by an increase of precisions of the former, a decrease for the
second, or a combination of both cases, see Feldman and Friston (2010) and Chap-
ter 4 for discussion. This process is implemented with the same assumption on the
time scale highlighted for parameters, where a second order scheme is introduced
following GF (Friston et al., 2010b):
µ¨pi = − ∂F
∂µpi
(3.39)
Hyperparameters (i.e., expected precisions) µpi should however be non-negative since
variances need to be positive. To include this constraint, following Friston et al.
(2007) we thus parametrise precisions pi (and consequently expected precisions µpi)
in the generative model as:
pi = exp (γ) (3.40)
creating log-normal priors on (expected) sensory precisions and making them strictly
positive thanks to the exponential mapping of hyperparameters γ (as part of the pre-
viously defined ϑ). The scheme in equation (3.39) is thus replaced by one in terms of
expected log-precisions µγ :
µ¨γ = − ∂F
∂µγ
(3.41)
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TABLE 3.1: The variables used in the derivation of the FEP.
Expression Description
m Model or agent
ψ Sensory input/observations/measurements
ϑ
Set of unobserved, or hidden, variables used in the generative
model, ϑ = {x, v, θ, γ}
x Hidden states of the generative model
v Inputs/causes of the generative model
θ Parameters of the generative model
γ
Hyperparameters of the generative model, used to map pre-
cisions/variances to log-normal (strictly positive) values
a
Actions of an agent with effects on world dynamics described
by the generative process
ψ˜, x˜, v˜
Generalised variables, a variable and its higher orders of mo-
tion (i.e., embedding orders), e.g., ψ˜ = {ψ,ψ′, ψ′′, . . . }
− ln(ψ|m) Surprisal or self-information, measuring how unlikely an ob-
servation ψ is for an agent m
H(ψ)
Shannon entropy or average/expected surprisal of observa-
tions ψ
DKL(p||q) Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, an asymmetrical measure
of the difference between two distributions p and q
F Variational free energy functional
p(ψ, ϑ) Generative density, an agent’s description of its observations
q(ϑ)
Recognition or variational density, used to approximate the
generative density in Variational Bayes
g(x, v)
Function mapping from inputs and hidden states to observa-
tions
f(x, v)
Function mapping from inputs and hidden states to hidden
states dynamics
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Expression Description
z˜
Random variables used to represent analytical (i.e., differen-
tiable) noise on observation/measurement uncertainty
w˜
Random variables used to represent analytical (i.e., differen-
tiable) random fluctuations/uncertainty in system dynamics
Πz˜ Precision (inverse covariance) matrix of z˜
Πw˜ Precision (inverse covariance) matrix of w˜
E(ϑ, ψ) Variational energy, used for the Laplace approximation
Z
Normalising factor or partition function, used for the Laplace
approximation
E(ϑ) Energy of variables ϑ, in analogy to Boltzamnn distribution
µ
Means/modes of the variational density for the Laplace ap-
proximation
ς
Variance of the variational density for the Laplace approxima-
tion
ϑˆ MAP estimate of the generative density
µx, µv, µθ, µγ
Expectations on variables x, v, θ, γ after the use of the Laplace
assumption
D
Differential operator shifting the embedding order by one for
consistency in minimisation of variational free energy in gen-
eralised coordinates of motion
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Chapter 4
A simple action-perception loop in
active inference
In active inference, perception is a process of inferring the causes of sensory data by
minimising the error between actual sensations and those predicted by a probabilis-
tic generative model. Action, on the other hand, is specified as a process that mod-
ifies the world such that the consequent sensory input meets expectations encoded
by the same internal model. These two processes, inferring properties of the world
and inferring actions needed to meet expectations, close the sensorimotor loop and
suggest a deep symmetry between action and perception. This chapter provides
a minimal model of a sensorimotor loop under active inference formulations to il-
lustrate its main features. I will introduce a simple cruise controller, an agent at-
tempting to regulate its velocity on a flat surface and focus on showing different
properties and working regimes of this agent, arising from the interaction of percep-
tion and action processes according to the FEP formulation. One of the main goals
is to discuss the implementation of passive and active agents depicted in Chapter 1
(see also “perception-centric” and “action-oriented” models of cognition under the
FEP in Chapter 2). By simply tweaking different parameters, i.e., precision weights,
I’ll show how the agent’s behaviour changes in non-trivial ways. Most of the results
reported here will be expanded in later chapters and therefore some of the impli-
cations will be discussed and elaborated there. This example should get the reader
more familiar with a set of ideas used in the remainder of the models. One of the
main assumptions of this thesis, i.e., the fact that an agent is not a copy-model or
mirror of its environment, will be momentarily dropped in favour of clarity for our
first implementation and also because the equations describing the world dynamics,
as we will see, could hardly ever be simplified by an agent.
4.1 Action in an active inference context
The role of action in the minimisation of variational free energy under the FEP
was recognised with the introduction of active inference in Friston, Daunizeau, and
Kiebel (2009) and Friston et al. (2010a), suggesting that biological systems not only
need to update predictions of their generative models through perception, they must
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also actively engage with the environment to minimise prediction errors by creating
sensory input predicted by such models. This perspective, as highlighted in Chap-
ter 2, is particularly relevant for this thesis since it provides some of the necessary
tools to connect the FEP with 4E ideas highlighting the importance of behaviour, in
particular sensorimotor loops and online feedback mechanisms.
However, the active inference proposal introduces several questions regarding
the behaviour of systems minimising free energy when actively interacting with
the world, e.g., Friston, Thornton, and Clark (2012). More specifically, the unify-
ing perspective of perception and action as processes of inference using the same
generative model (Friston et al., 2010a; Clark, 2013) presents some fundamental
differences with some of the more traditional approaches to the modelling of sen-
sorimotor loops. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, proposals accounting
for these processes in terms of Bayesian inference often focus on either perception
or action, expecting them to be sequentially (and optimally) combined following
the traditional sense-model-plan-act approach (Brooks, 1991b) of traditional cogni-
tive science/AI/robotics, e.g., Knill and Richards (1996), Todorov and Jordan (2002),
Todorov (2004), and Franklin and Wolpert (2011). Inspired by similar ideas of ac-
tion/control and planning as inference, e.g., Attias (2003), Botvinick and Toussaint
(2012), and Kappen, Gómez, and Opper (2012), active inference also relies on the in-
tuition that describes actions in terms of backward estimation starting from desired
goals treated as “observed” states in the future (Todorov, 2009b). Unlike other ap-
proaches in control theory, however (cf. (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000; Todorov, 2004), the estimation of hidden states and actions (n.b. also treated
as latent variables) is “shared” within a single (generative) model: the sequential
perception of external stimuli followed by the description of models of the environ-
ment later implementing motor commands is replaced by a single set of processes
that perform all of these tasks in a more unified and cohesive way. Following the
proposal advanced by active inference, an agent is engaging in behaviour driven by
a mix of estimates of properties of the world and an agent’s desires/priors that, fol-
lowing Bayes theorem, are combined into predictions triggering motor actions and
enacting (normative) behaviour without the need for precise models of the world.
Passive agents (see Chapter 1) that merely implement accurate estimates of hidden
properties of the environment, can still be described by active inference (Allen and
Friston, 2018) but provide no real explanation of adaptive behaviour (Bruineberg,
Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018).
Crucial in the active inference scheme is the role played by proprioception (the
sense of position and movement of different parts of our body), also constituting
the focus of all the experiments presented in this thesis. Active inference suggests
that an agent ought to produce its own (proprioceptive) predictions errors that can
then be solved by action and implemented via reflex arcs (Friston, 2011; Brown et
al., 2013). On this view, an agent should generate predictions of incoming sensa-
tions explicitly misaligned with world variables (“Action is enabled by systematic
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misrepresentations”, Wiese (2016)). For instance, in order to grab a mug on a table
a few steps away from me, active inference suggests that I should (strongly) predict
my hand to be around the mug so that visual, tactile and especially proprioceptive
sensations (my hand still being in my pocket) can generate prediction errors that are
then solved by motor actions: taking a few steps towards the table, getting my hand
out of my pocket and reaching for the mug. This turns the more traditional under-
standing of perception around: rather than estimating the hidden properties of the
world responsible for our sensory input to then accurately model the environment
and plan our next actions, active inference agents must explicitly mispredict their
sensations in order to bring their desires into existence via simple error minimisation
procedures resolved by appropriate motor actions. In this view, perception becomes
de facto a description of both an agent’s desires and world variables, mashed in a
way that bears little value to anyone but the agent itself.
To show the role of both priors and precisions in the context of sensorimotor
loops, in this chapter I present some initial results from computational simulations
of active inference agents performing basic homeostatic control. By focusing on a
minimal model of a “Bayesian cruise controller” similar in spirit to the example of
a “Bayesian thermostat” found in Buckley et al. (2017), I will emphasise the role of
perception and action in different settings of top-down and bottom-up processing
achieved by simply modifying the relative strength of different precisions weights.
These initial simulations will also reflect the emphasis of this thesis to work on mini-
mal models. I will not consider, at the moment, more advanced constructs provided
in other treatments of the FEP, including for instance hierarchies and generalised co-
ordinates of motion (Friston, 2008a) (generalised coordinates will however be used
in Chapter 6).
4.2 A Bayesian cruise controller
In this model, a block of mass = 1 kg (our agent) is placed on a surface with some
sliding friction. The goal of this agent is to regulate its velocity, which can be per-
ceived through a sensor, towards a desired set-point vdes (vdes = 10 m/s unless
otherwise stated). The regulation will be described as a Bayesian inference process,
inspired by the free energy principle and implemented in an active inference set up.
The details behind the mechanism for velocity regulation will not be specified, since
they don’t add any more insight to our proof of concept. We will simply assume
that this agent can apply a force that moves the block against the effects of friction
which tend to bring the velocity of the block down to zero. The generative process,
describing the dynamics of the world for our agent, will simply entail the definition
of a velocity variable x (here to be interpreted as hidden state rather than as a posi-
tion/displacement) that exponentially decays over time with a constant rate α due to
the effects of friction. We also describe these dynamics as noisy, with a random vari-
able w ∼ N (0, σ2w), and have an action variable a that represents the force applied
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by the agent as an input (in states-space formulations terms) to achieve homeostatic
control. The generative process is presented in the form of a state-space model as in
most implementations of active inference, e.g., Friston, 2008a; Buckley et al., 2017;
Bogacz, 2017; Baltieri and Buckley, 2019c:
x′ = −αx+ a+ w (4.1)
To simplify the example, no other exogenous inputs (again in a state-space represen-
m =1kg
A block on a surface 

with sliding friction
Applied

forceFriction
FIGURE 4.1: The agent, a Bayesian cruise controller. A block of mass
= 1 kg, i.e., the agent, is placed on a surface with dynamic friction. The
goal of the agent is to reach and maintain a velocity vdes.
tation sense) are added, cf. Chapter 6 where we also consider forces such as wind. To
maintain consistency with the previous formulation, I still assume that w is weakly
autocorrelated in a Stratonovich sense, i.e., not a Wiener process, even if the noise
variables are implemented as white noise in my code1. The velocity measurement y
is given as a (linear) noisy reading of x with observation noise z ∼ N (0, σ2z):
y = x+ z (4.2)
The next step requires the definition of the agent’s generative model, including a
model of the system’s dynamics:
x′ =− αx+ vdes + w (4.3)
1Wiener processes in continuous time are more often represented using a notation in terms of dif-
ferentials dx, dt and dW where W is a Wiener process or Brownian motion. Some notable exceptions,
however, use a Langevin formulation similar to the one applied here even in the case of white noise
(Longtin, 2003; Longtin, 2010).
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and of measurements:
y =x+ z
y′ =x′ + z′ (4.4)
One of the major assumptions made in active inference is that the action variable a
cannot be observed directly by an agent (i.e., it’s not part of its generative model)
and not necessary for problems of control (Friston et al., 2010a; Friston, 2011), giv-
ing rise to a different way of implementing homoestatic regulation. See in particular
Chapter 7 for a thorough discussion. In active inference, one thus assumes that an
agent is endowed with a minimal model that encodes how actions a modify obser-
vations y, y′ (rather than hidden states x, x′) via reflex arcs, as discussed in Friston
et al. (2010a) and Friston (2011) and in all following chapters. In this case we also
use, again for consistency, the notation in generalised coordinates of motion defined
in Chapter 3 for random variables z, z′. Under Gaussian assumptions for z, z′ and
w, one can write the above state-space model in a probabilistic form:
p(y|x) = N (x, σ2z)
p(y′|x′) = N (x′, σ2z′)
p(x′|x, v;α) = N (−αx+ vdes, σ2w) (4.5)
and considering the Laplace-encoded variational free energy defined in equation (3.30),
here reported as
F ≈ − ln p(ψ˜, x˜, v˜, θ, γ)
∣∣∣
ϑ˜=µ˜
one can see that the probabilistic description of the generative model presented
above reflects the likelihood and prior distributions necessary to build the generative
density for the definition of the free energy in equation (3.30). Given equation (3.15)
and specifying ψ˜ = {y, y′}, x˜ = {x, x′}, v˜ = {vdes}, θ = α and hyperparameters γ
encoding properties about precisions piz, piz′ , piw, one gets
p(ψ˜|x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = {p(y|x), p(y′|x′)} (4.6)
and
p(x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = p(x′|x, v;α) (4.7)
The free energy then becomes (see equation (3.33)):
F (y, µ˜x, µv) ≈1
2
[
piz(y − µx)2 + piz′(y′ − µ′x)2 + piw(µ′x + αµx − µv)2 − ln(pizpiz′piw)
]
(4.8)
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with perception ˙˜µx = Dµ˜− ∂F/∂µ˜x, following equation (3.35), defined as:
µ˙x =µ
′
x −
[− piz(y − µx) + piwα(µ′x + αµx − µv)] =
=µ′x +
[
piz(y − µx)− piwα(µ′x + αµx − µv)
]
µ˙′x =µ
′′
x −
[
piw(µ
′
x + αµx − µv)
]
=
=− piw(µ′x + αµx − µv) (4.9)
and action, a˙ = −∂F/∂a from equation (3.36), as:
a˙ = −∂F
∂a
= −[piz(y − µx)∂y
∂a
+ piz′(y
′ − µ′x)
∂y′
∂a
]
= −[piz′(y′ − µx′)] (4.10)
where we use the fact that an implicit model is embodied by the agent, with
∂y′
∂a
= 1,
∂y
∂a
= 0 (4.11)
see later chapters for more in depth discussions. These equations, when combined,
form an action-perception loop with information inferred from the environment
through perception and control exerted on the world via action. The combina-
tion of action and perception is regulated by precision parameters “pi”, represent-
ing weights in the weighted sum of prediction errors, see equation (4.8). Precisions
encode the uncertainty (they are in fact inverse variances) of different variables of
a generative model in an agent and effectively regulate the minimisation of free en-
ergy in equation (4.9) and equation (4.10). For the rest of this chapter and throughout
this thesis, I will specify sensory prediction errors as the errors weighted by sensory
precisions piz , or more in general piz˜ , and process or system prediction errors as the ones
weighted by process or system precisions piw, or piw˜, if dealing with generalised co-
ordinates of motion. This distinction will be useful when I emphasise the role of
precision weights on the minimisation of variational free energy, producing differ-
ent behaviours based on their relative (sensory vs process, bottom-up vs top-down)
strength.
More in general, precision parameters can be unrelated to the actual precisions
of the true hidden states, causes and observations of a generative process (i.e., the
world dynamics), and in some cases, as we will see, this misalignment becomes nec-
essary (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Wiese, 2016). They have been addressed also
in terms of “confidences”, thought to encode how confident an agent is about its
estimates of hidden variables. Precisions pi’s are in the most general case dynamic
parameters that can change over time allowing for several types of behaviours to
emerge depending on different situations, see for instance Feldman and Friston
(2010) or Chapter 6 where these weights are optimised for different tasks. In this
chapter, I assume fixed-valued precisions in order to focus, at least initially, on a few
cases of “precision engineering” (Clark, 2015b) showing their role in the emergence
of interesting and “pathological” behaviours (cf. Chapter 5). More specifically, I will
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analyse cases of “perception-centric” (or passive) and “action-oriented” (or active)
agents within the context of active inference showing the importance of tuning pre-
cisions appropriately. Following Chapter 2, perception-centric agents heavily rely
on perceptual inference, (over)focusing on estimating the causes of their sensory
input, while action-oriented agents prioritise acting on the world over accounting
for hidden properties of sensory input. After showing the importance of a closed
sensorimotor loop, I will highlight some of the differences emerging in agents that
focus on bottom-up (i.e., observations) or top-down (i.e., priors) information, using
a precision weighting mechanism that emphasises different (i.e., sensory or system)
prediction errors. Based on these ideas, I will present 4 case studies including agents
having or not having access to action, and showing a dominance of bottom-up or
top-down influences in their inference processes, as summarised in table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1: The role of action in agents minimising free energy
with different precisions’ strengths. The table summarises the re-
sults presented in terms of computational modes (purely bottom-up
vs. purely top-down) and presence or lack of the ability to interact
with the world (no action vs. with action).
Bottom-up Top-down
No action Passive tracker Passive dreamer
With action Active tracker Active dreamer
4.2.1 Just observing, the passive tracker
Passive trackers are agents that can only perceive their world without the ability
of modifying any of its properties. They are an even more extreme version of the
archetypical case advocated by CPP, already prioritising the estimation of the causes
of observed sensations over adaptive behaviour. Passive trackers not only over-
prioritise perception over action, they also heavily rely on bottom-up observations
over top-down priors, with precisions on sensory prediction errors (i.e., piz˜ , see equa-
tion (3.31)) taking a dominant role and driving predictions about incoming data. The
larger the ratio between observation and system prediction errors, the smaller is the
role played by prior beliefs. These agents present however in a straightforward way
some of the arguments advocated by ideas of analysis by synthesis and the Bayesian
brain hypothesis (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Yuille and Kersten, 2006), in particular the
necessity of top-down information in the form of priors to disambiguate observa-
tions, whose estimates are otherwise entirely enslaved by bottom-up signals. As we
can see in Fig. 4.2, in the simplest case, suitable priors filter out some of the noise
in the measurements, separating the signal to be inferred (the black line) from the
observation noise due to sensors/receptors.
If the precisions on sensory inputs are too large, there is no filtering, with increas-
ingly more rugged predictions made just on the base of error correction processes
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FIGURE 4.2: (The passive tracker) The velocity of the block. The ve-
locity perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate according to
weak priors (red) and the block’s true velocity, i.e., without measure-
ment noise (black).
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FIGURE 4.3: (The passive tracker) The acceleration of the block.
The acceleration perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate
according to weak priors (red) and the block’s real acceleration, i.e.,
without measurement noise (black).
triggered by new observations, see for instance Fig. 4.4. Given the Bayesian inter-
pretation behind Kalman(-Bucy) filters (Meinhold and Singpurwalla, 1983; Chen,
2003) and upon which the FEP is built, this is consistent with results found in the
Kalman filtering literature when the covariance matrices are off-balance and filters
over-prioritise new measurements over previous estimates. On the other hand, one
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FIGURE 4.4: (The passive tracker) The velocity of the block with
higher sensory precisions. The velocity perceived by the agent (blue
line), its best estimate according to weak priors (red) and the block’s
true velocity, i.e., without measurement noise (black). In this case
the sensory precision is increased to emphasise the tracking of the
incoming signal.
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FIGURE 4.5: (The passive tracker) The velocity of the block with
lower sensory precisions. The velocity perceived by the agent (blue
line), its best estimate according to weak priors (red) and the block’s
true velocity, i.e., without measurement noise (black). In this case the
sensory precision is decreased to emphasise the filtering properties of
the recognition dynamics in equation (4.9).
can also show the complementary case, whereby slightly weaker sensory precisions
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allow for priors to filter more of the incoming sensory noise, showing less respon-
siveness to observation disturbances Fig. 4.5. This behaviour may be preferable in
some cases, but at the same time it also induces slow responses to stimuli that may be
relevant to the system (Sontag, 2003; Andrews, Yi, and Iglesias, 2006). See Chapter 6
for a more thorough discussion on this matter.
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FIGURE 4.6: (The passive tracker) Weighted prediction errors and
variational free energy. The evolution of sensory prediction errors
on (A) velocity and (B) acceleration, and (C) system prediction error.
(D) The variational free energy of the system over time.
In Fig. 4.6 we can see that the variational free energy of our initial agent (see
Fig. 4.2) is (on average) minimised over time (Fig. 4.6d), driven mainly by the weighted
prediction errors on sensory input, since sensory precisions piz, piz′ are much larger
than process precision piw. Both the weighted sensory prediction errors present a
magnitude varying in the order of 101 (Fig. 4.6a and Fig. 4.6b), while the system
error is in the order of 10−5 (Fig. 4.6c).
4.2.2 In a delusional state, the passive dreamer
Passive dreamers are also agents with no direct access to motor actions, as in the case
of passive trackers. These agents prioritise their priors over incoming sensations.
As we will see in an example later, this may become a feature when motor actions
are introduced, but in the more basic case considered here, this simply implies the
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presence of agents with unfulfilled predictions about the world. These agents live
in a sort of hallucinatory state where predictions are completely disconnected from
sensory input, suggesting some possible conceptual link to models of psychiatric
disorders (see for instance Friston (2005b) and Adams et al. (2013) and the discussion
at the end of this chapter).
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FIGURE 4.7: (The passive dreamer) The velocity of the block. The
velocity perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate according
to weak priors (red) and the block’s true velocity, i.e., without mea-
surement noise (black).
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FIGURE 4.8: (The passive dreamer) The acceleration of the block.
The acceleration perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate
according to weak priors (red) and the block’s real acceleration, i.e.,
without measurement noise (black).
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In passive dreamers, precisions on system errors piw are overwhelming the ones
on sensory prediction errors, driving the recognition dynamics for perception exem-
plified in equation (4.9) purely based on a model of the world that does not take into
account new incoming information. For the velocity of the agent, we see a strong
contrast between what the model describes, an equilibrium at µx = µv = 10 m/s
when the system settles (red line), and the real velocity of the block which slowly
decreases down to zero following the true dynamics of the world (black line), see
Fig. 4.7. As for the acceleration, both the generative process and the generative
model describe a system that eventually stops and since no force is applied (i.e.,
no external input and no action), both the estimated and the real accelerations reach
the same equilibrium, see Fig. 4.8.
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FIGURE 4.9: (The passive dreamer) Weighted prediction errors and
variational free energy. The evolution of sensory prediction errors
on (A) velocity and (B) acceleration, and (C) system prediction error.
(D) The variational free energy of the system over time.
As in the case of the passive tracker, the variational free energy is minimised (on
average) over time, Fig. 4.9d, showing a sudden initial decrease due to the minimi-
sation of the weighted prediction error on the system’s dynamics and a temporary
increase right after (Fig. 4.9c) due to the overshooting of the estimate of the accel-
eration (as observed in Fig. 4.8 and on a smaller scale in Fig. 4.9c). For the passive
dreamer, the influence of sensory prediction errors is extremely low, with a differ-
ence of at least 5 orders of magnitude (Fig. 4.9a and Fig. 4.9b) when compared to the
Chapter 4. A simple action-perception loop in active inference 74
weighted prediction error on the system dynamics.
4.2.3 Acting with no reason, the active tracker
Active trackers are agents that can actively interact with their environment and un-
like their passive version, they integrate action to close the sensorimotor loop. How-
ever, they are just another (although more elaborate) example of the perception cen-
tric description introduced by Clark, 2015a; Clark, 2015b, a direct consequence of
Bayesian brain/predictive coding schemes (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Huang and Rao,
2011; Spratling, 2016) endowed with simple mechanisms for active behaviour and
motor control. These agents can impact their environment through motor actions
but they only do so to better sample sensations in agreement with their existing pre-
dictions, producing a “kind of self-fulfilling prophecy” (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015a)
entirely driven by incoming sensory input. Active trackers don’t use (possibly rele-
vant) priors to estimate their sensations and, as in the case of the passive tracker, are
completely enslaved by their observations in a state of pure information gathering.
Actions are only produced to cancel sensory prediction errors, to generate more ac-
curate predictions about the world. Effectively, this creates the “dark room problem”
for active agents exposed by Friston, Thornton, and Clark (2012), i.e., agents that
“predict”, or rather account for, all their observations, with actions simply bound to
produce a process of inconclusive behaviour (unless the purpose for a system is to
just estimate the hidden properties of its observations, unlike ours!).
The estimates of velocity, Fig. 4.10, and acceleration, Fig. 4.11, become good de-
scriptions of the real variables in the world as in the case of the passive tracker. In the
passive tracker example, however, the block naturally slowed down and eventually
stopped (nearly stopped, because of the presence of noise) close to the origin. In the
active version of the tracker, the initial sensory prediction error given by the estimate
µx initialised at 0 triggers an action (see Fig. 4.12) which is then maintained constant
over time after the prediction error on velocity is minimised, i.e., when the agent can
predict its velocity. Having no other drive but to accurately predict its observations,
this agent maintains its action constant since it has no cost (e.g., energy). Random
initialisations of µx give different set-point equilibriums to the system, providing
then simply different, but still accurate, estimates of the block’s motion.
As in the case of the passive tracker, sensory prediction errors (Fig. 4.13a and
Fig. 4.13b) exert a much larger influence on the minimisation of variational free en-
ergy (Fig. 4.13d) due to the precision weighting mechanism enforcing their role. The
only significant difference between the active and the passive versions is on the pro-
cess prediction error, cf. Fig. 4.13c and Fig. 4.6c, given by the fact that the active
tracker gets further away from the “desired” state represented by the prior thanks
to its motor actions.
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FIGURE 4.10: (The active tracker) The velocity of the block. The ve-
locity perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate according to
weak priors (red) and the block’s true velocity, i.e., without measure-
ment noise (black).
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FIGURE 4.11: (The active tracker) The acceleration of the block. The
acceleration perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate ac-
cording to weak priors (red) and the block’s real acceleration, i.e.,
without measurement noise (black).
4.2.4 Chasing one’s dreams, the active dreamer
The active dreamer presents a similar delusional state to the one described by its
passive counterpart. Unlike the passive dreamer, however, the active agent has the
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FIGURE 4.12: (The active tracker) The motor action of the agent. The
action induced by the minimisation of variational free energy follow-
ing active inference given, in this case, a weak prior.
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FIGURE 4.13: (The active tracker) Weighted prediction errors and
variational free energy. The evolution of sensory prediction errors
on (A) velocity and (B) acceleration, and (C) system prediction error.
(D) The variational free energy of the system over time.
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“power” to realise the desires encoded by its priors. This hallucinatory state be-
comes then a feature in active inference, following the equivalence between (stochas-
tic) optimal control and Bayesian inference (Todorov, 2009b), recasting the problem
of regulation as a problem of inferring the necessary actions to fulfil observations
biased by the agent’s priors. In this picture, self-generated sensory prediction er-
rors trigger actions that bring about the desired state of an agent. Unlike the active
tracker, actions here serve a purpose encoded by the agent’s priors and while this
may not be satisfactory by itself (i.e., where do these priors come from?), it provides
a possible description of a normative account of behaviour once these priors are ap-
propriate and serve an agent’s needs.
As we can see in Fig. 4.14, the estimate of the velocity is initially rather poor,
given the strong role played by priors that do not align with the world dynamics.
This misalignment, however, is what triggers action in Fig. 4.16, since it’s the
only other means to minimise variational free energy. Both the estimates of velocity
(Fig. 4.14) and acceleration (Fig. 4.15) become accurate descriptions of the true read-
ings once the desires are realised by action, creating the “self-fulfilling prophecy” ad-
vocated by Hohwy (2013) and Clark (2015a). In this case, however, the “prophecy”
is realised through adaptive behaviour following an agent’s drives. The variational
free energy landscape and its minimisation are then entirely consistent with the pas-
sive dreamer case. The only substantial difference is in the fact that sensory pre-
diction errors are now more effectively minimised, especially the one on velocity
Fig. 4.17a, thanks to the presence of motor actions affecting the agent’s observations
now increasingly more in agreement with its “delusional” predictions.
TABLE 4.2: Agents’ parameters and setups. The table summarises
the parameters used to simulate our two agents, the passive tracker
and the active tracker, following the implementation of equation (4.9)
and equation (4.10).
piz piz′ piw Action
Passive tracker exp(1) exp(1) exp(−12) a = a˙ = 0
Passive dreamer exp(−12) exp(−12) exp(2) a = a˙ = 0
Active tracker exp(1) exp(1) exp(−12) a˙ = ∂F/∂a
Active dreamer exp(−12) exp(−12) exp(2) a˙ = ∂F/∂a
4.3 Discussion
In theories derived from the Bayesian brain hypothesis (Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Doya, 2007) and predictive processing (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015b), there is often
a strong emphasis on perceptual processes. This is both due to historical reasons
that trace these ideas back to work by Helmholtz, and related, modern theories of
analysis by synthesis (Helmholtz, 1867; Neisser, 1967; Gregory, 1970), and to a strong
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FIGURE 4.14: (The active dreamer) The velocity of the block. The
velocity perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate according
to weak priors (red) and the block’s true velocity, i.e., without mea-
surement noise (black).
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FIGURE 4.15: (The active dreamer) The acceleration of the block.
The acceleration perceived by the agent (blue line), its best estimate
according to weak priors (red) and the block’s real acceleration, i.e.,
without measurement noise (black).
tradition in the cognitive sciences to focus on perception and cognition over action
and behaviour (Fodor, 1983; Boden, 2006). The repercussions of this bias in Bayesian
theories of the mind are deep and rooted, constantly re-emerging even in the most
modern proposals on the Bayesian brain.
Following the definition given by Clark (2015a) and Clark (2015b) and presented
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FIGURE 4.16: (The active dreamer) The motor action of the agent.
The action induced by the minimisation of variational free energy fol-
lowing active inference given, in this case, a strong prior.
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FIGURE 4.17: (The active dreamer) Weighted prediction errors and
variational free energy. The evolution of sensory prediction errors
on (A) velocity and (B) acceleration, and (C) system prediction error.
(D) The variational free energy of the system over time.
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in Chapter 2, I also strongly advocate for a formal distinction between “perception-
centric” and “action-oriented” Bayesian approaches to cognitive science (see also
Engel, Friston, and Kragic (2016) and the idea of passive and active agents in Chap-
ter 1), with implications that could potentially capture aspects of the more general
discussion between computationalist and 4E approaches to cognitive science.
In this chapter I provided a simple model of a sensorimotor loop built using ac-
tive inference and aimed at showing, with an example of homeostatic regulation,
some of the most fundamental points and possible misunderstandings of the FEP
and related theories. It was my goal to make the example especially simple, and for
this reason the problem of regulation was reduced to a (Bayesian) cruise controller
for an agent (i.e., a block) sliding on a surface with dynamic friction. The friction nat-
urally slows the block down, but the agent is endowed with ability to apply a force
over time that allows the block to move and maintain a desired speed. With this
example I then explored a few cases, 4 in total, combining the crucial components of
an active inference regulator: a closed action-perception loop and a specific balance
of weighted of prediction errors to minimise variational free energy according to the
goals of the agent. During this exploration I introduced two agents which I named
the “passive tracker” and the “passive dreamer”, where actions on the world were
not allowed. The weaknesses of stories without motor actions became soon obvi-
ous, but it was nonetheless important to establish the background over which the
rest of the simulations in this chapter, and more in general in this thesis, is based
(see also Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld (2018), where this point is explored
considering the literature on Bayesian brain and predictive coding theories). Along-
side the absence or presence of action to define an appropriate sensorimotor loop, I
also explored the balance of different (weighted) prediction errors. As we can see in
equation (4.8) in fact, the expression for the variational free energy under the Laplace
approximation (see Chapter 2) is reduced almost entirely to a weighted sum of pre-
diction errors. These prediction errors can be divided into sensory and process (or
system) prediction errors, the former encoding mismatches between predictions and
(bottom-up) sensory data, the latter encoding the differences between (top-down)
prior information and the current best estimate of the hidden variables of a system.
All these prediction errors are weighted by precision hyperparameters, encoding the
inverse variance of observations and hidden dynamics of a system. As stressed in
previous chapters and shown more in detail here, these hyperparameters need not
encode true properties of the world and can instead be seen as quantifying the un-
certainty, or confidence, of an agent in its estimates. Considering that precisions are,
in principle, defined over a continuous interval of values, I simplified the analysis
by imposing either higher sensory piz˜ or high process precisions piw. High precisions
drive the minimisation of free energy, enforcing the relative strength of one subset
of hyperparameters and relative prediction errors over the other.
The two examples where no action was included, the passive tracker and the pas-
sive dreamer, represent two extreme versions of purely bottom-up and top-down
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driven perceptual processing. The former passively engages with the world, at-
tempting to estimate new observations. The complete lack of prior information,
however, forces this agent to rely entirely on new observations and so, at best, to
track the incoming sensations over time after they have been observed. For the pas-
sive tracker, every sensation is essentially “surprising” (in statistical terms) since
priors play little to no role in making predictions about incoming data. Sensory pre-
diction errors have a much larger amplitude and are thus driving the minimisation
of free energy. The passive dreamer on the other hand, doesn’t take into account
newly observed sensations and is stuck in constant delusional state imposed by its
strong priors, e.g., the velocity being 10 m/s. The state of affairs of the world is,
in this case, completely insignificant since the agent simply hallucinates its desired
outcomes. Only process prediction errors are minimised, since sensory precisions
are too low to play a role in the optimisation of variational free energy. In this set
up, none of the new sensations are “surprising” (again, in statistical terms) since the
agent is completely uninterested in new incoming observations. Perhaps at odds
with our common intuition, this agent however presents some of the crucial ele-
ments necessary for the active inference version of a regulator. The self-generated
misalignment of real sensations and predictions about them biased by the agent’s
desires constitutes in fact the basis for forming (proprioceptive) prediction errors
that can be resolved using action (Friston et al., 2010a; Brown et al., 2013; Wiese,
2016).
In this context, it is easy to see why homeostatic regulation requires both a per-
ceptual process of estimation of the world (i.e., the agent’s velocity) and in particular,
an action selection procedure based on a “desire”, i.e., an internal set-point/target
encoded in the form of a prior. To highlight, once again, the role of prior informa-
tion for an agent I proposed two different agent in this case too: the “active tracker”
and the “active dreamer”. The active tracker largely follows the fate of the passive
one, bound to simply attempt to account for its observations. Action, in this case,
simply speeds up the process and generates behaviour similar to the one described
by the dark room problem (Friston, Thornton, and Clark, 2012). An agent whose
only purpose is to predict its sensations should find a state/place where sensations
are trivially predicted, i.e., a dark room. Considering the block in our set up, the
closest state to a “dark room” is any equilibrium of the system reached when the
action is stationary, since the action has no associated cost. This agent simply finds
the best way to predict its state by bending the world to its predictions and gener-
ating predictions that better conform to its sensations, no matter what the state of
the environment is. It is somewhat similar to the idea of niche construction in evolu-
tionary biology (Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman, 2003) and considered in active
inference too (Bruineberg et al., 2018; Constant et al., 2018), but lacks the idea of nor-
mativity constraints for building an environment that better promotes the survival
of an organism.
The last agent presented is the active dreamer. This agent actively engages with
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the environment to change the incoming sensations to match its priors, combin-
ing top-down and bottom-up processes with a more balanced role for precisions,
still however emphasising top-down information. Unlike the passive tracker and
dreamer, this agent interacts with the world and can introduce real changes to its
perceived input. Unlike the active tracker that predicts its sensations by just per-
forming actions that can fulfil them, our agent regulates variables in the environment
in order to generate input more in line with its priors. As previously mentioned, the
passive version of this agent may have looked a bit puzzling: strongly predicting
a state of affairs that has no correlation to states in the world while discarding all
the new information may look unintuitive. However, once action is introduced, this
“misperception” of the environment becomes extremely valuable. As we will see
in detail in Chapter 7, standard approaches to problems of control used in biology
and neuroscience are still based on accurate inferences of world variables, building
motor control out of inverse models mapping accurate estimates of unobservable
states of the environment to an agent’s motor commands. While this is (in principle)
possible in the linear case, the complexity of any realistic implementation of inverse
models in both biological and artificial systems is prohibitive (Adams, Shipp, and
Friston, 2013; Friston, 2011). In active inference, this process is bypassed by turning
the control problem into an inference one (see also Todorov (2009b) for a clear ex-
planation), having agents that create proprioceptive prediction errors that can only
be resolved by acting on the world (Friston, 2011). In our example, the proprio-
ceptive modality is represented by readings of the agent’s velocity and acceleration,
and errors are created by imposing a prior on the expected motion of the agent: if
the agent expected to maintain a velocity of 10 m/s, what action would it have to
take to achieve such goal? Fixing the final objective and calculating (trivially, in this
case) the time-independent policy by backward induction, one then finds a solution
given by a set of actions that counteracts the effects of sliding friction (responsible
for slowing the block down).
Even on such a simple system, some further investigations may be possible but
will not be tackled now. In particular, a possible directions involves the explo-
ration of the possible connections to computational psychiatry (Montague et al.,
2012; Stephan and Mathys, 2014). The nascent field of computational psychiatry
seeks to apply knowledge derived from computational models of decision making
to psychiatric nosology (i.e., the classification of diseases) in the standard diagnosis
process (Redish, 2004; Montague et al., 2012; Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016; Redish
and Gordon, 2016). The underlying idea is that aberrant behaviours found in psy-
chiatric disorders can be attributed to anomalous functioning of the (computational)
mechanisms responsible for the generation of such behaviours and other atypical
experiences related to a misperception of the world. Classifying pathologies in pa-
tients based on behaviour alone remains pervasive in modern diagnosis procedures
but the field is decisively moving in a new direction. The goal of computational psy-
chiatry is to pursue an understanding of behaviour and decision making based on
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the study of the latent (computational) mechanisms of psychiatric disorders through
the use of mathematical and computational models, in order to improve treatments
of different conditions. In a proposal I wrote for a fellowship in 2017, I argued for
the use of this approach not only for human experiments where it is in principle ap-
plicable (e.g., Redish (2004)), but also on artificial systems with the aim of 1) testing
the proposed computational techniques on systems with no side effects, i.e., artifi-
cial ones, and 2) improve the mathematical analysis and study of solutions that in
modern machine learning and AI tend to prefer “black-box” approaches. With re-
gards to this chapter’s agents, one could imagine to study the passive tracker’s state
as a very simple and high-level (phenomenological) model of schizophrenic traits
(Adams et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2016b). By building appropriate and more realis-
tic mechanisms of precisions update (see Chapter 6) or state-dependent uncertainty
(see Feldman and Friston (2010)), one could simulate the inability of modulating
the precision of sensory errors relative to the priors, studying how this produces
a series of effects (e.g., resistance to illusions) comparable to signs and symptoms
of schizophrenia and other psychiatric conditions. One of the main risks, in this
case, would be to oversimplify the analysis of mental health disorders by produc-
ing models that are extremely detached from reality or that make use of biologically
or behaviourally unreasonable assumptions. This is also the case, more in general,
with Bayesian descriptions of any phenomenon (Pearl, 2001; Jones and Love, 2011;
Bowers and Davis, 2012): accepting any prior as an explanation without having to
commit to the “right” answer. This discussion will however be expanded on in the
final Conclusions, where I will focus on some of the potential weaknesses of the FEP.
Another example of overly generous interpretations allowed by the use of ac-
tive inference comes from the interpretation one can give to precisions. As inverse
variances of variables in the generative model, they represent the uncertainty of an
agent on different variables of a model. In equation (4.8), as explained before, they
implement a weighting mechanism for different prediction errors. This is then used
in equation (4.9) and equation (4.10), where one can also see that their role as weights
becomes now similar to “learning rates” in connectionists’ models of optimisation.
In most of the cases reported in this chapter, these different interpretations are sim-
ply complementary and shed light on different aspects of the role of precisions. In
the last simulation implementing the active dreamer, however, I introduced an extra
learning rate in equation (4.10) to allow the convergence of action in a reasonable
time. While this may raise questions on the meaning of this extra parameter, its
presence in my simulations is only due to the method used for solving stochastic
differential equations in my examples, the Euler-Maruyama algorithm. This algo-
rithm is extremely straightforward, but it can generate large errors for even simple
stochastic simulations, as in my case when I tried to use very large process precisions
in the active dreamer. To avoid such issues, I would have to implement simulations
with a step size dt < 10−8 which would make most of my code too computationally
demanding even in its simplest form. In similar examples, see for instance Friston,
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Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau (2008), Friston uses a local linearisation approach
(Ozaki, 1992) which recasts a continuous time SDE into a discrete one while preserv-
ing most of its properties, and then simulates an exact discrete-time process.
In my work I also claimed that only the relative dominance of one set of preci-
sions over the other defines which prediction errors have priority in the minimisa-
tion of variational free energy. More in general, however, work such as Feldman and
Friston (2010) makes explicit and different predictions on the behaviour of a system
when sensory precisions are attenuated or process ones are strengthened. Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, the former defines models of the common (and according
to the authors necessary) effect of sensory attenuation, which would enable agents
to effectively generate motor action under active inference assumptions that, as we
saw, require not “paying attention” to our actual sensations. The latter, instead, is
proposed to be responsible for hallucinatory-like states where overly eager organ-
isms imagine different sensory inputs influenced by priors that are over-influencing
estimates of the state of the world.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a minimal implementation of active inference for the defini-
tion of an action-perception loop. The example was intentionally simple in order to
show the basic elements of an active inference agent and to focus on two aspects of
this framework: 1) the importance of action, to highlight the limitations of accounts
of the Bayesian brain hypothesis and predictive processing relying almost entirely
on models of perceptual inference, and 2) the role played by a balanced set of pre-
cisions, to emphasise that simple estimations of latent variables in the world with
weak priors does not allow the implementation of normative behaviour in an agent
(unless the norm is to just estimate hidden variables). The first point may look obvi-
ous, but it’s often overlooked by implementations of predictive processing/coding
models focusing on models of perception, implying that behaviour will emerge as a
consequence of good models of the world generated purely via perceptual accounts
of incoming sensory input. The second one builds on this idea and extends it to
show one of the crucial differences of the active inference framework: behaviour can
only be created by inaccurate inferences of the world. Unlike other similar frame-
works based on control theory requiring accurate estimates of latent variables (see
Chapter 7), in active inference motor actions and behaviour can emerge only in or-
der to minimise prediction errors created by systematic misrepresentations (Wiese,
2016).
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Chapter 5
Generative models of sensorimotor
contingencies
Previous implementations of active inference have typically relied on a passive,
“perception-centric" view of this theory, assuming that agents are endowed with
a detailed generative model of their surrounding environment. These “perception-
centric" approaches subordinate motor actions to the accurate and comprehensive
perception of the environmental properties generating sensory data (Hohwy, 2013)
(cf. the classical sandwich of cognitive science (Hurley, 2001)) and thus have often
brought the FEP and active inference into direct conflict with 4E views of cogni-
tion. In contrast to these claims, we present here an “action-oriented" (Clark, 2015a)
solution showing how adaptive behaviour can emerge even when agents operate
with a simple model which bears little resemblance to their environment, focusing
on a more ecological and embodied reading of the FEP (Seth, 2014b; Clark, 2015a;
Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018; Allen and Friston, 2018). This view
is, as we will see, more in line with 4E theories of cognition highlighting that be-
haviour generated by apparently complex world models is, in fact, the product of
agent/environment dynamical couplings. In this light, agents can only be properly
studied and understood when coupled to their environment and generative models
are, essentially, not generating objectively good predictions of the world but simple
sensorimotor contingencies.
In this chapter we implement an example of a simple wheeled agent performing
phototaxis under active inference and present it as a proof of principle of an “action-
oriented" reading on the FEP. We will explain the assumptions that allow for the
emergence of phototaxis, showing its dependence on precision parameters (inverse
variances) of different prediction errors and finally present an example of a different,
“pathological" behaviour when some of these assumptions are not met. This chap-
ter is based on Baltieri and Buckley (2017), with a few improvements: the state-space
model is now represented correctly using random variables rather than their means
(cf. Buckley et al. (2017)) and with learning rates (still introduced here for complete-
ness) now all set to 1, simplifying our interpretation of the agent’s behaviour which
is now completely independent on extra parameters. Compared to Chapter 4, here
I strongly emphasise the differences between the generative model of the agent and
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the generative process of the world (i.e., what characterises action oriented agents in
active inference), closer to ideas of sensorimotor contingencies (Buhrmann, Di Paolo,
and Barandiaran, 2013; Seth, 2014b) rather than agents as mirrors of the world.
5.1 Background
As shown in Chapter 3, under a series of assumptions (mainly the Laplace approxi-
mation), the free energy functional simplifies to equation (3.30). For simplicity, here
we assume that no hidden inputs v˜ are represented in the variational free energy.
Furthermore, in this work we do not consider the use of generalised coordinates of
motion, simplifying thus variables ψ˜, x˜ to ψ, x:
F ≈ − ln p(ψ, x; θ, γ)
∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
(5.1)
Parameters θ are all equal to 1 while hyperparameters γ are fixed variables; both of
them are dropped in this formulation from now on and only discussed later on
F ≈ − ln p(ψ, x)
∣∣∣
x=µx
(5.2)
As seen in previous chapters, p(ψ, x) = p(ψ|x)p(x) is the generative density com-
prising of a likelihood p(ψ|x) and a prior p(x) on (estimated) hidden states x. In this
chapter we will consider multiple independent variables, thus maintaining a formu-
lation in terms of scalar variables and function(al)s, and only in Chapter 7 present a
multivariate implementation of the FEP. Under this framework, it is suggested that
perception is implemented as the minimisation of variational free energy with re-
spect to the means of hidden states µx. With assumptions on the generative model
making external noise and internal fluctuations Gaussian random variables and un-
der the Laplace approximation (MacKay, 2003; Friston et al., 2007) (see also Chap-
ter 3), one can in fact reduce the optimisation of hidden states x to the minimisation
of their modes/means µx, showing that the variances of the recognition density, ς2,
are recovered analytically with the Hessian of the variational energy (MacKay, 2003;
Friston et al., 2007) (see again Chapter 3). Perception is thus implemented, as seen
in Chapter 3, as:
µ˙x = − ∂F
∂µx
(5.3)
which updates µx and converges when the minimum of the variational free energy
F is reached, i.e., when ∂F/∂µx = 0. This equation, unlike equation (3.35) in Chap-
ter 3, does not consider generalised coordinates of motion, meaning that higher em-
bedding orders of motion of expected hidden states x are suppressed. In practice
this means that our generative model will be in a static frame of reference (i.e., not
chancing over time), and that measurement noise and internal fluctuations will be
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modelled as Gaussian random variables with zero autocorrelation in the more tra-
ditional Ito’s sense, as in classic Bayesian filtering methodologies based on standard
state-space model formulations (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008).
In contrasts to perception, action is defined as a process of changing the world
such that sensory data better accords with predictions of the generative model (Fig. 5.1).
Specifically, in terms of the formalism presented in Chapter 3, while perception min-
imises the divergence term in the definition of free energy equation (3.6) by finding a
variational density closer to the posterior, action optimises indirectly the second one,
surprisal, by updating sensations ψ (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018). To
achieve this, an agent must know (or at least have an approximation of) how in-
puts ψ depend on motor actions a (i.e., ψ = f(a)) (Friston et al., 2010a; Buckley et
al., 2017). With such knowledge, action can similarly be cast as a minimisation via
gradient descent on the free energy with respect to a:
a˙ = −∂F
∂a
= −∂F
∂ψ
∂ψ
∂a
(5.4)
Thus action and perception can be described as the minimisation of the same quan-
tity, with the simultaneous implementation of both processes closing the action-
perception loop, see Fig. 5.1.
Generative model
World dynamics
Exteroceptive 
PEs
Proprioceptive 
PEs 
Predictions
Sensations
Action
Perception
Agent
FIGURE 5.1: A schematic of the FEP. Two types of sensations, extero-
ceptive (e.g., light intensity, ψl) and proprioceptive (e.g., motor veloc-
ity, ψm), represent the sensory input of an agent (blue arrows). Beliefs
or predictions on exteroceptive input are updated within the gener-
ative model through perception (red arrows). The dashed red arrow
denotes the lack of updates on proprioceptive prediction errors due to
new sensations, necessary for phototaxis later on. This update is how-
ever introduced later on to show “pathological behaviour". Action
solves the discrepancy between predictions of the generative model
and incoming sensations by engaging with the world.
Chapter 5. Generative models of sensorimotor contingencies 88
5.2 A minimal generative model of phototaxis
To present some of the core ideas behind the FEP and active inference and their
connections to 4E theories, we implement phototaxis on a simple 2-wheeled vehicle1.
We simulate an agent with circular body, 2 noisy light sensors and 2 noiseless motors,
see Fig. 5.2. For simplicity, we do not simulate occlusion of the light source by the
agent’s body.
ψl1 ψl2
ψm1 ψm2
μl1 μl2
μm1 μm2
FIGURE 5.2: The wheeled vehicle used in our simulations of pho-
totaxis. The agent receives input from two exteroceptors reading
light intensity (ψl1 , ψl2 ) and two proprioceptors reading wheel veloc-
ity (ψm1 , ψm2 ). Variables µl1 , µl2 , µm1 , µm2 are part of the generative
model of the agent. The red lines represent the relations between the
agent’s priors on the dynamics of the world, very distant from how
the real dynamics work.
In several previous agent-based simulations of the FEP, it is typically assumed
that an agent possesses a rich and detailed model of its environment, matching the
complexity of the dynamics describing the world, see for example Friston and Kiebel
(2009a), Friston et al. (2010a), and Friston et al. (2012). If we were to take the same
approach here, we would perhaps start by assuming that the agent has a represen-
tation of the locations of both itself and the light source, following a methodology
similar to SLAM (Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping) (Thrun, Burgard, and
Fox, 2005). However, a more action-oriented interpretation of the FEP suggests that
adaptive behaviour could emerge from generative models that are more parsimo-
nious and encoding only sensorimotor contingencies (Seth, 2014b; Clark, 2015a),
capturing only basic regularities of the coupled agent/environment system. To ex-
amine this, we endow our agent with a minimal model of its surrounding environ-
ment. Specifically, our agent receives four inputs: two from exteroceptors sensitive
to light ψl1 , ψl2 and two from proprioceptors ψm1 , ψm2 sensing motor velocity, see
Fig. 5.2. We then assume that it only models four hidden states x = {l1, l2,m1,m2},
one for each input, see table 5.1.
To specify the agent’s generative density necessary in equation (5.2), p(ψ, x) =
p(ψ|x)p(x), we then define a likelihood, p(ψ|x) and a prior p(x) in terms of the
1The code is available at https://github.com/mbaltieri/braitenberg_vehicles.
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TABLE 5.1: Variables used in the definition of the generative model.
Variable Description
ψ
Set of sensory inputs
{ψl1 , ψl2 , ψm1 , ψm2}
ψl1 , ψl2
Luminance readings from sensors 1
and 2 (exteroceptors)
ψm1 , ψm2
Velocity readings from motors 1 and 2
(proprioceptors)
x
Set of estimated hidden states
{xl1 , xl2 , xm1 , xm2}
xl1 , xl2
Hidden states of exteroceptive sensory
readings in the generative model
xm1 , xm2
Hidden states of proprioceptive sen-
sory readings in the generative model
µxl1 , µxl2
Means/expected hidden states of exte-
roceptive sensory readings in the gen-
erative model
µxm1 , µxm2
Means/expected hidden states of pro-
prioceptive sensory readings in the
generative model
z, w
Gaussian variables representing un-
certainty of the agent on sensory input
and dynamics, respectively
agent’s estimates of hidden states x. In order to do so we first prescribe a model
of how exteroceptive sensations (i.e., light intensity) are generated according to the
agent:
ψl1 = xl1 + zl1 , ψl2 = xl2 + zl2 , (5.5)
and similarly for the proprioceptors, representing readings of the velocity of each
motor:
ψm1 = xm1 + zm1 , ψm2 = xm2 + zm2 (5.6)
where we effectively assume that sensory readings are linearly related to their hid-
den states, with some additive zero-mean Gaussian noise z = {zl1 , zl2 , zm1 , zm2}with
variance σ2z = {σ2zl1 , σ
2
zl2
, σ2zm1
, σ2zm2
} representing measurement uncertainty. The
agent’s priors on hidden states are then specified in terms of p(xm, xl) = p(xm|xl)p(xl),
with variables xm1 , xm2 only depending on xl1 , xl2 . This relation implements a very
simple and naive assumption for the agent: predictions on proprioceptive input
xm1 , xm2 depend upon predictions on luminance (exteroceptive sensations) xl1 , xl2 ,
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but not the other way around. This is a simplifying assumption that, as we will see,
enforces a (nearly) reactive motor behaviour triggered by an (almost) input-output
response, i.e., proprioceptive input instantly guided by exteroceptive readings of the
sensors on the opposite side. We then write a model of the priors as:
xm1 = xl2 + wm1 , xm2 = xl1 + wm2 (5.7)
where w = {wm1 , wm2} are zero-mean Gaussian noise terms with variance σ2w =
{σ2wm1 , σ2wm2}, describing the uncertainty on the dynamics of the system. Effectively,
we specify relations between sensors and motors, describing the underlying dynam-
ics in terms of a contralateral relationship between estimates of exteroceptive (light)
sensors xl and proprioceptive (motor velocities) xm. These priors will make our
agent functionally consistent with Braitenberg vehicle 2b, the “aggressor" (Braiten-
berg, 1986). We then assume non-informative Gaussian priors on xl, p(xl), i.e., they
have high variance (low precision), making them nearly uniform and thus removing
them from our model for simplicity.
Under the assumption that random variables z are Gaussian with zero mean as
in equation (3.31), we can define the likelihood functions
p(ψl|xl) = 1√
2piσ2zl
exp
(−(ψl − xl)2
(2σ2zl)
)
p(ψm|xm) = 1√
2piσ2zm
exp
(−(ψm − xm)2
(2σ2zm)
)
(5.8)
where l = {l1, l2} and m = {m1,m2}. Similarly, with Gaussian noise w the priors
become
p(xm1 |xl2) =
1√
2piσ2wm1
exp
(−(xm1 − xl2)2
(2σ2wm1
)
)
p(xm2 |xl1) =
1√
2piσ2wm2
exp
(−(xm2 − xl1)2
(2σ2wm2
)
)
(5.9)
As a result of the Gaussian assumption for both z and w and considering the Laplace
assumption on the variational energy introduced in Chapter 3, the free energy is
evaluated at the mode of the generative density (see equation (5.2) and Chapter 3)
and reduces to (without constants):
F ≈ 1
2
(
pizl1 (ψl1 − µl1)2 + pizl2 (ψl2 − µl2)2 + pizm1 (ψm1 − µm1)2 + pizm2 (ψm2 − µm2)2
+ piwm1 (µm1 − µl2)2 + piwm2 (µm2 − µx1)2 + ln(pizl1pizl2pizm1pizm2piwm1piwm2 )
)
(5.10)
where pizl1 , pizl2 , pizm1 , pizm2 and piwm1 , piwm2 are the inverse variances of noise terms
z and w respectively, also called precisions (see Chapter 3). Precision parameters
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weight predictions errors based on the agent’s confidence on a certain expectation.
High precisions imply low variances/uncertainty and thus high confidence, and
vice versa. These parameters allow for different emphases on the minimisation of
free energy, for example, an agent could focus more on predictions based on its pri-
ors and weighted by piw or rely more on sensations from the environment when piz
are large (see Chapter 4). Some of the implications of this weighting mechanism will
be developed in more detail for this model with our simulations. We also explicitly
replaced hidden states x with their means µx, to highlight the fact that under the
Laplace approximation, the conditional variances ς2 can be obtained analytically as
explained in Chapter 3. With the expression for the free energy we can now derive
explicit equations for our model that will implement perception (equation (5.3)):
µ˙l1 = −k
(
pizl1 (µl1 − ψl1) + piwm2 (µl1 − µm2)
)
µ˙l2 = −k
(
pizl2 (µl2 − ψl2) + piwm1 (µl2 − µm1)
)
µ˙m1 = −k
(
pizm1 (µm1 − ψm1) + piwm1 (µm1 − µl2)
)
µ˙m2 = −k
(
pizm1 (µm2 − ψm2) + piwm2 (µm2 − µl1)
)
(5.11)
and action (equation (5.4)):
a˙1 =− k
(
pizm1 (ψm1 − µm1)
∂ψm1
∂a1
+ pizm2 (ψm2 − µm2)
∂ψm2
∂a1
)
a˙2 =− k
(
pizm1 (ψm1 − µm1)
∂ψm1
∂a2
+ pizm2 (ψm2 − µm2)
∂ψm2
∂a2
)
(5.12)
where k is the learning rate used for the gradient descent in Baltieri and Buckley
(2017) and here simply equal to 1.
To implement action according to equation (5.4) we must first introduce the
agent’s model of the relationship between its actions and its observations. Here
this relationship will be defined in a way consistent with the idea of sensorimotor
contingencies (Seth, 2014b), i.e., simple mappings between actions and percepts. We
assume that actions a1, a2 can influence proprioceptive sensations ψm1 , ψm2 but, for
simplicity, not exteroceptive ones ψl1 , ψl2 . This is clearly an unrealistic assumption
since actions do, in practice, change all types of sensory inputs. More in general
however, this speaks to our broader claim on the importance of simple generative
models coupled in the "right way" to their environment over their objective accuracy.
Although not the most accurate, these models may constitute a good set of heuristics
for the achievement of certain goals in, possibly, simplest way (i.e., Braitenberg-like
vehicles). As explained in Friston et al. (2010a), active inference dispenses with the
traditional notion of forward/inverse models for motor control in favour of a more
general generative (forward) model inverted through Bayesian inference. In this
framework, the “inverse” model is thought to be implicitly encoded in predictions
about proprioceptive consequences that are implemented through simple reflex arcs
embodied in an agent. In our agent, the reflex arcs correspond to the partial the
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partial derivatives ∂ψm1,2/∂a1,2 and will be encoded as:∂ψm1∂a1 ∂ψm2∂a1
∂ψm1
∂a2
∂ψm2
∂a2
 =
1 0
0 1
 (5.13)
Motor reflex arcs are then implemented in the world with the assumption that each
motor takes as an input one of the actions produced through the minimisation of
free energy
v1 = a1, v2 = a2. (5.14)
where v1, v2 are the real linear velocities of the vehicle’s wheels. One may ask why
we are not providing actions as forces (and thus accelerations) for the agent and this
is simply due to a simplification we made to avoid the formulation of dynamical
models in state-space models in generalised coordinates of motion, used in the fol-
lowing chapters. In general, if the only readings included (wheel) velocities, one
would need extra information regarding the mechanisms that transform accelera-
tions in velocities for the vehicle and normally implicitly assumed to be available in
implementations of standard controllers.
5.3 Simulations
5.3.1 Phototaxis
Each column in Fig. 5.3 shows the simulation of 10 different vehicles with random
initial conditions (position and orientation of the agent). We also added Gaussian
noise to each precision parameter (mean varying up to ±20% of the nominal value
of each log-precision, variance 1) to confirm the robustness of the solution.
The behaviour of agents operating under the FEP can be shown to depend on
the value of precision parameters. In our first simulation, we adjust the precisions to
implement phototaxis. Priors in the generative model implement linear contralateral
relations between µl and µm (see equation (5.7)). In this setup, our agent needs to
accurately infer µl from its readings on luminance ψl (Fig. 5.3c top). Expectations
µl are then mapped to expectations on proprioceptive input µm (Fig. 5.3c bottom),
see priors in equation (5.7) and projected to the motors via fast (instantaneous in
our simulations) reflex arcs, i.e., ψm = µm. To do so, precisions on proprioceptive
sensations (pizm) need to be much lower relatively to those on the priors (piwm), in
turn smaller than the precisions on exteroceptors (pizl).
This enables the sensorimotor flow we just implicitly described: 1) inference of
exteroceptive sensations, 2) coupling between expectations about light levels and
motor velocities and 3) actuation of the motors based on the agent’s expectations
about proprioceptive input (dictated by the light intensity). In table 5.2, we show
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TABLE 5.2: Simplified equations for phototaxis. Approximations of
equation (5.11) and equation (5.12) with assumptions on precisions
enacting phototactic behaviour.
Approximate dynamics - phototaxis
Left sensor, right motor Right sensor, left motor
1) µ˙l1 ≈ −pizl1 (µl1 − ψl1) 1) µ˙l2 ≈ −pizl2 (µl2 − ψl2)
2) µ˙m2 ≈ −piwm2 (µm2 − µl1) 2) µ˙m1 ≈ −piwm1 (µm1 − µl2)
3) a˙2 ≈ −pizm2 (ψm2 − µm2) 3) a˙1 ≈ −pizm1 (ψm1 − µm1)
how the formulation of perception and action set out in equation (5.11) and equa-
tion (5.12), respectively, is simplified by these assumptions for the left-sensor/right-
motor relation, {µl1 , µm2} and the right-sensor/left-motor one {µl2 , µm1}. When
these assumptions are met, the vehicle performs phototaxis akin to Braitenberg ve-
hicle 2b (Braitenberg, 1986).
Fig. 5.3a shows the “aggressor-like" behaviour of our agent, which speeds up
close to the light and slows down away from it. At the beginning of our simulation
we initialise all estimates x to zero. Fig. 5.3e shows how, after a brief transient due
to these initial conditions, the free energy rapidly approaches a minimum value ex-
hibiting fluctuations only driven by noise on exteroceptive input. This minimum is
reached in less than 0.1 seconds, while it takes the agent nearly 2 seconds to reach
the light, see Fig. 5.3c top. This is because the generative model we define does
not encode explicit priors on light levels and thus does not specify a target lumi-
nance. Instead, the agent minimises free energy by simply satisfying a sensorimotor
mapping between expectations about light levels and motor velocities. Phototaxis
emerges as a consequence of the coupling between expectations µl and µm, not be-
cause of an explicitly encoded goal.
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FIGURE 5.3: Phototaxis and akinesia under active inference. First
column: Phototaxis under the active inference. (A) Trajectory of the
vehicle over 5 seconds of simulation. The red circles represent the
agents at their initial positions (with orientations parallel to the verti-
cal axis shown using black lines), the yellow circle is the light source.
(C - top) True (blue line) and inferred (red line) sensory input ψl1 and
µl1 . (C - bottom) Coupling of expectation on left sensor µl1 with ex-
pectation on right motor velocity µm2 . (E) Free energy over the first
0.2 seconds. Second column: Example of “pathological" behaviour
under the FEP/Active Inference (akinesia) obtained with higher sen-
sory/proprioceptive precisions. Same layout described above with
figures (B), (D), (F).
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5.3.2 Pathological behaviour
The sensitivity of behaviour to precisions has been used extensively to develop hy-
potheses and computational models for phenomena including for instance psychosis
and schizophrenia (Adams et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2016b), sensory attenuation
(Brown et al., 2013) and attention (Feldman and Friston, 2010). Here we present an
interpretation of the role of precisions for our agent inspired by these accounts.
If the balance of precisions on proprioceptive inputs pizm and on priors piwm is al-
tered, with an increase of the former and a decrease of the latter, the behaviour of our
vehicle is severely affected by the change. The sensorimotor flow necessary for pho-
totaxis is disrupted and while the agent still infers light levels through µl (Fig. 5.3d
top), these expectations are not mapped to µm (Fig. 5.3d bottom) since the agent’s
precisions about their relation piwm are dominated by precisions on proprioceptive
input pizm (equation 2 in table 5.3).
This behaviour is consistent with interpretations, under the FEP, of motor control
disorders where movements are limited (hypokinesia) or entirely absent (akinesia)
(Brown et al., 2013). In active inference terms, decreasing proprioceptive prediction
errors precisions, pizm in our case, is thought to be a necessary condition to actuate
motor commands (Brown et al., 2013). Failing to reduce them generates atypical
behaviour corresponding to an agent completely unable to move as in the case we
discussed when precisions on proprioceptive input pizm are larger than precisions
piwm (Fig. 5.3b), or having limited motor capabilities when pizm and piwm are closer
in magnitude (not shown here). More importantly, processes of inference on new
incoming sensations are preserved, but this information is not used to trigger ap-
propriate motor commands (see the passive tracker in Chapter 4).
TABLE 5.3: Simplified equations for pathological behaviour. Ap-
proximations of equation (5.11) and equation (5.12) with assumptions
on precisions preventing phototactic behaviour.
Approximate dynamics - pathological behaviour
Left sensor, right motor Right sensor, left motor
1) µ˙l1 ≈ −pizl1 (µl1 − ψl1) 1) µ˙l2 ≈ −pizl2 (µl2 − ψl2)
2) µ˙m2 ≈ −pizm2 (µm2 − ψm2) 2) µ˙m1 ≈ −pizm1 (µm1 − ψm1)
3) a˙2 ≈ −pizm2 (ψm2 − µm2) 3) a˙1 ≈ −pizm1 (ψm1 − µm1)
5.3.3 Other vehicles
Previously, we showed that different precisions within the same generative model
can qualitatively affect the behaviour of an agent, going from performing photo-
taxis to a catatonic state by just regulating some of these weights. In this section we
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explore how different priors, encoding in our case the relationships between extero-
ceptive and proprioceptive inputs (see equation (5.7)) can also be used to generate
new emergent behaviour. As we saw in section 5.2, during the definition of our gen-
erative model, vehicles in Fig. 5.3a described trajectories consistent with Braitenberg
vehicle 2b. Simple changes to the priors in equation (5.7) can easily reproduce be-
haviours analogous to other vehicles, for instance 2a (the “coward"), 3a (the “lover")
and 3b (the “explorer").
In more detail, models of the priors were updated to:
• for the coward vehicle, rapidly running away from the light to then slow down
once distance is gained,
µm1 = µl1 + wm1 , µm2 = µl2 + wm2 (5.15)
• for the lover vehicle, quickly approaching the light while decreasing its speed
close to the source,
µm1 = lmax − µl1 + wm1 , µm2 = lmax − µl2 + wm2 (5.16)
• for the explorer vehicle, repelled by the light, moving slowly in its vicinity and
speeding up away from it,
µm1 = lmax − µl2 + wm1 , µm2 = lmax − µl1 + wm2 (5.17)
with lmax representing the highest light intensity in the agents’ environment.
5.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we presented an implementation of phototaxis within an emerging
framework in computational and cognitive neuroscience, the Free Energy Principle
(FEP). According to the FEP, processes like perception, learning and action can be de-
fined in biological systems as the minimisation of a quantity defined as (variational)
free energy (Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Friston, 2010b; Friston, 2012). Most
of the simulations proposed so far have focused on “perception-centric" interpre-
tations of the FEP, where generative models play the role of accurate descriptions
of the dynamics of the world they represent. These models can capture the intrin-
sic properties of an agent’s sensations and reconstruct the hidden properties of these
sensations to a great degree of detail. On this view, a model is assessed on how accu-
rately it can predict incoming sensations, behaviour only emerges as a consequence
of reliable information encoded by the agent.
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FIGURE 5.4: Different braitenberg vehicles are obtained by updat-
ing the priors of the agent. (A) shows the “coward"-like behaviour
of Braitenberg vehicle 2a. (C) is akin to vehicle 3a, the “lover". (E)
behaves as vehicle 3b, the “explorer". On the right, (B), (D) and (F)
show the respective processes of minimisation of variational free en-
ergy. Ten simulations were performed for each set up, with random
initial conditions (position and orientation of the agent). We also
added Gaussian noise to each precision parameter (mean varying up
to ±20% of the value of each precision parameter, variance 1) to con-
firm the robustness of the solution.
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Our implementation, on the other hand, represents an example of “action-oriented"
interpretations of the FEP framework (Seth, 2014b; Clark, 2015a; Bruineberg, Kiver-
stein, and Rietveld, 2018; Allen and Friston, 2018), with a focus on minimal gen-
erative models. In this case, models are evaluated based on their ability to allow
an agent to perform a task or achieve a certain goal. The information recapitulated
in these models is only relevant to an agent engaging in ecologically relevant be-
haviour: inferring and encoding more properties of the world dynamics is not nec-
essarily an advantage (Ashby, 1958). This idea is described within the formalism
of the FEP as the complexity-accuracy trade off. It is possible, in fact, to rewrite
equation (3.6) in information theoretical terms as a combination of measures of com-
plexity and accuracy (Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Friston, 2010b), see equa-
tion (3.10). According to this alternative reading, minimising variational free energy
is equivalent to maximising a measure of the predictive power (i.e., accuracy) of a
generative model while minimising its complexity (i.e., the number of degrees of
freedom). An agent, according to the FEP, is then mandated to encode only relevant
information to avoid unnecessary complex models that don’t improve its perfor-
mances.
Our agent’s generative model contains a set of variables, µx = {µl1 , µl2 , µm1 , µm2}
acting as expectations on the hidden states x of sensations ψ = {ψl1 , ψl2 , ψm1 , ψm2}.
In our implementation, these variables are not strongly related to how sensory data
ψ’s are actually generated, i.e., they contain no information about, for example, the
details of the agent’s body or its environment. It could be argued that this agent
does not even possess a generative model since, effectively, it cannot generate predic-
tions in line with sensory data if not tightly coupled to its environment (cf. classi-
cal ideas such as the wake phase in the wake-sleep algorithm (Dayan et al., 1995)).
Our interpretation, however, aligns with (Clark, 2015a; Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and
Rietveld, 2018) in saying that a generative model in the context of embodied agents
should be assessed based on its ability to prescribe an agent to perform a task (action-
oriented), rather than on how well it can reconstruct and accurately predict sensory
input (perception-centric).
In our simulations, we first provided an account of phototaxis functionally con-
sistent with vehicle 2b (Braitenberg, 1986), and how it could be implemented under
the FEP. To allow for such behaviour, our agent was endowed with expectations on
exteroceptive readings (i.e., light intensity) mapped to proprioceptive ones (i.e., mo-
tor velocity) using simple linear priors on contralateral relations. In addition, this
agent needs to implement high and low precisions on exteroceptive and proprio-
ceptive inputs respectively, with precisions on their interaction placed somewhere
in between. This agent performs phototaxis through active inference without explic-
itly encoding information about a target end-point in the generative model, i.e., it
does not specify a light intensity to achieve. The priors of this agent encode a target
“state of affairs" rather than a final goal. This agent thus minimises its free energy by
complying with this state of affairs, not by achieving an explicit goal state, similarly
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to the idea of homeokinesis (Der and Martius, 2012). Phototaxis is just a consequence
of sensorimotor contingencies represented by how priors relate light levels to motor
velocities.
We then explored behaviours defined as “pathological", inspired by work on the
FEP for motor disorders, psychosis and schizophrenia among others (Adams et al.,
2013; Friston et al., 2016b). Some pathologies, it has been suggested, can be recapit-
ulated under the FEP and active inference using different weighting parameters in a
generative model (i.e., precisions). Our simulations investigated a case where a com-
bination of high precisions on proprioceptive prediction errors and low precisions
on the prior coupling between extero- and proprioceptive expectations resulted in
a reduced (or complete lack of) ability to move. A similar idea was presented by
Brown et al. (2013) where decreasing the confidence (precision) of sensations about
self-generated movements is thought to be a necessary condition for the initiation
of action. We finally explored how simple changes in priors can produce new emer-
gent behaviours, for example an alternative version of phototaxis and two types of
photophobia, in line with vehicles 2a and 3a-b (Braitenberg, 1986), .
In the future, we will investigate the possible functional benefits of this architec-
ture based on the FEP. For instance, preliminary results comparing standard Brait-
enberg vehicles and our implementation already suggest a higher robustness of the
active inference agent in very noisy environments because of low-pass filters im-
plemented by equation (5.11) and equation (5.12). A second direction will address
generative models with a less minimal set of assumptions, including for example
priors on different exteroceptive inputs (e.g., a target position to reach?) or intero-
ceptive ones (e.g., the maintenance of temperature or other variables related to lu-
minance?). These priors could model the exploration of behaviours that can only be
performed with the implementation of such mechanisms (e.g., dynamic trajectories
such as keeping a certain distance from the light source while maintaining a certain
temperature?). This will allow us to investigate the implications for the perception-
centric vs. action-oriented debate on the interpretation of the FEP (Clark, 2015a;
Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018; Allen and Friston, 2018) for more com-
plex adaptive behaviours. It would also be interesting to investigate the “wiggling”
behaviour displayed by all of our agents, see Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4. This is likely to be
appear because of the small delays introduced between the estimation of light levels
and the implementation of motor actions in our numerical simulations (smaller time
steps were already reducing the jiggling, although not cancelling it out completely).
In active inference we could dispose of this abnormal behaviour with the implemen-
tation of delayed differential equations using generalised coordinates of motion in
our model, discounting for these small delays by including them into the agent’s
generative model, see for instance Perrinet, Adams, and Friston (2014).
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5.5 Conclusions
The implementation of phototaxis we presented here is admittedly rather compli-
cated. However, this chapter constitutes a simple but complete proof of concept
of action-oriented approaches to the FEP. By creating a generative model encoding
virtually no objective knowledge of the environment, we showed that the common
intuition prescribing the necessity of agents as mirrors of their world in the FEP
and other Bayesian accounts of cognition is misguided. In this chapter’s set up, be-
haviour can emerge as a simple consequence of strong priors enforcing a tight cou-
pling between an agent and its milieu. The minimisation of variational free energy
describes then only the realisation of such coupling, while the dynamics of an agent-
environment system altogether generate (apparently) purposeful behaviour as in
classic implementations of 4E ideas, e.g., Braitenberg (1986). The action-oriented
model we implemented has also begun to address some of the concerns about the
FEP exposed in Clark (2015a) and Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld (2018), es-
sentially worrying that interpretations of this framework have been so far too de-
pendent on a perception-centric account of behaviour. Our example shows that this
need not be the case. We would argue that, more in general, the FEP is neutral on
the implementation details of agentive behaviour and is thus compatible with many
different cognitive frameworks, including 4E.
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Chapter 6
An active inference models of
robust regulation via integral
control
The relationship between information/probability theory and control theory has
long been recognised, with the first intuitions emerging from work by Ashby (1958),
Shannon (1959), and Kalman (1960c). As discussed in Chapter 2, a unifying view
of these two theoretical frameworks is nowadays proposed for instance in stochas-
tic optimal control (Stengel, 1994; Todorov, 2008) and extended in active inference
(Friston, 2011), with connections to ideas of sensorimotor loops in biological systems
(Friston et al., 2010a; Friston et al., 2015). These connections emphasise homeosta-
sis, regulation and concepts such as set-point control and negative feedback for the
study of different aspects of living systems, with roots in the cybernetics movement
(Ashby, 1957; Wiener, 1961). It remains, however, unclear how the active inference
formulation directly relates to more traditional concepts of classical control theory.
PID control, a popular control strategy working with little prior knowledge of the
process to regulate, is commonly applied in engineering (Åström, 1995; Ang, Chong,
and Li, 2005; Åström and Hägglund, 2006) and more recently used in biology and
neuroscience modelling (Yi et al., 2000; Yang and Iglesias, 2006; Ang et al., 2010; Ritz
et al., 2018; Chevalier et al., 2018). In this chapter, we develop an information theo-
retic interpretation of PID control, showing how it can be derived in a more general
Bayesian (active) inference framework. We will show, in particular, that approximate
models of the world are often enough for regulation, and in particular that simple
linear generative models that only approximate the true dynamics of the environ-
ment implement PID control as a process of inference. Using this formulation we
also propose a new method for the optimisation of the gains of PID controllers based
on the same principle of variational free energy minimisation, and implemented as
a second order optimisation process. Finally, we will show that our implementa-
tion of PID controllers as approximate Bayesian inference lends itself to a general
framework for the formalisation of different (conflicting) criteria in the design of a
controller, the so-called performance-robustness trade-off (Åström and Hägglund,
2001; Åström and Hägglund, 2006), as a cohesive set of constraints implemented in
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a free energy functional. In active inference, these criteria will be mapped to pre-
cisions, or inverse variances, of observations and dynamics of a state-space model
with a straightforward interpretation in terms of uncertainty on different variables
of a system.
This chapter extends results from Chapter 5 and is based on Baltieri and Buckley
(2018a) and Baltieri and Buckley (2019c). Here we emphasise once more the role of
potential differences between the generative model of an agent and the generative
process of its environment. The generative model in particular is a simple linear
approximation of the world dynamics with priors representing the agent’s target
state (or more in general target trajectory). Regulation equivalent to PID control is
achieved by agents forcing the world to match their desires expressed in terms of
linear dynamics. The chapter includes a mathematical derivation PID-like control
in active inference, showing then the equivalence between the parameters or gains
of a PID controller and precisions of the FEP formulation. I then propose an ana-
lytical mechanism for the optimisation of these gains based on the optimisation of
precision hyperparameters introduced in Chapter 3. An agent-based model of cruise
control with more realistic and complex dynamics (cf. Chapter 3) is then used to sim-
ulate our active inference agent and test its robustness in presence of disturbances,
changes to target states and varying observation noise. We finally test the optimi-
sation of (hyper)parameters, showing the improvements achieved by our PID-like
agent.
6.1 PID control
Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) control is one of the most popular types of
controllers used in industrial applications, with more than 90% of total controllers
implementing PID or PI (no derivative) regulation (Åström and Hägglund, 2004;
Åström and Hägglund, 2006). It is one of the simplest set-point regulators, whereby
a desired state (i.e., set-point, reference, target) represents the final goal of the reg-
ulation process, e.g., to maintain a room temperature of 23◦ C. PID controllers are
based on closed-loop strategies with a negative feedback mechanism that tracks the
real state of the environment. In the most traditional implementation of negative
feedback methods, the difference between the measured state of the variable to reg-
ulate (e.g., the real temperature in a room) and the target value (e.g., 23◦ C) produces
a prediction error whose minimisation drives the controller’s output, e.g., if the tem-
perature is too high, it is decreased and if too low, it is raised. In mathematical terms:
e(t) = yr − y(t) (6.1)
where e(t) is the error, yr is the reference or set-point (e.g., desired temperature) and
y(t) is the observed variable (e.g., the actual room temperature).
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This mechanism is, however, unstable in very common conditions, in particular
when a steady-state offset is added (e.g., a sudden and unpredictable change in ex-
ternal conditions affecting the room temperature which are not under our control),
or when fluctuations need to be suppressed (e.g., too many oscillations while reg-
ulating the temperature may be undesirable). PID controllers elegantly deal with
both of these problems by augmenting the standard negative feedback architecture,
here called proportional or P term, with an integral or I and a derivative or D term,
see Fig. 6.1. The integral term accumulates the prediction error over time in order
to cancel out errors due to unaccounted steady-state input, while minimising the
derivative of the prediction error leads to a decrease in the amplitude of fluctuations
of the controlled signal. The general form of the control signal u(t) generated by a
PID controller is usually described by:
u(t) = kpe(t) + ki
∫ t
0
e(τ)dτ + kd
de(t)
dt
(6.2)
where e(t) is, again, the prediction error and kp, ki, kd are the so called proportional,
integral and derivative gains respectively, a set of parameters used to tune the rela-
tive strength of the P, I and D terms of the controller.
FIGURE 6.1: A PID controller. The prediction error e(t) is given by
the difference between a reference signal r(t), yr in our formulation,
and the output y(t) of a process. The different terms, one proportional
to the error (P term), one integrating the error over time (I term) and
one differentiating it (D term), drive the control signal u(t). Image
taken from (Arturo Urquizo, 2011).
The popularity of PID controllers is largely due to their robustness in the pres-
ence of uncertainty, i.e., step disturbances and more in general measurement noise,
given by the filtering properties of the I term. One of the major challenges on the
other hand, lies with the tuning of parameters kp, ki, kd, that have to be adapted to
deal with different (often conflicting) constraints on the regulation process (Åström,
1995; Åström and Hägglund, 2001).
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6.1.1 The performance-robustness trade-off
The presence of conflicting criteria for the design of PID controller is a well known is-
sue in the control theory literature, often referred to as the performance-robustness
trade-off (Rivera, Morari, and Skogestad, 1986; Åström, Panagopoulos, and Häg-
glund, 1998; Åström and Hägglund, 2001; Åström and Hägglund, 2006; Garpinger,
Hägglund, and Åström, 2014). A controller needs to optimise pre-specified perfor-
mance criteria while, at the same time, preserving some level of robustness in face
of uncertainty and unexpected conditions during the regulation process. In recent
attempts to formalise and standardise these general principles (Åström and Häg-
glund, 2001; Åström and Hägglund, 2006), the performance of a controller has been
proposed to be evaluated through:
• load disturbance response, how a controller reacts to changes in external in-
puts, e.g., a step input,
• set-point response, how a controller responds to different set-points over time,
• measurement noise response, how noise on the observations impacts the reg-
ulation process,
while robustness to be assessed on:
• robustness to model uncertainty, how uncertainty on the plant/environment
dynamics affects the controller.
The goal of a general methodology for the design and tuning of PID controllers
is to bring together these (and possibly more) criteria into a formal and tractable
framework that can be used for a large class of problems. To date, the only pro-
posal attempting to do so is presented in Åström, Panagopoulos, and Hägglund
(1998). This methodology is based on the maximisation of the integral gain (equiv-
alent to the minimisation of the integral of the error from the set-point, see Åström
(1995)), subject to constraints derived from a frequency domain analysis related to
the Nyquist stability criterion applied to the controlled system (Åström, Panagopou-
los, and Hägglund, 1998). In this chapter, we propose our formulation also as a gen-
eral framework for the design and tuning of PID controllers leveraging the straight-
forward interpretation of the performance-robustness trade-off for PID controllers
in terms of uncertainty parameters (i.e., precisions or inverse variances) in the vari-
ational free energy.
6.2 PID control as active inference
To implement PID control as a process of active inference, we will first describe an
agent’s generative model as a generalised linear state space model of second order
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(i.e., only two higher orders of motion, anything beyond that is zero-mean Gaussian
noise):
ψ = x+ z
ψ′ = x′ + z′
ψ′′ = x′′ + z′′
x˙ = x′ = −α(x+ v) + w
x˙′ = x′′ = −α(x′ + v′) + w′
x˙′′ = x′′′ = −α(x′′ + v′′) + w′′
where θ = α is a parameter (see Chapter 3). As previously suggested, with a Gaus-
sian assumption on z˜, w˜, the likelihood is reduced to:
P (ψ˜|x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = P (ψ˜|x˜; θ, γ) = N(µ˜x, σ2z˜) (6.3)
where we assume no direct dependence of observations ψ˜ on external inputs v˜, while
the prior is described by:
P (x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = P (x˜|v˜; θ, γ)P (v˜; θ, γ) (6.4)
with
P (x˜|v˜; θ, γ) = N(−α(µ˜x + µ˜v), σ2w˜)
P (v˜; θ, γ) = N(η˜x, σ
2
v˜) (6.5)
The Laplace-encoded variational free energy in equation (3.33) then becomes:
F ≈ 1
2
[
piz
(
ψ − µx
)2
+ piz′
(
ψ′ − µ′x
)2
+ piz′′
(
ψ′′ − µ′′x
)2
+ piw
(
µ′x + α(µx − ηx)
)2
+
+piw′
(
µ′′x + α(µ
′
x − η′x)
)2
+ piw′′
(
µ′′′x + α(µ
′′
x − η′′x)
)2 − ln (pizpiwpiz′piw′piz′′piw′′)]
(6.6)
To simplify our formulation, we assume that precisions piv˜ tend to infinity (i.e., no
uncertainty on desires), so that P (v˜; θ, γ) in equation (6.5) becomes a delta function
and inputs v˜ reduce to their prior expectations η˜x, i.e., µ˜v = η˜x. With this simplifica-
tion, prior precisions piv˜ and respective predictions errors (µ˜v − η˜x) are not included
in our formulation (see Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau (2008) and Friston
et al. (2010b) for more general treatments). By applying the gradient descent de-
scribed in Chapter 3 to our free energy functional, we then get the following update
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equations for perception (estimation):
µ˙x =µ
′
x −
[
− piz
(
ψ − µx
)
+ piwα
(
µ′x + α(µx − ηx)
)]
µ˙′x =µ
′′
x −
[
− piz′
(
ψ′ − µ′x
)
+ piw′α
(
µ′′x + α(µ
′
x − η′x)
)
+ piw
(
µ′x + α(µx − ηx)
)]
µ˙′′x =µ
′′′
x −
[
− piz′′
(
ψ′′ − µ′′x
)
+ piw′′α
(
µ′′′x + α(µ
′′
x − η′′x)
)
+ piw′
(
µ′′x + α(µ
′
x − η′x)
)]
(6.7)
and for action (control):
a˙ = −
[
piz
(
ψ − µx
)∂ψ
∂a
+ piz′
(
ψ′ − µ′x
)∂ψ′
∂a
+ piz′′
(
ψ′′ − µ′′x
)∂ψ′′
∂a
]
(6.8)
The mapping of these equations to a PID control scheme becomes more clear un-
der a few simplifying assumptions. First, we assume strong priors on the causes of
proprioceptive observations. Intuitively, these priors are used to define actions that
change the observations to better fit the agent’s desires, i.e., the target of the PID
controller. This is implemented in the weighting mechanism of prediction errors by
precisions in equation (6.6); see also Friston et al. (2010a) and Brown et al. (2013)
and Chapter 4 for similar discussions on the role of precisions for behaviour. In our
derivation, weighted prediction errors on system dynamics, piw˜(µ˜′x + µ˜x − η˜x), will
be weighted more than weighted errors on observations, piz˜(ψ˜ − µ˜x). To achieve
this, we decrease sensory precisions piz˜ on proprioceptive observations, effectively
biasing the gradient descent procedure towards minimising errors on the prior dy-
namics (Brown et al., 2013). Secondly, we set the decay parameter α to a large value
(theoretically α → ∞, in practice α = 105 in our simulations), obtaining a set of
differential equations including only terms of order α2 for perception:
µ˙x ≈− piwα
(
α(µx − ηx)
)
µ˙′x ≈− piw′α
(
α(µ′x − η′x)
)
µ˙′′x ≈− piw′′α
(
α(µ′′x − η′′x)
)
(6.9)
This can be interpreted as an agent encoding beliefs in a world that quickly set-
tles to a desired equilibrium state. This assumption effectively decouples orders
of generalised motion, with higher orders not affecting the minimisation of lower
ones in equation (6.7), since terms from lower orders are modulated by α directly.
The remaining terms effectively impose constraints on the generalised motion only
close to equilibrium, playing a minor role in the control process away from the tar-
get/equilibrium (the more interesting part of regulation). These terms are necessary
for the system to settle to a proper steady state when (µ˜x − η˜x) → 0 and maintain
consistency across generalised orders of motion for small fluctuations at steady state,
but have virtually no influence at all in conditions far from equilibrium. Following
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equation (6.9), at steady state, expectations on hidden states µ˜x are mainly driven by
priors η˜x:
µ˜x = η˜x (6.10)
but are still not met by appropriate changes in observations ψ˜ which effectively im-
plement the regulation around the desired target. To minimise free energy in pres-
ence of strong priors, this agent will necessarily have to modify its observations ψ˜
to better match expectations µ˜x, which in turn are shaped by priors (i.e., desires)
η˜x. Effectively, the agent “imposes” its desires on the world, acting to minimise the
prediction errors arising at the proprioceptive sensory layers. In essence, an active
inference agent implements set-point regulation by behaving to make its sensations
accord with its strong priors/desires. After these assumptions, action can be written
as:
a˙ ≈ −
[
piz
(
ψ − ηx
)∂ψ
∂a
+ piz′
(
ψ′ − η′x
)∂ψ′
∂a
+ piz′′
(
ψ′′ − η′′x
)∂ψ′′
∂a
]
(6.11)
where we still need to specify partial derivatives ∂ψ˜/∂a. As discussed in Friston
et al. (2010a) and previous chapters, this step highlights the fundamental differences
between the FEP and the more traditional forward/inverse models formulation of
control problems in biological systems (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000). While these derivatives help in the definition of an inverse model (i.e., finding
the correct action for a desired output), unlike more traditional approaches, active
inference does not involve a mapping from hidden states x˜ to actions a, but is cast
in terms of sensory data ψ˜ directly, This is thought to simplify the problem: from a
mapping between unknown hidden states to actions, to a mapping between known
observations ψ˜ and actions a. It is claimed that this provides an easier implementa-
tion for an inverse model (Friston, 2011), one that is grounded in an extrinsic frame
of reference, i.e., the real world (ψ˜), rather than in a intrinsic one in terms of hidden
states (x˜) to be inferred first. To achieve PID-like control, we assume that the agent
adopts the simplest (i.e., linear) relationship between its actions (controls) and their
effects on sensory input across all orders of motion:
∂ψ
∂a
=
∂ψ′
∂a
=
∂ψ′′
∂a
= 1 (6.12)
This reflects a very simple reflex-arc-like mechanism that is triggered every time a
proprioceptive prediction is generated: positive actions (linearly) increase the values
of the sensed variables ψ˜, while negative actions decrease them. There is, however,
an apparent inconsistency here that we need to dissolve: the proprioceptive input ψ
and its higher order states ψ′, ψ′′ are all linearly dependent with respect to actions a
as represented in equation (6.12). While an action may not change position, veloc-
ity and acceleration of a variable in the same way, a generative model doesn’t need
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to perfectly describe the system to regulate: these derivatives only encode sensori-
motor dependencies that allow for, in this case, sub-optimal control. In the same
way, PID controllers are, in most cases, effective but only approximate solutions for
control (Åström, 1995; Åström and Murray, 2010). This allows us to understand the
encoding of an inverse model from the perspective of an agent (i.e., the controller)
rather than assuming a perfect, objective mapping from sensations to actions that
reflects exactly how actions affect sensory input (Friston et al., 2010a). This also
points at possible investigations of generative/inverse models in simpler living sys-
tems where accurate internal models are not perhaps needed, and where strategies
like PID control are implemented (Yi et al., 2000; Yang and Iglesias, 2006; Ang et al.,
2010). By combining equation (6.11) and equation (6.12), action can then be simpli-
fied to:
a˙ ≈ piz
(
ηx − ψ
)
+ piz′
(
η′x − ψ′
)
+ piz′′
(
η′′x − ψ′′
)
(6.13)
which is consistent with the “velocity form” or algorithm of a PID controller (Åström,
1995):
u˙ = ki
(
yr − y
)
+ kp
d
dt
(
yr − y
)
+ kd
d2
dt2
(
yr − y
)
(6.14)
Velocity forms are used in control problems where, for instance, integration is pro-
vided by an external mechanism outside the controller (Åström, 1995; Åström and
Murray, 2010). Furthermore, velocity algorithms are the most natural form for the
implementation of integral control to avoid windup effects of the integral term,
emerging when actuators can’t regulate an indiscriminate accumulation of steady-
state error in the integral term due to physical limitations (Åström, 1995; Svrcek,
Mahoney, Young, et al., 2006). This algorithm is usually described using discrete
systems to avoid the definition of the derivative of random variables, often assumed
to be white noise in the Ito’s sense (i.e., Markov processes). In the continuous case, if
the variable y is a Markov process, its time derivative is in fact not well defined. For
this form to exist in continuous systems, y must be a smooth (stochastic) process. Ef-
fectively, this drops the Markov assumption of white noise and implements the same
definition of analytic (i.e., differentiable) noise related to the generalised coordinates
of motion we described earlier. The presence of extra prediction errors beyond the
traditional negative feedback (proportional term) can, in this light, be seen as a nat-
ural consequence of considering linear non-Markovian processes with simple re-
flex mechanisms responding to position, velocity and acceleration in the generalised
motion phase space (see equation (6.12)). To ensure that the active inference imple-
mentation approximates the velocity form of PID control we still need to clarify the
relationship between the generalised coordinates of motion in equation (6.13) and
the differential operators d/dt, d2/dt2 in equation (6.14). As pointed out in previous
work, when the variational free energy is minimised, the two of them are equal since
the motion of the mode becomes the mode of the motion (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto,
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and Daunizeau, 2008; Buckley et al., 2017). To simplify our formulation and show
PID control more directly, we can consider the case for η′x = η′′x = 0, defining the
more standard set-point control where a desired or set-trajectory collapses to a sin-
gle set-point in the state-space (cf. homeostasis as homeokinesis collapsed to a single
point (Der and Martius, 2012)) and equivalent, in the velocity form, to the case where
yr is a constant and dyr/dt = d2yr/dt2 = 0.
6.3 A model of cruise control
To show an implementation of PID control through active inference we use a stan-
dard model of cruise control, i.e., a car trying to maintain a certain velocity over
time1. While only a toy model, the intuitions and results we derive can easily be
transferred to the regulation of proteins in bacterial chemotaxis (Yi et al., 2000) or
yeast osmoregulation (Muzzey et al., 2009), and more generally to any homeostatic
mechanism (Ashby, 1957), especially when including limited knowledge of external
forces (Sontag, 2003). In this setup, a controller receives the speed of the car as an
input and adapts the throttle of the vehicle based on a negative feedback mecha-
nism to achieve the desired, or target, cruising velocity. In real-world scenarios, this
mechanism needs to be robust in presence of external disturbances, essentially rep-
resented by changes in the slope of the road, wind blowing, etc., see Fig. 6.2d. For
simplicity, we will use the model based on the formulation in (Åström and Murray,
2010).
The equation of motion of the car is:
m
d2s
dt2
= F − Fd (6.15)
where s is the position, F the force generated by the engine and Fd a disturbance
force that accounts for a gravitational component Fg, a rolling friction Fr and an
aerodynamic drag Fa, such that Fd = Fg + Fr + Fa, see again Fig. 6.2d. The forces
will be modelled as following:
F =rga(t)Tm
(
1− β
( ω
ωm
− 1
)2)
Fg =mg sinλ
Fr =mgCr sgn s˙
Fa =
1
2
ρCdAs˙
2 (6.16)
with all the constants and variables reported and explained in table 6.1.
In this particular instance, we will simplify PID to PI control since the deriva-
tive term is often not used for the cruise control problem (Åström and Murray,
2010), hence implementing only a first order generalised state-space model (see
1The code is available at https://github.com/mbaltieri/PIDControlActiveInferenceFEP.
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TABLE 6.1: Cruise control problem, constants and variables.
Description Value
s(t) car position -
rg gear ratio divided by wheel radius 12
a(t) control -
Tm maximum torque 190Nm
β motor constant 0.4
ω engine speed αnv
ωm speed that gives maximum torque 420rad/s
m car mass 100kg
g gravitational acceleration 9.81m/s2
λ slope of the road 4◦
Cr coefficient of rolling friction 0.01
ρ density of the air 1.3kg/m3
Cd aerodynamic drag coefficient 0.32
A frontal area of the car 2.4m2
equation (6.3)). The controller receives noisy readings ψ,ψ′ of the true velocity and
acceleration of the car, x, x′, following the formulation in equation (6.3). The con-
troller is provided with a Gaussian prior in generalised coordinates encoding de-
sired velocity and acceleration with means ηx = 10 km/h, η′x = 0 km/h2. This prior
represents a target trajectory for the agent that, as we aW in equation (6.13), will be
equivalent to integral and proportional terms of a PI controller in velocity form. The
recognition dynamics are then specified in equation (6.7) and equation (6.8).
In Fig. 6.2 we show the behaviour of a standard simulation of active inference
implementing PI-like control for the controller of the speed of a car. The sensory and
process precisions piz˜, piw˜ are fixed, to show here only the basic disturbance rejection
property of PID controllers (Åström, 1995; Sontag, 2003). In Fig. 6.2a, after the car
is exposed to some new external condition (e.g., wind) represented in Fig. 6.2c and
not encoded in the controller’s generative model, the regulation process brings the
velocity of the car back to the desired state after a short transition period. Fig. 6.2b
shows how sudden changes in the acceleration of the car are quickly cancelled out
in accord with the specified prior η′x = 0 km/h2. The action of the car is then shown,
as one would expect (Sontag, 2003), to counteract the external force v, Fig. 6.2c.
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FIGURE 6.2: A cruise controller based on PI control under active
inference. (a) The response of the car velocity over time with a target
state, or prior in our formulation, ηx = 10 km/h, ηx′ = 0 km/h2. (b)
The acceleration of the car over time with a specified prior η′x = 0
km/h2. (c) The external force v, introduced at t = 150s, models a
sudden change in the environmental conditions, for instance wind or
change in slope. Action obtained via the minimisation of variational
free energy with respect to a and counteracts the effects of v. The
motor action is never zero since we assume a constant slope, λ = 4◦
(see table 6.1, section 6.3). (d) The model car we implemented, where
v could be thought as a sudden wind or a changing slope.
6.3.1 Responses to external and internal changes
It is often desirable for a PID regulator to provide different responses to external
perturbations (e.g., wind), which should be rather rapid, and to internal updates
(e.g., a shift in target velocity) which should be relatively smooth (Åström, 1995;
Åström and Hägglund, 2004), see also section 6.1.1. It is not, however, trivial to
identify and isolate parameters that contribute to these effects (Araki and Taguchi,
2003; Ang, Chong, and Li, 2005; Johnson and Moradi, 2005), and thus to tune these
properties independently. It has been suggested that in order to achieve such de-
coupling, a controller with two degrees of freedom is necessary (Araki and Taguchi,
2003; Åström and Hägglund, 2004). Such controller can be thought to contain a
feedforward model of the dynamics of the observed/regulated system (Åström and
Murray, 2010). In our implementation, this is elegantly achieved by construction,
since active inference is based on generative (forward) models. Specifically, we can
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fix the response to external forces by setting the expected sensory precisions piz˜ (i.e.,
PI gains) but then independently tune the response to changes in the setpoint by
altering the expected process precisions piw˜ on the priors, see Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4.
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FIGURE 6.3: Responses to load disturbances. The same load dis-
turbance (v = 3.0km/h2) is applied with varying expected process
precisions piw˜ where piw = {exp(−24), exp(−22), exp(−20)}. Expected
sensory log-precisions piz˜ are fixed over the duration of the simula-
tions, with µγz = 1. The simulations were 300s, with an external
disturbance introduced at t = 150s. Here we report only a 20 seconds
time window around the change in conditions.
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FIGURE 6.4: Responses to load set-point changes. A similar exam-
ple for changes in the target velocity of the car, from ηx = 13km/h
to ηx = 10km/h, tested on varying expected process precisions piw˜
where piw = {exp(−24), exp(−22), exp(−20)}. The simulations were
300s, with a different target velocity introduced at t = 150s. Here we
report only a 20 seconds time window around the change in condi-
tions.
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In the limit for process prediction errors piw˜(µ˜′x + α(µ˜x − η˜x)) much larger than
the sensory ones piz˜(ψ˜ − µ˜x) and with fixed expected sensory precisions piz˜ , the re-
sponse to load disturbances is invariant (Fig. 6.3). A new target velocity for the
car creates different responses with varying piw = {exp(−24), exp(−22), exp(−20)}2.
Larger piw˜ values imply an expected low uncertainty on the dynamics (i.e., changes
to the set-point are not encoded and therefore not expected) and are met almost
instantaneously with an update of expected hidden states µ˜x, matched by suitable
actions a. On the other hand, smaller piw˜ account for higher variance/uncertainty
and thus changes in the target velocity are to be expected, making the transitions to
new reference values slower, as seen in Fig. 6.4.
6.3.2 Optimal tuning of PID gains
One of the main goals of modern design principles for PID controllers is to find ap-
propriate tuning rules for the gains on the prediction errors: proportional, integral
and derivative terms. Existing approaches are often limited (Åström, Panagopou-
los, and Hägglund, 1998; Åström and Hägglund, 2001; Johnson and Moradi, 2005;
Ang, Chong, and Li, 2005; Åström and Hägglund, 2006) and a unifying theoretical
framework guiding how the gains should be optimally tuned is elusive (Åström and
Hägglund, 2001; Ang, Chong, and Li, 2005). In general, the proportional term must
bring a system to the target state in the first place, the integral of the error should
promptly deal with errors generated by steady state inputs not accounted by a model
(Sontag, 2003), while the derivative term should reduce the fluctuations by control-
ling changes in the derivative of a variable (Åström and Murray, 2010). In our car
example, this could mean for example controlling the velocity of the vehicle in spite
of changes such as the presence of wind or variations in slope of the road (I term) and
avoiding unnecessary changes in accelerations close to the target (D term, often not
used for cruise control problems anyway (Åström and Murray, 2010)). In our treat-
ment of PID controllers as approximate Bayesian inference, the controllers’ gains
ki, kp, kd become equivalent to sensory precisions piz, piz′ , piz′′ , cf. equation (6.13) and
equation (6.14). Following Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau (2008), Friston
(2008a), and Friston et al. (2010b), we thus propose to optimise these precisions to
minimise the path integral of variational free energy (or free action), assuming that
parameters and hyperparameters change on a much slower time scale. To do so,
we extend our previous formulation and replace fixed sensory precisions piz, piz′ , piz′′
with expected sensory precisions µpiz , µpiz′ , µpiz′′ , derived from a Laplace approxima-
tion applied not only to hidden states x but extended also to these hyperparameters,
now considered as random variables to be estimated, rather than fixed quantities
(Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Friston et al., 2010b), see Chapter 3.
Active inference provides then an analytical criterion for the tuning of PID gains
in the temporal domain, where otherwise mostly empirical methods or complex
2Precisions on higher embedding orders are built, in both cases, using a smoothness (i.e., decay)
factor of 1/2, see Friston (2008a)
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methods in the frequency domain have insofar been proposed (Rivera, Morari, and
Skogestad, 1986; Åström, 1995; Åström, Panagopoulos, and Hägglund, 1998; Åström
and Hägglund, 2006). In frameworks used to implement active inference, such
as DEM (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Friston, 2008a), parame-
ters and hyperparameters are usually assumed to be conditionally independent of
hidden states based on a strict separation of time scales (i.e., a mean-field approx-
imation). This assumption prescribes a minimisation scheme with respect to the
path-integral of free energy, or free action, requiring the explicit integration of this
functional over time. In our work, however, for the purposes of building an online
self-tuning controller, we will treat expected sensory precisions as conditionally de-
pendent but changing on a much slower time-scale with respect to states x, using
a second order online update scheme based on generalised filtering (Friston et al.,
2010b), as explained in Chapter 3. The controller gains, µpiz , µpiz′ , µpiz′′ , will thus be
updated following a reparametrisation that ensures they are positive (precisions are
defined as non negative and control is achieved only with negative feedback), fol-
lowing the scheme presented in Chapter 3, equation (3.41).
For practical purposes, the second order system presented in equation (3.41) is
usually reduced to a simpler set of first order differential equations (Buckley et al.,
2017):
µ˙γz˜ =φ˜
˙˜
φ =− ∂F
∂µγz˜
− κφ˜ (6.17)
where φ˜ is a prior on the motion (i.e., only the rate of change in this case) of hyper-
parameters γ which encodes a “damping” term for the minimisation of free energy
F . This term enforces hyperparameters to converge to a solution close to the real
steady state thanks to a drag term for κ > 03. The parametrisation of expected pre-
cisions in terms of log-precisions γz˜ , in fact, makes the derivative of the free energy
with respect to log-precisions strictly positive ( ∂F∂γz˜ > 0), not providing a steady-state
solution for the gradient descent (Friston et al., 2010b). This “damping” term sta-
bilises the solution, reducing the inevitable oscillations around the real equilibrium
of the system. Given the free energy defined in equation (6.6), with exp(µγz˜) replac-
ing piz˜ , the minimisation of expected sensory log-precisions (or “log- PID gains”) is
3κ = 5 in our simulations
Chapter 6. An active inference models of robust regulation via integral control 115
prescribed by the following equations:
µ˙γz =φz
φ˙z =− ∂F
∂µγz
− κφz = −1
2
[
exp (µγz)(ψ − µx)2 − 1
]
− κφz
µ˙γz′ =φz′
φ˙z′ =− ∂F
∂µγz′
− κφz′ = −1
2
[
exp (µγz′ )(ψ
′ − µ′x)2 − 1
]
− κφz′
µ˙γz′′ =φz′′
φ˙z′′ =− ∂F
∂µγz′′
− κφz′′ = −1
2
[
exp (µγz′′ )(ψ
′′ − µ′′x)2 − 1
]
− κφz′′ (6.18)
This scheme introduces a new mechanism for the tuning of the gains of a PID con-
troller, allowing the controller to adapt to adverse and unexpected conditions in an
optimal way, in order to avoid oscillations around the target state.
In Fig. 6.5 the controller for the car velocity is initialised with suboptimal sen-
sory log-precisions µγz˜ , i.e., log-PI gains. The parameters were initially not updated
(Fig. 6.5d) to allow the controller to settle around the desired state, see Fig. 6.5a. The
adaptation begins at t = 30s and is stopped at t = 150s, when an external force
is introduced, to test the response of the controller after the gains have been opti-
mised. With the adaptation process, the controller becomes more responsive when
facing external disturbances (cf. Fig. 6.2), quickly and effectively counteracted by
prompt changes in controls, see Fig. 6.5c. The optimisation of the gains through µγz˜
without extra constraints (if not the stopping condition we imposed at t = 150s,
after the adaptation reaches a steady-state) effectively introduces an extremely re-
sponsive controller: cancelling out the effects of unwanted external inputs, such as
wind in our cruise control example, but also more sensitive to measurement noise.
In Fig. 6.6 we show summary statistics with the results of the adaptation of the gains.
Following the examples in Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.5, we simulated 20 different cars with
expected sensory log-precisions µγz˜ sampled uniformly in the interval [−4,−2] and
expected process log-precisions µγw˜ in the interval [−23,−21]. We initially main-
tained (i.e., no adaptation) the same hyperparameters and introduced a load dis-
turbance at t = 150s, then repeated the simulations (20 cars) with the same initial
conditions allowing for the adaptation of expected sensory log-precisions as log-PI
gains after t = 30s, as in Fig. 6.5. Following (Hägglund, 1995), we measured the
performance of the controllers by defining the integral absolute error (IAE):
IAE =
∫ t+τ
t
|e(t)| dt (6.19)
between two zero-crossings: the last time the velocity was at the target value before
a disturbance is introduced, assumed to be t = 150 in our case, and the first time the
velocity goes back to the target after a disturbance is introduced (t+ τ ). To compute
t+τ , we took into account the stochasticity of the system and errors due to numerical
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FIGURE 6.5: Optimising PID gains as expected sensory log-
precisions µγz˜ . This example shows the control of the car velocity
before and after the optimisation of µγz˜ (before and after the vertical
dash dot black line) is introduced. (a) The velocity of the car. The
controller is more responsive to sudden external forces, e.g., wind,
immediately regulated against (cf. Fig. 6.2a), but as a trade-off, the
variance of the velocity is also increased. (b) The acceleration of the
car. (c) The action of the car, with an external disturbance introduced
at t = 150s. (d) The optimisation of expected sensory precisions µγz˜
and their convergence to an equilibrium state, after which the optimi-
sation is stopped before introducing an external force. The blue line
represents the true log-precision of observation noise in the system,
γz = γz′ = 5.
approximations, considering the case for the real velocity to be within a ±0.5 km/h
interval away from the target value. The IAE captures the impact of oscillations on
the regulation problem by integrating the error over the temporal interval where
the car is pushed away from its target due to some disturbance (for more general
discussions on its role and uses see Åström (1995)). As we can see in Fig. 6.6, the
IAE converges to a single value for all cars (taking into account our approximation
of a±0.5 km/h interval while measuring it) and is clearly lower when the adaptation
mechanism for expected sensory log-precisions is introduced, making the controller
very responsive to external forces and thus reducing the time away from the target
velocity, see Fig. 6.5 for an example.
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FIGURE 6.6: Performance of PID controllers with and without adap-
tation of the gains based on the minimisation of free energy. The
integral absolute error (IAE) is used to measure the effects of the os-
cillations introduced by a single load disturbance at t = 150s (see text
for the exact definition of the IAE).
6.4 Measurement noise and model uncertainty in active in-
ference
Nowadays, it is common to include two more desiderata for the design of PID con-
trollers (see section 6.1 and Åström and Hägglund (2001)) in order to characterise
and tune their response to (1) different types of measurement noise and (2) their ro-
bustness to model uncertainty, inherent in simple approximate controllers (Åström
and Hägglund, 2001; Åström and Hägglund, 2006). In our example, these proper-
ties map, respectively, to the response of a car given time-varying noise and to the
available knowledge of a system, e.g., the working range of a controller or the type
of disturbances affecting the car.
In particular, the former describes the behaviour of a PID controller in presence
of noise on the observed variables by modulating the decay of different prediction
errors in equation (6.13). It is known that this response is (in the limit for t → ∞
and with the assumption of a system at equilibrium) inversely proportional to the
integral gain (Åström, 1995; Åström and Hägglund, 2006). In our case however,
we have a more general and trivial relationship where the integral gain ki is, by
construction, equivalent to the inverse variance (i.e., precision) of the measurement
noise piz , see equation (6.13) and equation (6.14). The remaining gains kp, kd can
then be seen as encoding the uncertainty (i.e., precision) of higher orders of motion
when the measurement noise is effectively coloured, otherwise just approximating
possible correlations of the observed data over time.
On the other hand, the robustness to model uncertainty can be seen in terms of
expected process log-precisions µγw˜ encoding (again by construction) the amplitude
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of fluctuations due to unknown effects on the dynamics (Friston, 2008a). By modu-
lating the prior dynamics of a system, these hyperparameters assume then a double
role, they can either: (1) passively describe (estimate) the dynamics of a system (cf.
Kalman filters (Kalman, 1960b)) or (2) actively impose desired trajectories on ob-
servations that can be implemented through actions on the world, as explained in
section 6.2 and more generally in Chapter 4. With these conditions at the extremes,
a spectrum of intermediate behaviours is also possible, with µγw˜ enacting different
sensorimotor couplings by weighting the importance of objective information and
desired states/priors of a system.
In the majority of the formulations of control problems, the properties of mea-
surement noise and model uncertainty (especially their (co)variance) are assumed
to be constant over time. Often, these parameters need also to be adapted to dif-
ferent systems since their properties are likely to be different. In section 6.3.2, we
proposed an optimisation method for the gains of a PID controller based on active
inference that here we exploit for time changing properties of the noise of a system,
and that we show in an example when the measurement noise suddenly increases.
In our car example, we could think of a drop in performance of the sensors recording
velocity.
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FIGURE 6.7: Performance of PID controllers with a sudden increase
in measurement noise. 20 cars simulated in the case where measure-
ment noise is increased at t = 150s during the 300s simulations. We
report aggregate results with the variance from the target value mea-
sured over the last 25% (225 < t < 300s) of a simulation. We show (1)
the case for adaptation of the gains of the PI controller (through ex-
pected sensory log-precisions, or log-PI gains, µγz˜ ) interrupted before
the measurement noise drastically changes, and (2) the case where the
adaptation process persists for the entire duration of the simulations.
We simulated 20 cars for 300s with adaptation of expected sensory log-precisions
(or log-PI gains) µγz˜ , initiated at t = 30s and stopped at t = 150s. At t = 150s we
then decreased the log-precision of measurement noise (n.b. not the expectation on
the log-precision) from γz = 5 to γz = 2 for the rest of the simulations and stopped
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the adaptation process. We then had 20 cars with the same set up but for which
adaptation was not halted after the increased measurement noise. To represent the
difference, we measured the variance of the real velocity of the cars (without mea-
surement noise to avoid biases), from t = 225s to t = 300s to allow the velocity to
settle after the transient due to the sudden change. Controllers continuously adapt-
ing their gains are shown to be more robust to persistent changes in noise.
In the case of model uncertainty, given the dual role of µγw˜ explained above, i.e.,
encoding prior dynamics reflecting both real properties of the environment and de-
sired trajectories imposed on the system to regulate, it is harder to show the update
of expected precisions without compromising the control of the car. The optimisa-
tion we proposed is, in fact, not intrinsically biased towards the control of a system,
i.e., we externally imposed that as a condition for the agent. While having more flex-
ible priors, an agent could potentially begin to account for uncertainty in the world
rather than forcibly change its observations to reach its target.
6.5 Discussion
In this chapter we developed a minimal account of regulation and control mech-
anisms in biological systems based on active inference, a process theory for per-
ception, action and higher order functions expressed via the minimisation of vari-
ational free energy (Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Friston et al., 2010a; Fris-
ton, 2010b; Buckley et al., 2017). Our implementation constitutes an example of the
parsimonious, action-oriented models described in Clark (2015a) and Clark (2015b),
connecting them to methods from classic control theory. We focused in particular
on Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) control, both extensively used in industry
(Åström, 1995; Ang, Chong, and Li, 2005; Johnson and Moradi, 2005; Åström and
Hägglund, 2006) and more recently emerging as a model of robust feedback mech-
anisms in biology, implemented for instance by bacteria (Yi et al., 2000), amoeba
(Yang and Iglesias, 2006) and gene networks (Ang et al., 2010), and in psychology
(Ritz et al., 2018). PID controllers are ubiquitous in engineering mostly due to the
fact that one needs only little knowledge of the process to regulate. In the biological
sciences, this mechanism is thought to be easily implemented even at a molecular
level (Chevalier et al., 2018) and to constitute a possible account for limited knowl-
edge of the external world in simple agents (Sontag, 2003).
Following our previous work on minimal generative models (see Chapter 5), we
showed that this mechanism corresponds, in active inference terms, to linear gen-
erative models for agents that only approximate properties of the world dynamics.
Specifically, our model describes linear dynamics for a single hidden or latent state
and a linear mapping from the hidden state to an observed variable, representing
knowledge of the world that is potentially far removed from the real complexity be-
hind observations and their hidden variables. To implement such model, we defined
a generative model that only approximates the environment of an agent and showed
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how under a set of assumptions including analytic (i.e., non-Markovian, differen-
tiable) Gaussian noise and linear dynamics, this recapitulates PID control. A crucial
component of our formulation is the presence of low sensory precision parameters
on proprioceptive prediction errors of our free energy function or equivalently, high
expected variance of proprioceptive signals. These low precisions play two roles
during the minimisation of free energy: (1) they implement control signals as pre-
dictions of proprioceptive input influenced by strong priors (i.e., desires) rather than
by observations, see equation (6.11) and Friston et al. (2010a), and (2) they reflect a
belief that there are large exogenous fluctuations (low precision = high variance) in
the observed proprioceptive input. This last point can be seen as the well known
property of the Integral term (Åström and Murray, 2010; Sontag, 2003) of PID con-
trollers, dealing with unexpected external input (i.e., large exogenous fluctuations).
The model represented by derivatives ∂ψ˜/∂a encodes then how actions a approxi-
mately affect observed proprioceptive sensations ψ˜, with an agent implementing a
sensorimotor mapping that does not match the real dynamics of actions applied to
the environment. The formulation in equation (6.7) and equation (6.8) can in gen-
eral be applied to different tasks, in the same way PID control is used in different
problems without specific knowledge of the system to regulate.
The generative model we used is expressed in generalised coordinates of mo-
tion, a mathematical construct used to build non-Markovian continuous stochastic
models. Their importance has been expressed before (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and
Daunizeau, 2008; Friston, 2008a; Friston et al., 2010b), for the treatment of real world
processes best approximated by continuous models and for which Markov assump-
tions don’t really hold (see also Kim (2018) for discussion). The definition of a gen-
eralised state-space model provides then a series of weighted prediction errors and
their higher orders of motion from the start, with PID control emerging as the con-
sequence of an agent trying to impose its desired prior dynamics on the world via
the approximate control of its observations on different embedding orders (for I, P
and D terms). In this light, the ubiquitous efficacy of PID control may thus reflect
the fact that the simplest models of controlled dynamics are first-order approxima-
tions to generalised motion. This simplicity is mandated because the minimisation
of free energy is equivalent to the maximisation of model evidence, which can be
expressed as accuracy minus complexity (Friston, 2010b; Clark, 2015b). On this
view, PID control emerges via the implementation of constrained (parsimonious,
minimum complexity) generative models that are, under some constraints, the most
effective (maximum accuracy) for a task.
In the control theory literature, many tuning rules for PID gains have been pro-
posed (e.g., Ziegler-Nichols, IMC, etc., see (Åström, 1995; Åström and Hägglund,
2006) for a review) and used in different applications (Åström, 1995; Åström, Panagopou-
los, and Hägglund, 1998; Ang, Chong, and Li, 2005; Johnson and Moradi, 2005;
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Åström and Hägglund, 2006), however most of them produce quite different re-
sults, highlighting their inherent fit to only one of many different goals of the con-
trol problem. It is also unclear what the criterion, or set of criteria, for optimality of
PID controllers should be: minimum variance, minimum time, stability, robustness
etc.. With our active inference formulation, we argue that different criteria can and
should be expressed within the same set of equations in order to better understand
their implications for a system. Modern approaches to the study of PID controllers
propose four points as fundamental features to be considered for the design of a
controller (Åström and Hägglund, 2001):
• load disturbance response
• set-point response
• measurement noise response
• robustness to model uncertainty.
In our formulation, these criteria can be interpreted using precision (inverse vari-
ance) parameters of different prediction errors in the variational free energy, express-
ing the the uncertainty associated to observations and priors, as reported in table 6.2,
see also section 6.4 for further reference.
TABLE 6.2: Active inference as a general framework for PID con-
trollers.
Criterion Mapped to Advantages in active inference
Load disturbance re-
sponse
µpiz˜
Intuitively expressed via the expected in-
verse variance of the observations (i.e.,
precision), with low variance implying
a fast response and vice versa (see sec-
tion 6.3.1 and section 6.3.2)
Set-point change re-
sponse
µpiw˜
Natural formulation of PID controllers
with two degrees of freedom derived
from sensory and process precisions and
expressed as a Bayesian inference process
(see section 6.3.1)
Measurement noise
response
µpiz˜
Straightforward interpretation of PID
gains as (expected) inverse variances of
different embedding orders of measure-
ment noise (see section 6.4)
Robustness to model
uncertainty
µpiw˜
Direct mapping of model uncertainty to
expected variances of the fluctuations,
representing unknown dynamics, of the
system to control (see section 6.4)
After establishing the equivalence between PID control and linear approxima-
tions of generalised motion in generative models, we showed that the controllers’
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gains, ki, kp, kd, are in our formulation equivalent to expected precisions, µpiz , µpiz′ , µpiz′′ ,
for which a minimisation scheme is provided in Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Dau-
nizeau (2008), Friston (2008a), and Friston et al. (2010b). The basic version of this
optimisation produces also promising results in presence of time-varying measure-
ment (white) noise in the simulated car (see Fig. 6.7 in section 6.4). If the adaptation
is halted on a system with fixed measurement noise, it can be used to effectively
deal with load disturbances, external forces acting against a system reaching his tar-
get (see Fig. 6.5), e.g., a change in chemicals concentration for a bacterium.
Future extensions could provide a more principled way of dealing with these
two (and possibly other) conflicting cases, an issue that can be solved by introduc-
ing suitable hyperpriors (priors on hyperparameters) expressing the confidence of a
system regarding changes in measurement noise via the use of precisions on hyper-
priors (Friston, 2008a). High confidence (i.e., high precision on hyperpriors) would
imply that a system should quickly react to sudden changes, both in measurement
noise and other disturbances, since they are unexpected. On the other hand, low con-
fidence (i.e., low precision on hyperpriors) would make a system’s reaction to new
conditions slower since such changes are expected. A trade-off between these condi-
tions, with appropriate knowledge of a system or a class of systems and introduced
in the form of hyperpriors, would then make the process completely automatised,
taking advantage of empirical Bayes for learning such hyperpriors (Friston, 2010b).
By extending our proposition with priors on precisions (i.e., hyperpriors) we can
also, in principle, cast more criteria for the controller, expressing different require-
ments for more complex regulation processes. Given the fact that any optimality
criterion can be recast as a prior, following the complete class theorem (Ferguson,
1967; Brown, 1981), as long as we know how to represent these rules as priors for the
controller, we can provide any combination of requirements and tune the parameters
in a straightforward fashion.
6.6 Conclusion
PID controllers are robust controllers used as a model of regulation for noisy and
non-stationary processes in different engineering fields (Åström and Hägglund, 2006;
Åström and Murray, 2010). More recently, they have also been proposed as be-
havioural models of adaptive learning in humans (Ritz et al., 2018) and as mech-
anistic explanations of different functions of systems in microbiology (Yi et al., 2000;
Yang and Iglesias, 2006; Ang et al., 2010). Their utmost relevance to the natural
sciences is becoming clear, with implementations now proposed at the level of sim-
ple biomolecular interactions (Briat, Gupta, and Khammash, 2016; Chevalier et al.,
2018). PID controllers are renowned for their simplicity and straightforward inter-
pretation, however they do not guarantee optimality, so an interpretation of this
control strategy in terms of more general mathematical principles is still missing.
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Active inference has been proposed as a general mathematical theory of life and
cognition according to the minimisation of variational free energy (Friston, 2010b).
On this view, biological agents are to be seen as homeostatic systems maintaining
their existence via the the minimisation of free energy. This process is implemented
via the estimation and prediction of latent variables in the world (equivalent to per-
ception) and the control of sensory inputs with behaviours accommodating norma-
tive constraints of an agent. It is often described as an extension of optimal control
theory with deep connections to Bayesian inference (Friston, 2011). While meth-
ods such as PID control are still widely adopted as models of biological systems, it is
unclear how general theories such as active inference connect to practical implemen-
tation of homeostatic principles such as PID control. In this chapter we proposed a
way to connect these two perspectives showing how PID controllers can be seen as
a special case of active inference. This account is based on the definition of a linear
generative model for an agent approximating the dynamics of its environment, po-
tentially very different from the information represented by the model. The model is
expressed in generalised coordinates of motion (Friston, 2008a; Buckley et al., 2017;
Kim, 2018) with prediction errors at different temporal orders for integral, propor-
tional and derivative components emerging naturally as a consequence of an agent
assuming non-Markovian dynamics on its sensory input. Through the active in-
ference we also proposed the implementation of a mechanism for the optimisation
of the gains of a PID controller, i.e., the weights of different prediction errors, now
interpreted as precision parameters encoding the uncertainty of different variables
from the perspective of an agent.
In this chapter I introduced another example of an agent described by a gener-
ative model whose formulation is deeply divorced from the dynamics of its milieu,
reinforcing the idea that Bayesian accounts of cognition need not consider agents
as mirrors of their world. Furthermore, following some of the claims regarding the
FEP as a possible unifying theory of all biologyical systems (Friston, 2012; Friston,
2013), this work constitutes also a direct connection between the FEP and models of
behaviour in simple (down to unicellular) biological organisms, e.g., (Yi et al., 2000).
124
Chapter 7
Modularity, the separation
principle and active inference
The assumption that action and perception can be investigated independently is
entrenched in theories, models and experimental approaches across the brain and
mind sciences. In cognitive science, this has been a central point of contention be-
tween computational and 4E (enactive, embodied, extended and embedded) the-
ories of cognition, with the former embracing the “classical sandwich", modular,
architecture of the mind and the latter advocating a more holistic view of cognitive
functions as depending on agent-environment dynamics. In this chapter, we suggest
that the modularity of action and perception at the core of computational theories
may be seen in analogy with the separation principle of control theory. Furthermore,
we argue that this principle provides formal criteria that can be used to evaluate the
implications of the modularity of action and perception in the cognitive and natural
sciences. We also claim that real-time responses to feedback from the environment,
one of the main ideas proposed by 4E approaches in contrast to more traditional
proposals, can still be consistent with cognitivist theories, again in analogy with the
separation principle. Finally we argue that an emerging theory in the cognitive and
brain sciences, active inference, by extending ideas derived from control theory to
the study of biological systems, disposes of the separation principle. In doing so, it
describes non-modular models of behaviour strongly aligned with some aspects of
non-reductionist theories of cognition.
This chapter provides one of the strongest arguments for the connection between
the FEP and 4E cognition. By using its roots in control theory, I will argue that
the FEP is in conflict with the dominant view of perception and action as separate
processes adopted by the vast majority of models in psychology and neuroscience.
Following the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, I will first introduce the core mathe-
matical formulations of such models based on the separation principle and its most
well known instantiation, the LQG framework. I will then focus on the differences
with the active inference proposal, implementing a standard example (the double in-
tegrator) classically used for the study of LQG systems, comparing the LQG solution
of the problem with an active inference one. As in Chapter 4, the generative model
of the agent and the generative process of the environment will be relatively similar
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since the problem’s formulation is extremely simple to begin with. Important differ-
ences will however emerge due to the priors encoded by our active inference agent,
“hallucinating” (imaginary) springs and pistons attached to its body that fulfil its
desires. The chapter is based on material from Baltieri and Buckley (2018b), Baltieri
and Buckley (2019b), and Baltieri and Buckley (2019a).
7.1 Background
Can perception and action be studied as separate processes?
In cognitive science, the hypothesis that the mind is modular originated with Fodor’s
work (Fodor, 1983; Coltheart, 1999; Barrett and Kurzban, 2006; Prinz, 2006), formal-
ising the idea that the perceptual and motor systems should be considered as formed
by separate and informationally encapsulated components, sitting at the periphery
of an organism (for a more historical review see Boden (2006)). This view has in-
spired decades of research in different areas of cognition that have recently been
described by the so-called “classical sandwich” architecture of cognitive systems,
whereby cognition sits in between perception and action, effectively rendering them
almost autonomous (Hurley, 2001; Wilson and Foglia, 2017). This view contrasts
with non-reductionist theories of the mind such as 4E (enactive, embodied, embed-
ded and extended), suggesting that situated, dynamical interactions with the envi-
ronment are critical to explain cognitive processes. In doing so, 4E proposals reject
the hypothesis of segregated perceptual and motor components (Van Gelder, 1995;
Clark, 1998; Wilson, 2002; Beer and Williams, 2015; Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Baran-
diaran, 2017), now seen as integrated and strongly coupled by feedback mechanisms
mediated by the environment.
In this chapter we argue, however, that the emphasis of feedback is not enough
to distinguish 4E theories from the ones related to the classical sandwich architecture
(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Beer, 1995). We will see that the modular view
can (often implicitly) survive in modern studies of action and perception even in the
presence of closed sensorimotor loops. To ground this argument and related discus-
sions on Fodorian (Fodor, 1983; Coltheart, 1999; Prinz, 2006) and post-Fodorian (Bar-
rett and Kurzban, 2006) modularity, we make use of formal frameworks that have
emerged from information and control theory, already widely exploited in modern
theories of perception and action based on processes of estimation/inference and
control (Knill and Richards, 1996; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and
Ghahramani, 2000; Todorov, 2004; Friston, 2010b; Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and
Friston, 2013) (see Chapter 2). Perception, on this view, is modelled as a process of
estimation of the hidden or latent variables of the world given noisy and often in-
accurate observations. Action, on the other hand, is accounted for with theories of
optimal control, suggesting possible optimality principles for the implementation of
motor actions and behaviour more in general. In this light, we then argue that the
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so-called separation principle of estimation and control in control theory provides con-
crete grounding of Fodor’s modularity with regards to action and perception. After
presenting this principle and its connections to the idea of modularity, we will dis-
cuss its role in the study of cognitive and natural systems. We finally propose active
inference (Friston et al., 2010a; Friston, 2010b) as an alternative view that, we argue,
openly rejects the separation principle, thus supporting non-modular 4E arguments
while maintaining its control/information theoretical roots consistent with modern
approaches to action and perception.
7.2 Modularity as an analogy of the separation principle
The separation principle of control theory provides a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions under which an optimal controller can be constructed by combining a
Kalman(-Bucy) filter and a Linear Quadratic Regulator that can be treated indepen-
dently (Wonham, 1968; Åström, 1970; Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994;
Georgiou and Lindquist, 2013). This methodology is widely adopted in control the-
ory and can be used to build controllers for noisy and uncertain systems where envi-
ronmental states are only partially observable. Separating estimation and control is
practically desirable because it becomes then possible to optimally solve the estima-
tion problem and subsequently use the output estimate to build an optimal controller.
The idea of the separation theorem is also very closely related to the certainty equiv-
alence principle described in econometrics and decision making (Simon, 1956; Theil,
1957; Bar-Shalom and Tse, 1974; Åström, 1970; Stengel, 1994). In information theory,
Shannon (1948) also previously introduced a definition of a separation principle, to
explain coding via two (separate) phases of source compression and channel cod-
ing (Gastpar, Rimoldi, and Vetterli, 2003). The connections between this notion and
the separation principle in control theory have become more clear in recent years,
thanks to work showing how Shannon’s description captures and potentially gen-
eralises the results from control theory, see for instance Tatikonda (2000), Tanaka,
Esfahani, and Mitter (2015), and Fox and Tishby (2016). In this thesis, the focus will
however be on the principle traditionally described in control theory.
The separation principle rests on a set of assumptions that, following (Åström,
1970; Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994), can be summarised as:
1. linear process dynamics and observation laws describing the environment and
its latent variables
2. Gaussian white noise in both process and measurement equations/laws
3. known (co)variance matrices representing uncertainty of both process and mea-
surement noises
4. a quadratic cost function used to measure the performance of a system
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5. known inputs for the estimator (i.e., the Kalman-Bucy filter), since the esti-
mator needs to have access to all the variables and parameters, external and
internal ones, affecting the inference of hidden states.
In the next sections we will first briefly introduce Kalman(-Bucy) filters and Lin-
ear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) as the optimal estimator and controller, respectively,
for the linear case. Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control is then presented as
the linear combination of the two, with further details related to the separation prin-
ciple. All these approaches will also be directly linked to different models used in
perceptual and motor neuroscience, extensively reviewed in Chapter 2.
7.2.1 Linear Quadratic Estimator (LQE) or Kalman(-Bucy) filter
One of the most popular algorithms for estimation problems is the Kalman filter
(KF) (Kalman, 1960b), or Kalman-Bucy filter for continuous systems (Kalman and
Bucy, 1961), with applications spanning the most diverse fields, see for instance
Chen (2003) and references therein. The Kalman(-Bucy) filter, also known as Lin-
ear Quadratic Estimator (LQE), is especially popular since 1) it’s optimal for the
estimation of linear systems, 2) it provides an advantageous iterative algorithmic
implementation and 3) it is defined without specific assumptions on the stationar-
ity of a system (Sorenson, 1970; Jazwinski, 1970; Chen, 2003). In this treatment we
will use the continuous formulation and therefore focus on the Kalman-Bucy imple-
mentation. To define the filter, we initially describe a (linear) continuous dynamical
systems in a state-space form, representing the system whose state(s) the filter is
trying to estimate:
dx =Ax dt+ dw
y =Cx+ dz (7.1)
Here the bold characters indicate vectors. The first equation describes linear dynam-
ics for a vector of processes x. In the second equation, y is a vector of (noisy) mea-
surements, or observations, of processes x. Vectors w, z are Wiener processes for
state and observation equations respectively, with dw = N (0,Σw), dz = N (0,Σz)
thus defined as zero-mean white Gaussian random variables with covariance matri-
ces Σw,Σz , represented according to Ito’s definition of white noise relying on strictly
zero-autocorrelation functions for w, z (Jazwinski, 1970; Chen, 2003), see previous
chapter for discussions on Ito/Stratonovich formulations. Matrices are represented
using capital letters, C is the measurement/observation matrix mapping processes
x to observations y and A is the state transition matrix characterising the dynamic
behaviour of x.
The Kalman-Bucy filter is well known in the literature to be the optimal esti-
mator for linear systems with quadratic cost functions and Gaussian white random
variables (Kalman, 1960b; Jazwinski, 1970; Chen, 2003; Åström and Murray, 2010).
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It is also known to be a minimum variance estimator (Jazwinski, 1970; Chen, 2003),
minimising the mean square error (MSE), or variance of the error, given by:
J = E[(x− xˆ)T (x− xˆ)] (7.2)
where xˆ is a vector containing the estimates of states x. The Kalman-Bucy filter is
usually presented as (Jazwinski, 1970; Stengel, 1994; Chen, 2003):
˙ˆx =Axˆ+K(y − Cxˆ)
K =PCT (Σz)
−1
P˙ =Σw +AP + PA
T −K(Σz)KT (7.3)
with the estimates xˆ given by the solution to the first equation, a sum of the current
best estimate multiplied by the known transition matrix, Axˆ and prediction errors,
or innovations, (y − Cxˆ). These prediction errors are multiplied by the so-called
Kalman gain (matrix) K, described in the second equation, which represents the op-
timal trade-off between previous estimates and new information gathered from new
observations. To calculate the Kalman gain matrix it is necessary to estimate P , the
a posteriori error covariance matrix, expressing the accuracy of the state estimate
in the first equation. The trace of P (i.e., the sum of the components on the main
diagonal) gives the sum of the independent components of the covariance matrix
(i.e., the sum of the variances of the single independent errors) equal to the MSE in
equation (7.2). Kalman(-Bucy) equations thus minimise the MSE expressed in equa-
tion (7.2), with small values in the error covariance matrix implying high accuracy
of the state estimation process. The process of estimation based on Kalman(-Bucy)
filters can also easily be seen in terms of Bayesian inference processes, where a mul-
tivariate Gaussian distribution x is estimated using the above equations to create
another multivariate Gaussian distribution with means xˆ and covariance matrix P
(Meinhold and Singpurwalla, 1983; Chen, 2003). The general structure provided
in these models gives rise to a series of hypotheses regarding Bayesian interpreta-
tions of perception in predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Rao, 1999) and is
then generalised to control and behaviour, for instance, in active inference and the
free energy principle (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Friston, 2008a;
Friston, 2010b), see Chapter 2.
Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) The Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) is the
most basic example of closed-loop control found in the optimal control literature
(Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994; Åström and Murray, 2010). In its simplest
form, it is defined for deterministic linear systems with quadratic cost functions, for
which the optimal control law turns out to be a simple negative feedback mechanism
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(Anderson and Moore, 1990) in the case of infinite-horizon control. Given a system:
dx = Ax dt+Ba dt (7.4)
representing a linear, noiseless, environment, we define x as a vector of measured
variables to be controlled. In this case the vector of processes to control are assumed
to be directly observable (no measurement noise, dz in the LQE formulation) so a
formulation in terms of Ito’s calculus (using the differential form dx) is not strictly
necessary but maintained for consistency with the Kalman-Bucy filter definition pro-
vided previously. The vector a defines the actions that can be applied to x. In more
traditional formulations, this vector is usually represented by u, but in this work
we want to highlight a difference that will become crucial later. I will define u as
a vector of inputs from a more general state-space perspective, i.e., variables that
affect the state of a system but are not states themselves. On the other hand, a repre-
sents a subset of inputs u, i.e., the (motor) actions of an agent, while I is used (often
implicitly) for external forces generated by the world. In (optimal) control theory,
these two definitions are often used interchangeably, assuming that all inputs are
motor actions and no external forces can affect the state of a system. In our case
however, we will also consider exogenous inputs/forces from the environment (I)
which are not represented by an agent’s actions but can still affect its state (Sontag,
2003; Åström and Murray, 2010). A is the state transition matrix, as in the case of the
Kalman-Bucy filter, while B is a matrix mapping actions a to outputs x.
In LQR, the goal is to stabilise (control or regulate) variables x around target
values x¯ (for simplicity here we will assume x¯ = 0) by controlling their behaviour
through actions a. Such actions are determined via the optimisation of a function
that accumulates costs over time called cost-to-go or value function:
J =
∫ ∞
0
1
2
xTQx+
1
2
aTRa dt (7.5)
which represents the infinite horizon simplification of the problem (i.e., the upper
limit of the integral is infinity). The instantaneous version, simply called cost func-
tion or cost rate, is defined for LQR as:
c(x,a) =
1
2
xTQx+
1
2
aTRa (7.6)
with Q ≥ 0 and R > 0 as arbitrary matrices representing the relative balance be-
tween the minimisation of the distance from the target and costs for control respec-
tively, e.g., physical costs such as energy. The optimal action vector a can then be
shown to be equal to (Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994; Todorov, 2006;
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Kappen, 2011):
a =− Lx
L =R−1BTV
−V˙ =Q+ATV + V A− LTR−1L (7.7)
where a essentially implements a negative feedback mechanism on x and L is feed-
back gain matrix, described in the second equation. The third equation defines the
matrix V , which is the Hessian of the cost-to-go function in equation (7.5). The use
of LQR controllers is central in several models of action and behaviour in the form of
negative feedback/delta-rule mechanisms (Widrow and Hoff, 1960; Rescorla, Wag-
ner, et al., 1972), see also (Todorov and Jordan, 2002; Li and Todorov, 2004; Todorov,
2005; Stevenson et al., 2009; Nagengast, Braun, and Wolpert, 2010; Yeo, Franklin,
and Wolpert, 2016) for work explicitly mentioning LQR and its generalisation LQG
(defined in the next section).
One of the limitations of LQR controllers, however, lies in the fact that they do not
explicitly deal with state/observation uncertainty or noise, i.e., the original formula-
tion is defined for deterministic systems. On the other hand, in real-world engineer-
ing applications as well as in biological systems, it is in fact more common to think of
systems with limited access to information from the environment and actions a thus
applied to a set of hidden states x with only (noisy) measurements/observations y
available. In the control theory literature, Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) con-
trol (Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994; Åström and Murray, 2010) grace-
fully combines estimation or inference and control for linear systems. Under a set
of assumptions, LQG controllers can be seen as modular: estimation and control
components can be built and optimised as (nearly) independent processes under the
“separation principle”.
7.2.2 Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control
Following the separation principle, the LQG controller produces optimal estima-
tion and optimal control for linear systems, sequentially combining two separate
sub-systems, a Kalman-Bucy filter and LQR, in an optimal (i.e., minimum-variance)
way (Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994; Kappen, 2011). The Kalman-Bucy
filter provides the optimal state-estimate of an observation and the LQR controller
uses such estimate (i.e., the mean) to implement the optimal deterministic controller:
LQG control makes use of the estimated mean and feeds it into an LQR controller.
A general linear system to be regulated in the presence of noise on the observed
state is described by:
dx =Ax dt+Ba dt+ dw
y =Cx+ dz (7.8)
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where all the variables and parameters are the same as previously defined for Kalman-
Bucy filters and LQR. In this case, the cost rate is slightly different as we are dealing
with a stochastic system with white noise on both dynamics and observations. The
standard approach of optimal control is thus extended to include stochastic variables
and what is minimised is the expected cost-to-go (Stengel, 1994; Todorov, 2006), with
cost rate defined as:
c(x,a) = E
[
1
2
xTQx+
1
2
aTRa
]
(7.9)
Using the separation principle, it can then be shown that minimising the expected
value of the cost-to-go is equivalent to minimising the cost-to-go for the expected
state (Kappen, 2011)
c(x,a) = c(xˆ,a) =
1
2
xˆTQxˆ+
1
2
aTRa (7.10)
where we replaced states xwith their estimates xˆ, meaning that the optimal control
can be computed using only the state estimate (i.e., the mean) xˆ. The problem of
estimation and control in LQG terms is then implemented by the following system
combining Kalman-Bucy filter and LQR equations:
˙ˆx =Axˆ+Ba+K(y − Cxˆ)
a =− Lxˆ
K =PCT (Σz)
−1
L =R−1BTV
P˙ =Σw +AP + PA
T −K(Σz)KT
−V˙ =Q+ATV + V A− LTRL (7.11)
The ability to easily evaluate the cost rate in equation (7.10) is the core feature of
LQG architectures. In more intuitive terms, after starting from the probabilistic con-
trol problem in equation (7.9), which accounts for the limited knowledge of a system,
the problem becomes essentially deterministic in equation (7.10), where we simply
replaced the state of a system with its estimate (see Stengel (1994) and Kappen (2011)
for the mathematical proof). The state estimate is obtained via the use of a Kalman-
Bucy filter, which is optimal and only conditionally dependent on the vector of mo-
tor actions a that contributed to the generation of observations y at the time of the
estimate, i.e., neither the past nor the future of a are important. In this sense, the
processes of estimation and control, or perception and action, exchange some ba-
sic information (estimates xˆ to the controller and actions a to the estimator) but are
otherwise working independently. Moreover, the regulation problem is probabilistic
only for the estimator, while a simple LQR can be used for control, as if the problem
was deterministic and all information about a system was available to begin with.
The restrictive nature of the requirements for the separation principle and the
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related LQG architecture have been widely debated in the control theory literature
(Stengel, 1994; Åström and Murray, 2010). Here we are especially interested and
will discuss their possible meaning for the study of cognition, arguing that cog-
nitivist accounts on the modular nature of the mind can be seen in analogy with
the separation advocated by this principle. Countless studies in neuroscience and
psychology make use of this assumption, focusing on either aspects of perception
(Fodor, 1983; Marr, 1982; Knill and Richards, 1996; Rao, 1999) or action (Wolpert and
Ghahramani, 2000; Todorov and Jordan, 2002; Todorov, 2004; Franklin and Wolpert,
2011), as if they could be modelled independently. However, living organisms are
highly nonlinear and the environments they operate within are also themselves non-
linear, hence they cannot be fully understood with systems of linear equations (see
assumption 1. in section 7.2). There is no evidence for noise in physical systems
to be described by white Gaussian random variables (assumption 2.), on the other
hand, it is often claimed that the assumption for noise to be white is not realistic
(Van Kampen, 1981; Fox, 1987; Friston, 2008a). Whether biological system could
effectively keep an updated estimate of the uncertainty in environmental variables
(represented by covariance matrices in control theory) is also unclear (assumption
3.), especially considering non-stationary environments (Åström and Murray, 2010).
It is then non-trivial to describe biological phenomena with quadratic cost functions
(assumption 4.) (Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Franklin and Wolpert, 2011). Lastly,
the separation principle suggests that perceptual systems must have access to an
accurate copy of outgoing motor commands and all other possible inputs from the
environment (assumption 5.).
As pointed out above and as shown in Fig. 7.1, under this scheme, the estimator
(i.e., the Kalman-Bucy filter) and the controller (i.e., LQR) exchange information in
two ways. The estimator relays accurate estimates xˆ of latent variables in the world
to the controller, which in turn sends a copy of the motor command a back to the
estimator. This copy of the motor command is crucial to allow the estimator, used as
a metaphor for sensory systems, to discount sensory consequences of motor actions.
In the absence of this information, estimates of world variables quickly become im-
precise and subsequently controls become unstable (Friston, 2011). The notion of a
copy of motor signals is consistent with the classical idea of efference copy in neu-
roscience (Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950; Crapse and Sommer, 2008; Schwartz, 2016;
Straka, Simmers, and Chagnaud, 2018). Efference copy is thought to represent a
copy of signals from low-level motor areas in the brain that is sent to processing ar-
eas in order to disambiguate movements performed by an agent from environmental
stimuli, although its definition is often vague and mixed with the idea of corollary
discharge (Crapse and Sommer, 2008; Schwartz, 2016; Straka, Simmers, and Chag-
naud, 2018). In the most prominent examples of LQG-based architectures in the
cognitive sciences, efference copy is necessary for appropriate estimations of hid-
den variables in the world (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000; Todorov,
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2004; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, and Flanagan, 2011). Its exact definition and plausi-
bility in neural system have however been comprehensively challenged (Feldman,
2009; Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013; Feldman et al., 2015; Feldman,
2016). In particular, some authors claim that the neurophysiological evidence sup-
porting its existence is conflicting (Feldman, 2009; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013;
Feldman et al., 2015; Feldman, 2016), proposing then alternative models that eschew
this idea entirely (Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013). Furthermore,
this still doesn’t speak to the presence of external forces affecting the observations
of an agent and that cannot be known for different reasons. On the other hand, the
presence of efficient mechanisms to counteract the effects of unknown stimuli is a
defining feature of biological systems (Sontag, 2003) and remains unexplained by
LQG architectures.
While the separation principle may not strictly hold, one could argue for a weaker
version of separability/modularity and claim, nonetheless, its validity at least as a
general driving theory for the study of cognitive systems. Agents could be cast as
“approximately” or “partially” separable, following a less strict definition of sepa-
ration (see Whittle (1981) for instance), with such notions still useful metaphors to
understand perception and action as separate modules even without optimality as
defined by the separation principle. This is especially true for the first four assump-
tions of the separation principle that we listed. For example, it may be possible to
approximate nonlinear descriptions of a system with linearisations around relevant
points/equilibria of a system (assumption 1.) (Åström and Murray, 2010) or to de-
scribe coloured noise as a high order autoregressive process expressed in terms of
white noise (assumption 2.) (Chui and Chen, 2017). One may also think of estimat-
ing covariance matrices that although not optimal, closely resemble the uncertainty
of a process (assumption 3.) (Rao, 1999). It may also be that quadratic cost func-
tions provide good approximations in some instances (assumption 4.) (Simon, 1956;
Körding and Wolpert, 2004). On the other hand, we argue that a weaker notion of
“approximate” separability is not well defined for the last of the requirements of
the separation principle (assumption 5.). This will thus be the main focus of our
argument for the cognitive sciences.
The assumption that an estimator needs to have information about its own mo-
tor actions and other forces from the environment is often not considered a problem
in control theory and robotics: a copy of motor signals can easily be retrieved and
sent back to the estimator/forward model (Kawato, 1999) and external stimuli can
be discounted by the experimenter. In biology and neuroscience, however, while
the presence of information flowing from motor to sensory areas has been estab-
lished for decades in the form of efference copy/corollary discharge (Cullen, 2004;
Crapse and Sommer, 2008; Schwartz, 2016; Straka, Simmers, and Chagnaud, 2018),
recent discussions on the information contents of such mechanisms (Feldman, 2009;
Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013; Feldman, 2016) lead us to carefully
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consider frameworks based on these ideas and their role in the cognitive and natu-
ral sciences. Furthermore, modern experimental set ups in biology and neuroscience
where unexpected external inputs are essentially denied have been put into discus-
sions by several authors (Ahissar and Assa, 2016; Krakauer et al., 2017; Busse et
al., 2017; Najafi and Churchland, 2018), questioning their relevance for ethologically
meaningful explanations of natural behaviour. An alternative modelling approach,
disposing with the need for a copy of motor signals and access to knowledge of
all external inputs, is proposed with active inference. In active inference these is-
sues are bypassed using a more powerful forward, or generative model, and trivial
sensorimotor mappings in the form of reflex arcs replacing complex inverse mod-
els/controllers (see Fig. 7.2), similar to threshold or referent control ideas (Feldman
et al., 2015).
Estimator/
forward 
model
Estimated
sensations Controller
Motor signal
copy
Sensations 
Motor
signal
Plant/
environment
Action and perception in the separation principle
FIGURE 7.1: A control architecture based on the separation princi-
ple. An estimator, or forward model, infers the causes of incoming
sensory input which are relayed to the controller. The controller cal-
culates the optimal output motor signal based on these estimates and
allows the system to act on the environment. In parallel, the controller
sends also a copy of the command to the estimator, allowing the latter
to take this command into account during the estimation of observed
stimuli and discount the effects of internally generated actions.
7.3 Active inference and non-modular architectures
Active inference is a process theory proposed to explain brain functioning and other
functions of living systems based on Bayesian inference and optimal control theory
(Friston et al., 2010a; Buckley et al., 2017). In this section we establish its relations
to the LQG architecture, starting by building an active inference version of the reg-
ulation of a linear multivariate system, and highlighting differences, limitations and
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possible extensions proposed for the control problem. As with LQG control, we will
build an estimator of the hidden states x. In this case however, we will give a varia-
tional account of the estimator in generalised coordinates of motion that generalises
the MLE/MAP derivation of Kalman-Bucy filters (Jazwinski, 1970; Meinhold and
Singpurwalla, 1983; Chen, 2003) using Variational Bayes with a Laplace approxima-
tion (Friston et al., 2007; Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Friston et al.,
2010b; Buckley et al., 2017), see Chapter 3. We start by defining a generative model
for an agent capturing the dynamics of the system to control and how these relate
to observations and represented in a generalised state-space form1 (Friston, 2008a;
Buckley et al., 2017):
x′ =Aˆx′ + Bˆv +w
y =Cˆx+ z (7.12)
where the hat over the matrices simply represents the fact that the matrices used
in the generative model don’t necessarily mirror their counterparts describing the
world dynamics, as shown in our model later. The main difference with respect to
LQG however, is that LQG explicitly mirrors (by construction in the linear case) the
dynamics of the observed system, thus including knowledge of inputs a, while in
active inference this vector is not explicitly modelled by an agent, assuming that
no copy of motor signals is available. It is in fact proposed that a deeper duality
of estimation and control exists whereby, in the simplest case (i.e., a purely reflex-
ive account), actions are just responses to the presence of prediction errors at the
proprioceptive level, irrespectively of the cause of sensations, self-generated or ex-
ternal (Friston, 2011; Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012b; Brown et al., 2013;
Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013). In recent accounts of more complex behaviour un-
der active inference, action is cast as a problem of inference with (fictitious) control
states c or rather time-dependent policies pic2 that are inferred via the minimisa-
tion of expected free energy y (Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012b; Friston
et al., 2015). Both these proposals support theories in motor neuroscience suggest-
ing that knowledge of such self-produced controls (i.e., efference copy (Holst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950)) is not available, and not necessary, for estimation in biological
systems (Feldman, 2009; Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013; Feldman,
2016; Wiese, 2016). The vector v replacing a in the generative model encodes instead
external or exogenous inputs in a state-space models sense. For the regulation of a
system, these inputs represent priors or “desired” outcomes for an agent that could
be derived from hierarchical implementations as outputs from layers above (Friston,
2008a).
1The notation for generalised coordinates introduced in Chapter 3, e.g., x˜, is however dropped here
for clarity. Moreover, for a fair comparison with LQG, the world dynamics of the model introduced
later on are described using white noise, thus not requiring descriptions in terms of higher embedding
orders. We will however maintain a Stratonovich definition of noisy terms, using for instancew rather
than the differential form dw.
2called u and piu in (Friston et al., 2015)
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This state-space model can then be written down in a probabilistic form, map-
ping the measurements equation to a likelihood p(y|xˆ) (no direct influence of inputs
on observations), and the system’s dynamics to a prior p(x,v) (Friston, 2008a), see
also Chapter 3. The two probabilities densities are both Gaussian and can be written
as:
p(y|x) = 1√
(2pi)m|Σz|
exp
(
−1
2
(y − Cˆx)TΣ−1z (y − Cˆx)
)
p(x,v) =
1√
(2pi)n|Σw|
exp
(
−1
2
(x′ − Aˆx′ − Bˆv)TΣ−1w (xˆ′ − Aˆx′ − Bˆv)
)
(7.13)
where m,n represent the number of elements of vectors y and x respectively and
|Σz|, |Σw| are the determinants of the respective covariance matrices. With the gen-
eral formulation of Laplace encoded variational free energy defined in Chapter 3
and here extended to the multivariate case:
F ≈ − ln p(y,x,v,θ,γ)
∣∣∣
ϑ=µ
(7.14)
the free energy for a generic linear multivariate system becomes then:
F ≈1
2
[(
y − Cˆµx
)T
Πz
(
y − Cˆµx
)
+
(
µ′x − Aˆµˆx − Bˆµv
)T
Πw
(
µ′x − Aˆµx − Bˆµv
)
− ln (Πz)− ln (Πw)+ (m+ n) ln 2pi] (7.15)
where we defined precision matrices Πz,Πw as the inverse of covariance matrices
Σz,Σw. Variables m,n represent the dimensions of vectors y and x respectively. It
is important to highlight that, in general, the covariance matrices used in the gen-
erative model can be different from the ones used to describe the environment or
generative process. To simplify the already heavy notation we will however rep-
resent them in the same way. We also explicitly replaced x with their expectations
µx, since under the Laplace assumption this represents the best estimate of x. Ex-
pectations µx play the same role of estimates xˆ in LQG, we simply decided to use
a notation consistent with some of our previous work, see Buckley et al. (2017) and
previous chapters.
The recognition dynamics, encoding perception and action in a system min-
imising free energy (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Friston et al.,
2010b; Buckley et al., 2017) and equivalent to estimation and control functions re-
spectively, are implemented in standard active inference formulations as a gradient
descent scheme minimising the free energy with respect to the means xˆ for percep-
tion/estimation:
µ˙x = Dµx + Cˆ
TΠz
(
y − Cˆµx
)
+ AˆTΠw
(
µ′x − Aˆµx − Bˆµv
)
µ˙′x = Dµ
′
x −Πw
(
µ′x − Aˆµx − Bˆµv
)
(7.16)
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and actions a for action/control, assuming only that actions have an effect on obser-
vations y:
a˙ = −∂F
∂a
= −∂F
∂y
∂y
∂a
= −∂y
∂a
T
Πz
(
y − Cˆxˆ
)
(7.17)
The estimation expressed in equation (7.16) prescribes a generalisation of Kalman-
Bucy filters to trajectories with arbitrary embedding orders where random variables
are treated as smooth stochastic processes, i.e., without the Markov assumption nec-
essary in standard Kalman-Bucy filters (see above). In equation (7.16), we also in-
clude a term Dµx, previously introduced in Chapter 3 as the mode (or mean for
Gaussian variables) of the motion for the minimisation in generalised coordinates of
motion (Friston, 2008a; Buckley et al., 2017). Action as expressed in (7.17) may ap-
pear similar to the traditional LQR/LQG form, but is fundamentally different since
it depends on observations y rather than on estimates of hidden states µx.
7.3.1 Action and perception are not separable
In active inference, perfect knowledge of the motor signals is not assumed to be
necessary for combined models of control and estimation (Friston, 2011; Adams,
Shipp, and Friston, 2013), and possibly not at all present in biological systems (Feld-
man et al., 2015; Feldman, 2016). The proposed alternative entails recasting motor
control problems into perceptual or inference problems, considering that these two
classes of problems can be solved by the same algorithms (Kalman, 1960c; Anderson
and Moore, 1990; Attias, 2003; Todorov, 2008; Friston, 2011). According to active
inference, perception and action are largely overlapping processes sharing most of
their computation, with differences arising mainly at a physiological level (Adams,
Shipp, and Friston, 2013). The problem of finding actions is essentially converted
into an inference problem, solved by the same underlying predictive coding scheme
implementing perceptual processes, see Fig. 7.2. In this architecture, proprioceptive
sensations are also predicted by an agent, alongside exteroceptive and interocep-
tive ones. Explicit motor output is then produced by simple sensorimotor mappings
implemented at the very periphery of a system, translating proprioceptive predic-
tions into actions in the external world (Friston et al., 2010a). Conceptually, active
inference disposes with the need of a copy of motor signals proposing a more gen-
eral predictive coding scheme based on priors applied to proprioceptors, coupled
to simple sensorimotor mappings translating proprioceptive predictions into actual
actions (Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013).
More in detail, unlike LQG where the Kalman-Bucy filter is provided with a copy
of motor controls a, effectively discounted from the estimation of states xˆ, in active
inference these signals are not provided and the problem of control is almost en-
tirely replaced by the generalised Kalman-Bucy filter expressed in equation (7.16).
This new “filter” provides estimates µx biased towards the desires of an agent (Fris-
ton et al., 2010a), rather than an objective account of observations y. Action is then
Chapter 7. Modularity, the separation principle and active inference 138
Sensations 
Motor
signal
Plant/
environment
Estimated
sensations 
(Proprioceptive)
Prediction
errors
Generative
model
Controller
Action and perception in active inference
FIGURE 7.2: A control architecture based on active inference. Ac-
tive inference converts the complex problem of optimal control into
a more viable problem of inference, solved by a more general gener-
ative model (Friston, 2011). The forward, or generative, model pro-
duces estimates of the sensory input. The mismatch between these
estimates and real sensory data (here represented as only proprio-
ceptive but more in general including also exteroceptive and intero-
ceptive) generates prediction errors that are used to update the gen-
erative model itself and thus infer the causes of sensory data when
they are minimised. Propriocetive prediction errors are also explicitly
minimised via simple reflex mechanisms implemented at the level of
peripheral “controllers”. These controllers receive information in an
intrinsic frame of reference, proprioceptive signals within an agent,
and translate them into controls in an extrinsic one, motor actions in
the world, using hardwired sensorimotor mappings (Friston et al.,
2010a).
determined entirely through its effects on observations ∂y/∂a instead of requiring
precise knowledge on how control affects estimates of hidden states µx, thought to
be a much harder problem to solve (Friston, 2011). In active inference, the more
standard inverse problem used to formulate motor control problems in (Kawato,
1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000) as mappings is decomposed into two parts.
The first one, mapping desires/reference values in extrinsic (i.e., world) coordinates
to an internal frame of reference (i.e., proprioception) is solved by the same gener-
ative model already in charge of predicting and estimating hidden variables from
observations of the real world. The second one, providing mappings between pro-
prioceptive predictions and actions in the real world is thought to be implemented
at the spinal level via simple reflex-like mechanisms (Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp,
and Friston, 2013), for simplicity assumed to be endowed by evolutionary processes
rather than learnt (Friston et al., 2010a). In active inference, action is also expressed
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for systems in generalised coordinates of motion considering how, in the more gen-
eral case, an agent’s actions can affect a trajectory rather than a single order of mo-
tion, a feature that introduces for instance new interpretations of classical regulation
strategies such as PID control (see Chapter 6).
In active inference, the more traditional, sequential and modular role of per-
ception and action advocated by the separation principle has already been ques-
tioned, suggesting that these processes are deeply intertwined (Friston, 2011; Pick-
ering and Clark, 2014; Engel, Friston, and Kragic, 2016; Wiese, 2016; Pezzulo et al.,
2017). Essentially, this alternative architecture is based on a fundamentally entan-
gled action-perception loop where the two processes cannot really be investigated
independently, since action is enacted by systematic perceptual misrepresentations
(Wiese, 2016) and classical accounts of perceptual functions only exist as a special,
non-ecologically plausible instance of agent-environment systems (Friston, Thorn-
ton, and Clark, 2012). In support of this idea, and following our own argument
on the parallelism between Fodor’s idea of modularity and the separation prin-
ciple of control theory, we claim that active inference does not formally meet the
requirements for the separation of estimation and control (perception and action).
Furthermore, it is engaging in an explicitly non-modular architecture of cognitive
processing. As previously suggested, while the first four requirements of the sepa-
ration principle may be prone to arguments regarding the existence of separation in
at least some approximate sense (e.g., an approximately linear model, noise that is
approximately Gaussian, etc.), the presence of a copy of motor signals generates a
strong dichotomy, with no room for approximations. In this very specific case, the
separation of estimation and control is only possible in presence of this copy and
no approximate separation can exist when this is missing, since Kalman-Bucy are
not well defined without this information (Kalman, 1960c; Chen, 2003). Without a
copy of motor signals, the architecture described by the separation principle is un-
avoidably broken and thus, according to our initial claim regarding the cognitive
sciences, Fodor’s modularity cannot be implemented. More in general, the presence
of any external force I is bound to generate the same effects: if inputs I are not rep-
resented within the Kalman-Bucy filter, the separation principle cannot be defined
since all inputs need to be provided. Active inference models, by explicitly eschew-
ing the idea that a copy of motor signals is sent to estimators (Friston, 2011), embrace
a fully non-modular perspective with action and perception intimately entangled
only “separated” in name for consistency with traditional labels used in cognitive
science.
7.4 The model
The double integrator is a canonical example used to describe control theoretical
methods and is one of the simplest and most fundamental problems in optimal con-
trol, modelling single degree-of-freedom motion of different physical systems (Rao
Chapter 7. Modularity, the separation principle and active inference 140
and Bernstein, 2001; Åström and Murray, 2010). In the simplest case presented here,
this could be thought of as, essentially, a block on frictionless surface. The standard
double integrator is usually described as a deterministic system. The control policy
is thus usually defined using a feedback law applied directly to the known dynamics,
as the full state of the system is measured with no uncertainty (Rao and Bernstein,
2001). For the purposes of this work, where uncertainty and noise are crucial com-
ponents, we will introduce process and measurement noise into the system, making
the estimation of hidden states necessary and thus fully compare LQG and active
inference in one of the simplest possible examples in the control theory literature3.
The double integrator is described by the following state-space model:
x˙ =Ax+Ba+w
y =Cx+ z (7.18)
where observations, hidden states, controls and noise/fluctuations are defined as
vectors:
y =
y
y′
 x =
x
x′
 a =
0
a
 z =
z
z′
 w =
w
w′

and matrices A,B,C as:
A =
0 1
0 0
 B =
0 0
0 1
 C =
1 0
0 1
 (7.19)
while covariance matrices Σz,Σw as:
Σz =
exp(0) 0
0 exp(0)
 Σw =
0 0
0 exp(−1)
 (7.20)
which effectively reduces the system to
x˙ =x′
x˙′ =x′′ = a+ w
y =x+ z
y˙ = y′ =x′ + z′
(7.21)
3The code is available at https://github.com/mbaltieri/doubleIntegrator.
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m =1kg
Sliding block on a frictionless surface

goal: x = 0, x’ = 0
x = 0
Force

applied
FIGURE 7.3: The generative process, a double integrator. The double
integrator problem, corresponding to a block of mass=1kg placed on
a surface with no friction. The goal is to have the block moving to
position x = 0 and then stop x′ = 0.
7.4.1 The LQG solution to the double integrator
With LQG, the equations for estimation and control in the double integrator follow-
ing the Kalman-Bucy filter + LQR structure are (see equation (7.11)):
˙ˆx =xˆ′ + k1(y − xˆ) + k2(y′ − xˆ′)
˙ˆx′ =a+ k3(y − xˆ) + k4(y′ − xˆ′)
a =− l1(xˆ− r)− l2(xˆ′ − r′)
K =PCT (Σz)
−1
L =R−1BTV
P˙ =Σw +AP + PA
T −K(Σz)KT
−V˙ =Q+ATV + V A− LTRL (7.22)
where r is the target position, r = 0 for the double integrator. For the LQR compo-
nent, we then specify matrices:
Q =
1 0
0 1
 R =
4 0
0 4
 (7.23)
not optimising their values since it is beyond the scope of this work. For further
results and analysis see for instance (Rao and Bernstein, 2001).
As we can see in Fig. 7.4a, the block is effectively driven to the desired position
x = 0 and velocity x′ = 0 from a set of 5 randomly initialised conditions (zero-mean
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FIGURE 7.4: The double integrator solved using LQG. (a) Five LQG
agents with different initial conditions showing the observed trajecto-
ries of the blocks in the phase-space (in blue) and the agents’ estimates
of the trajectories (in red). (b) Actions taken by the five agents.
Gaussian distributed, sd=100). In Fig. 7.4b we then simply show the actions over
time of the same 5 examples, all converging to zero since the agents effectively reach
their desired target. The main feature of LQG, and from which active inference will
depart, is the reliability of estimates of both position and velocity (the red line in the
phase space). In LQG, accurate estimates are necessary to then enact the LQR com-
ponent implementing a negative feedback mechanism based on estimates xˆ rather
than true hidden states x.
When knowledge of the motor signals a is removed from equation (7.11), es-
timates of the hidden properties of the world become inaccurate and unstable, as
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FIGURE 7.5: The double integrator solved using LQG with no
knowledge of motor signals. (a) Five examples with different ini-
tial conditions showing in blue the observed trajectories of different
blocks in the phase-space and in red the agent’s estimates of the same
trajectories. In this case we specifically removed motor signals a from
equation (7.11), simulating a lack of information regarding these sig-
nals. (b) Actions taken by the five agents.
shown in Fig. 7.5 for the double integrator. In this example, rather than converging
towards the desired state, our agents get away from it (Fig. 7.5a) since the new ob-
servations are too inaccurate given the lack of mechanisms to discount the effects of
a. In Fig. 7.5b we can then see that actions a begin to exponentially oscillate rather
than converging to zero, as in Fig. 7.4. This is due to one of the assumptions for
observability defined by Kalman in (Kalman, 1960c), explicitly requiring knowledge
of all inputs and outputs of a system in order to determine its latent state(s).
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FIGURE 7.6: The double integrator solved using LQG with no
knowledge of external forces. (a) Five LQG agents with different ini-
tial conditions showing the observed trajectories of the blocks in the
phase-space (in blue) and the agents’ estimates of the trajectories (in
red). (b) Actions taken by the five agents (coloured lines) and external
force applied to the agent (in black).
In Fig. 7.6 we introduced a new external force I not modelled by the agents,
equivalent to a disturbance from the environment (black line in Fig. 7.6b). Fig. 7.6a
then shows that the agents are incapable of regulating their position/velocity against
this unknown input (blue lines), after an initial convergence towards the desired
state, they in fact move away from the target when the force is introduced. Further-
more, these agents are incapable of correctly inferring their trajectories, providing
inaccurate estimates of their sensed variables (red lines). In Fig. 7.6b we see that all
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of these agents attempt to counteract the effects of unexpected stimuli (they min-
imise their velocity after the force is introduced), however the lack of an appropriate
mechanism to track their position correctly (i.e., integral action) pushes them away
from the target.
7.4.2 The double integrator with active inference
To solve the same control problem, active inference relies on the generation of pre-
dictions of proprioceptive sensations (position, velocity and acceleration of the agent
in this case), followed by the implementation of actions in the world via (trivial) re-
flex arcs. The proprioceptive modality is essentially treated as other inputs (vision,
audition, etc.) and estimates/predictions are generated using the same generative
model taking advantage of incoming proprioceptive sensations. This produces a
considerably different control system, with state estimates and actions now created
by the same model, making it hard to clearly separate processes of perception and
action, see Fig. 7.2. The copy of motor control signals (cf. efference copy (Holst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950)), necessary in standard LQG settings to meet the observability
constraints of Kalman-Bucy filters (Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994) is not
included in this formulation, as explained in section 7.3.1. Active inference postu-
lates in fact that direct representations of the causes or actions a of self-generated
sensations need not be discounted during the prediction of new incoming sensory
inputs. This could be seen as a limitation of active inference accounts, but in gen-
eral it speaks to the robustness of this approach in face of unknown inputs (i.e.,
motor actions produced by an agent or exogenous forces from the environment).
It is also claimed that, in this framework, inputs/causes can be estimated using an
appropriate generative model of the world dynamics (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and
Daunizeau, 2008), a feature thought to be defining for biological systems (Sontag,
2003). Simple and effective approximations are also possible, for example with in-
tegral control, thought to be the most basic heuristic dealing with the problem of
uncertain inputs even in biological systems down to the unicellular level (Sontag,
2003) and shown to be consistent with formulations of linear generative models in
active inference (see Chapter 6). To derive the active inference solution to the same
double integrator problem, we start by defining a generative model for the agent,
i.e., the block:
x′ =Aˆx+ Bˆv +w
y =Cˆx+ z (7.24)
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m =1kg
Spring-mass-damper system
−α1x
−α2x′ 
x = 0
FIGURE 7.7: The generative model for the double integrator. The
agent implements a generative model with priors representing an
imaginary spring that pulls the block back to the origin (x = 0) and
an imaginary damper that slows it down (x′ = 0).
where observations, hidden states, inputs and noise/fluctuations are defined as vec-
tors (for the notation, refer to Chapter 3):
y =

y
y′
y′′
 x =

x
x′
x′′
 v =

v
v′
v′′
 z =

z
z′
z′′
 w =

w
w′
w′′
 (7.25)
and matrices Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ as:
Aˆ =

0 1 0
−α1 −α2 0
0 0 0
 Bˆ =

exp(1) 0 0
0 exp(1) 0
0 0 exp(1)
 Cˆ =

0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
 (7.26)
with covariance matrices Σz,Σw defined as:
Σw =

exp(1) 0 0
0 exp(1) 0
0 0 exp(1)
 Σz =

exp(8) 0 0
0 exp(8) 0
0 0 exp(8)
 (7.27)
The description of this generative model already highlights profound differences
with the LQG approach that will be discussed in detail in section 7.5. For now, it is
important to notice that an extra observation is provided, the measured acceleration
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y′′, and that this generative model depicts the agent as a spring-mass-damper sys-
tem. The agent implements beliefs of a world where it is pulled back to the desired
state x = 0 and x′ = 0 by an imaginary spring and slows down thanks to an imag-
inary piston-like damper, “designed” (in this case by us, but more in general one
could imagine evolutionary processes for biological system (Friston et al., 2010a)) to
favour normative behaviour.
Following equation (7.26), the variational free energy for our controller is then
described by:
F ≈1
2
[
piz(y − µx)2 + piz′(y′ − µ′x)2 + piz′′(y′′ − µ′′x)2 + piw′(µ′′x − µv)2 (7.28)
− ln(pizpiz′piz′′piw′)− 6 ln 2pi
]
(7.29)
where precisions pizpiz′piz′′piw′ are taken from the diagonals of precision matrices
Πz,Πw (inverse covariances matrices Σz,Σw defined in the generative model). After
explicitly writing out the equations derived from the matrix formulation in (7.16),
we get the following formulation of perceptual inference:
µ˙x =µ
′
x + piz(y − µx) + piw(µ′x + αµx − βµv)
µ˙′x =µ
′′
x + piz′(y
′ − µ′x) + piw′(µ′′x + αµ′x − βµ′v)
µ˙′′x =µ
′′′
x + piz′′(y
′′ − µ′′x) + piw′′(µ′′x + αµ′x − βµ′v) (7.30)
and
µ˙′x =− piw(µ′x + αµx − βµv)
µ˙′′x =− piw′(µ′′x + αµ′x − βµ′v) (7.31)
showing another important difference derived from the lack of the Kalman gain K:
if K is non-diagonal as in this case (one can simply verify this claim with standard
functions solving continuous Riccati equations, as in the provided code), multiple
orders of motion are present in the optimal filter problem in equation (7.11), but
only one appears in equation (7.30) since the precision matrices are assumed to be
diagonal in our formulation.
The action component is, however, the one most significantly different, starting
from the assumption that direct knowledge of motor signals is not available and
thus not modelled in the generative model (motor commands a are replaced by in-
puts v acting as priors). This entails a new approach to the understanding of the
problem, with active inference suggesting that the only information needed comes
from observations y, see equation (7.17). On this account, action then reduces to
a˙ = −
(
∂y′
∂a
)T
Πz(y − Cˆµx) (7.32)
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and with the assumption that
∂y
∂a
=
[
1 1 1
]T
the explicit, scalar version of action becomes
a˙ = −piz(y − µx)− piz′(y′ − µ′x)− piz′′(y′′ − µ′′x) (7.33)
replacing the LQR component in equation (7.11). This type of control is equiva-
lent to a PID controller (see Chapter 6) and as we will discuss later is the “optimal”
linear solution when knowledge of inputs a or I is not available in the generative
model. As in the case of filtering, the feedback gain L is missing in the active in-
ference formulation, replaced by learning rates of the gradient descent or by clever
approximations (see Chapter 4).
In Fig. 7.8 we can see an example implementation of the double integrator us-
ing active inference. Five agents are initialised at random position and velocity
(zero-mean Gaussian distributed, sd=100) and Fig. 7.8a, and converge to the tar-
get solution where the output actions are essentially zero (excluding some noise), as
expected Fig. 7.8b. The most striking feature is that estimates of both position and
velocity of the block are very inaccurate but the agent nonetheless reaches the de-
sired target in the phase space. These differences are given by the generative model
implemented by the agent, encoding an imaginary spring-damper system that pulls
it towards its desired state. By relaxing the stiffness of the spring and the friction
represented by the damper we can see that the agents start circling around the tar-
get increasingly more and more, and are essentially slower at reaching their desired
state, see Fig. 7.9a and Fig. 7.10a. However, their estimates of the latent variables, po-
sition and velocity, are more accurate. In active inference, action and perception can
be seen as competing for the same resources (essentially an attention-like mechanism
(Feldman and Friston, 2010; Brown et al., 2013)) within a single generative model,
and better performances of one guarantee worse results for the other. Agents that
are “too good” at inferring properties of their environment don’t move (Brown et
al., 2013), while agents that move too much might end up missing important details
(Friston, Daunizeau, and Kiebel, 2009; Friston et al., 2010a): only a balanced mix of
action and perception can allow for normative behaviour.
Fig. 7.11 shows then the robustness of this implementation when an external
force I is introduced: by implementing integral control (Baltieri and Buckley, 2018a),
active inference can in this case counteract the effects of unexpected inputs. The pres-
ence of integral action perfectly counteracts the effects of disturbances Fig. 7.11b (cf.
Fig. 7.6b), and more importantly allows for the desired regulation of the agents’ po-
sitions, Fig. 7.11a, which is impossible in LQG accounts assuming perfect knowledge
of the world (cf. Fig. 7.6a).
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FIGURE 7.8: The double integrator solved using active inference
(α1 = exp (2), α2 = exp (1)). (a) Five active inference agents with
different initial conditions showing the observed trajectories of the
blocks in the phase-space (in blue) and the agents’ estimates of the
trajectories (in red). (b) Actions taken by the five agents.
7.5 Discussion
Active inference is an emerging theory in the cognitive sciences proposed to account
for several phenomena of life and cognition, including action, perception, learn-
ing and other higher order functions (Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Friston,
2010b; Friston et al., 2010a; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015b). Its position over the long
standing debate between computational and 4E (enactive, embodied, embedded,
extended) theories of cognition remains however unclear (Clark, 2015a; Allen and
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FIGURE 7.9: The double integrator solved using active inference
(α1 = exp (1), α2 = exp (0.5)). (a) Five active inference agents
with different initial conditions and different parameters of the imag-
inary mass-spring system implemented as a prior, α1 = exp(1), α2 =
exp(0.5). Showing the observed trajectories of the blocks in the phase-
space (in blue) and the agents’ estimates of the trajectories (in red). (b)
Actions taken by the five agents.
Friston, 2018; Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018; Kirchhoff and Froese, 2017;
Gładziejewski, 2016). In this work we focused on the idea of modularity explicitly in-
troduced in the cognitive science debates by Fodor (1983). In particular, this idea is
central to architectures based on the classical sandwich of cognitive science (Colt-
heart, 1999; Hurley, 2001; Barrett and Kurzban, 2006), where perception and action
are seen as modules of a feedforward-only architecture that are explicitly separated
by cognition, the sandwich’s “filling” (Hurley, 2001). Traditional views of cognitive
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FIGURE 7.10: The double integrator solved using active inference
(α1 = exp ( − 1), α2 = exp (0)). (a) Five active inference agents
with different initial conditions and different parameters of the imagi-
nary mass-spring system implemented as a prior, α1 = exp(−1), α2 =
exp(0). Showing the observed trajectories of the blocks in the phase-
space (in blue) and the agents’ estimates of the trajectories (in red).
(b) Actions taken by the five agents.
science openly embrace this architecture and the idea of modularity of perception
and action while 4E theories largely reject them, claiming that fast-paced dynamic
interactions between an agent and its environment imply that perception and action
are deeply entangled and therefore not modular since such dynamics cannot be in-
ternally modelled (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Clark, 1998; Wilson, 2002;
Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandiaran, 2017).
In active inference, the more established modular role of action and perception
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FIGURE 7.11: The double integrator solved using active inference
with no knowledge of external forces. Same layout as Fig. 7.4. (a)
Five active inference agents with different initial conditions showing
the observed trajectories of the blocks in the phase-space (in blue) and
the agents’ estimates of the trajectories (in red). (b) Actions taken by
the five agents (coloured lines) and external force applied to the agent
(in black).
has already been put in discussion (Friston, 2011; Pickering and Clark, 2014; Seth,
2014b; Engel, Friston, and Kragic, 2016; Wiese, 2016; Pezzulo et al., 2017). We thus
argued that in this framework not only action and perception are not modular in a
Fodorian (Fodor, 1983; Coltheart, 1999; Prinz, 2006) or post-Fodorian (Barrett and
Kurzban, 2006) sense, but that their intimate relation challenges our common un-
derstanding of these processes per se. To support this claim, we then connected the
idea of modularity in cognitive science to concepts from control theory in order to
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define it using established mathematical frameworks. The concept of modularity
itself is often considered vague (Coltheart, 1999; Barrett and Kurzban, 2006), Fodor
himself defined modularity only “to some interesting extent”, (Fodor, 1983). How-
ever, we believe that information encapsulation (Fodor, 1983) should be considered
a necessary requirement for this idea (as pointed out by Fodor more recently (Fodor,
2001), see also Prinz (2006)) , highlighting (1) restricted access to higher order in-
formation and vice versa, and (2) information content limited and specific to each
module. We then suggest that the concept of modularity can be constructively for-
malised using the separation principle of control theory (Wonham, 1968; Åström and
Murray, 2010; Georgiou and Lindquist, 2013). This proposal follows a general trend
in the fields of cognitive science, neuroscience and psychology to use theories of
estimation and control to account for perception and action respectively (Knill and
Richards, 1996; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Kawato, 1999; Todorov, 2004; Todorov, 2009b;
Franklin and Wolpert, 2011). All these proposals, however, suggest (often implicitly)
that the two processes can be treated separately. On the other hand, 4E formula-
tions normally assume that the presence of feedback mechanisms in tightly coupled
agent-environment systems is indicative of non-modular systems (Beer, 1995; Clark,
1998; Hurley, 2001; Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008; Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandi-
aran, 2017; Wilson and Foglia, 2017).
With the architecture defined by the separation principle, i.e., the Linear Quadratic
Gaussian (LQG) control framework, it is however possible to implement agent-
environment systems where a separation of estimation (perception) and control (ac-
tion) for an agent is not only possible, but optimal according to a specific list of
criteria. While still focusing on action and perception, it is also important to high-
light that following the definition of “learning” given in Chapter 3 and based on
Friston (2008a), the conditions for this separation further introduce computation-
ally tractable ways of learning the parameters of a (linear) dynamical system, a pro-
cess also known as system identification. For instance, using methods based on the
standard Ho-Kalman algorithm (Ho and Kalman, 1966), or its stochastic versions
(Akaike, 1974; Van Overschee and De Moor, 1993), and given the Markov parameters
of a system (i.e., its impulse response), one can identify an Hankel (block) matrix
encoding conditions of observability and controllability, and subsequently recover
state transition, input-state and observation mappings of a system, described by ma-
trices A, B and C. These requirements are, nevertheless, very restrictive and possi-
bly unrealistic for the study of real-world organisms. To obviate these limitations,
the active inference formulation of sensorimotor loops (Friston et al., 2010a; Fris-
ton, 2010b; Buckley et al., 2017) proposes an extension of the traditional LQG-based
architectures that does not implement the assumptions required by the separation
principle. Following our claim regarding the modularity of the mind as an analogy
of this principle, we thus claim that active inference aligns in this sense with themes
closer to 4E cognition, and in particular formalises some of the implicit claims made
by 4E researchers.
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7.5.1 LQG vs Active inference, different mathematical formulations
The framework provided by LQG control linearly combines two processes of 1) es-
timation or inference of hidden properties of the environment and 2) control or reg-
ulations of variables of interest. The estimation of hidden variables is based on the
presence of a Kalman (for discrete time systems) or Kalman-Bucy (for continuous
time systems) filter, while the control of the desired variables on a Linear Quadratic
Regulator (LQR) (Wonham, 1968; Anderson and Moore, 1990; Stengel, 1994). In par-
ticular, this combination is provably optimal according to a set of specifications:
1. the estimator must be implemented through a state-space model where only
linear process dynamics and observation laws describe the environment and
its latent variables
2. uncertainty or noise processes in both dynamics and observations are repre-
sented by white, zero-mean Gaussian variables
3. the properties of these random variables, and in particular their (co)variance
matrices representing uncertainty are known
4. the performance of the regulator can be evaluated using a quadratic cost func-
tion
5. all the inputs to the agent are known, e.g., external disturbances and internal
bodily signals such as motor actions.
As we argued in section 7.3.1, the first four criteria could be considered reasonable
approximations of real-world phenomena in some cases, but the last one is more
problematic. One of the main features of living systems is in fact the constant and
inherent lack of knowledge of exogenous input signals, or forces, from the world
(Sontag, 2003). Moreover, these inputs include also motor signals thought to be
essentially discounted from the set of real observations of an agent in order for
the agent to differentiate between exafferent and reafferent input (Holst and Mit-
telstaedt, 1950; Crapse and Sommer, 2008), i.e., forces coming from the world or
initiated by the organism. In the state-space representation advocated by LQG, both
these classes of inputs are included under variables u, that we defined as a superset
of motor actions a in equation (7.11) and external forces I .
In our active inference implementation, the controller is built using a genera-
tive model that still represents the agent as a block but now includes beliefs about
the dynamics of the system as if the block was attached to a spring and a damper
(e.g., a piston). The fictitious spring stabilises the position of the agent around its
desired position, while the imaginary friction generated by the damper allows it
to slow down and eventually stop, i.e., at velocity zero. The target trajectory, i.e.,
position = velocity = 0, is specified using prior expectations encoded by the agent.
The active inference solution of the problem takes thus a radically different stance
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on problems of regulation. In traditional formulations based on forward and in-
verse models (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000), the control strongly
relies on the presence of an internal model that inverts the causal chain of actions
generating observations in order to estimate the best action or policy that can bring
about a desired observed state. In active inference, on the other hand, action is de-
fined using an extrinsic frame of reference, combining a Bayesian model inversion
scheme on proprioceptive sensations with innate reflex arcs minimising (proprio-
ceptive) prediction errors through actions on the world (see section 3.2.2).
Active inference agents require direct observations of proprioceptors that can be
used to trigger reflexes once (proprioceptive) prediction errors are generated. In our
example, this means that agents need access to observations on their acceleration
since their motor output is a force. In standard LQG architectures, this information
can be seen as intrinsic, since the Kalman-Bucy filter needs full knowledge of inputs
a (and external ones I if present) to appropriately estimate hidden states x (Stengel,
1994). The active inference version may look more demanding because derivatives
of noisy readings are usually to be avoided, but in standard implementations of
Kalman-Bucy filters as models of perception, it remains unclear if a copy of motor
outputs a can even be used at all, see discussions on efference copy in Feldman
et al. (2015), Feldman (2016), and Friston (2011). In support of the active inference
proposal, it has been shown that even unicellular organisms can use simple mecha-
nisms estimating derivatives of their observations if they have no dedicated recep-
tors, e.g., temporal sensing of chemical concentration gradients in E. Coli (Andrews,
Yi, and Iglesias, 2006). Furthermore, by eschewing explicit internal representations
of external inputs and including observations on acceleration, active inference im-
proves the controller used for problems of regulation, now necessarily including an
integral-like component (see Chapter 6). The presence of this extra term can easily be
explained by the known property of integral controllers to approximate via a linear
mechanism the presence of unknown inputs (Sontag, 2003). In this context, integral
control can be seen as the “optimal” linear controller in the presence of uncertainty,
i.e., when input signals (motor commands or external forces) are not known.
A crucial difference between LQG and active inference lies in the definition of the
Kalman gain, K, and feedback gain, L, matrices. These two matrices essentially pre-
scribe the optimal update speed of estimates of hidden states and controls. Both of
them require solving Riccati equations involving knowledge of the covariance ma-
trices of dynamics and observation noise in the first case, and weights representing
costs for estimation and control for the latter. However, K and L are in general not
well defined in active inference since their formulation requires the use of Marko-
vian stochastic processes (Stengel, 1994). These processes, essentially implemented
using Wiener noise, are often considered a good approximation of coloured noise
when the time scale of the estimator is much slower than the one of the true dynam-
ics of the environment. However, this hardly holds in practical implementations in
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engineering with a high sampling rate (Stratonovich, 1967). Similarly, biological sys-
tems have a characteristic time scale closer to real dynamics, implying that estima-
tion mechanisms must somehow be dealing with non-Markovian dynamics (Friston,
2008a). The apparent complication derived from the definition of the so called gener-
alised coordinates of motion, implementing generalised state space models where non-
Markovian, analytical stochastic processes are represented becomes in this sense a
small token to pay. Furthermore, it can be seen as necessary in cases where the un-
derlying stochastic dynamics are themselves non-Markovian processes, as pointed
our previously for applications in engineering (Stratonovich, 1967; Jazwinski, 1970),
physics (Fox, 1987; Van Kampen, 1992; Łuczka, 2005) and neuroscience (Friston,
2008a; Valdes-Sosa et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011). In active inference, the Kalman gain,
K, and feedback gain, L, matrices are replaced by learning rates such as in this work
or in the implementation presented in Chapter 5, or by clever implementations that
allow for adaptive update schemes with varying integration steps as in (Friston,
Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008), see also Chapter 4.
Another point of contention can be found in the cost function(al) minimised in
the two cases: a value or cost-to-go function for LQG, equation (7.5), and a vari-
ational free energy functional for active inference, equation (3.8). As we can see,
the free energy functional presents more terms than the value function of LQG. The
presence of multiple prediction errors in the variational free energy formulation can
be explained by the fact that errors map directly to likelihood and prior distribu-
tions as obtained from the joint density of observed and hidden states used to define
free energy, see equation (3.33). In LQG, on the other hand, there’s an often implicit
assumption on the invertibility of matrix C, mapping estimated states xˆ to obser-
vations y, see eqn. 4.1-1 to 4.1-8 in (Anderson and Moore, 1990) for a clarification.
Thanks to this assumption, the desired/target trajectory can be expressed directly
into the frame of reference of hidden, rather than measured states. While this may
be a fair assumption for many systems in LQG, solutions for non-invertible matri-
ces, i.e., as in the more general nonlinear case, are still not available. In active in-
ference, a pseudo-inversion is provided through Bayes theorem and approximated
with a variational formulation that can encompass also nonlinear systems (Friston,
Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008; Buckley et al., 2017).
7.5.2 LQG vs Active inference, repercussions for the cognitive sciences
LQG-based architectures are modular in nature, with perception and action seen as
separate problems solved nearly independently (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahra-
mani, 2000; Todorov, 2004). According to this view, initially a system should find
accurate estimates of the hidden properties of its observations, and only once such
estimates are available should an agent attempt to regulate variables that are of in-
terest to achieve its goals, e.g., temperature, oxygen level, etc.. On the other hand,
we can define a framework based on mathematical formulations of control problems
where the separation principle is not included or required. According to one such
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proposal, that we identified in active inference (Friston et al., 2010a; Friston et al.,
2010b; Buckley et al., 2017), perception and action are combined in an inseparable
sensorimotor loop described by the minimisation of variational free energy for an
agent. In this set up, action and perception are seen as instances of a fundamen-
tally unique functional process (Clark, 1998), using different labels for our (i.e., the
observers’) convenience. In particular, the idea of precise inferences of world vari-
ables is called into question (Clark, 2015a), to the point that inaccurate perception
is not only possible but becomes a pre-requisite to act on the world (Brown et al.,
2013; Wiese, 2016). In architectures based on the separation principle, the estimated
state of a system is thought of as a relevant account of real observations, e.g., their
means and covariances. Conversely, in active inference it becomes clear that esti-
mates of latent variables of the world are deeply connected to the current goal of
an agent, e.g., to regulate its observations, cf. (Powers, 1973). To do so, its targets
are encoded as prior expectations and used to bias inferential processes toward its
desires so that prediction errors are created as the mismatch of observations and
the estimates of hidden variables. These errors are then minimised by acting on the
world (Friston et al., 2010a), taking advantage of proprioceptive prediction errors
that enact reflex arcs to make observation better accord with existing predictions
(Clark, 2015b; Wiese, 2016). More in general, the active inference formulation allows
also for accurate estimates of the latent variables generating observations, see for
instance (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and Daunizeau, 2008), but this modality funda-
mentally excludes the possibility of acting: if no prediction errors are generated for
action to minimise, an agent becomes a simple mirror of its world with no strong de-
sire or even necessity to act (Friston, Thornton, and Clark, 2012; Brown et al., 2013)
(see also Chapter 4). In other words, depending on different precision weights an
agent can accurately estimate its observations without acting or potentially discard
its sensations to only pursue its desires, generating all possible cases in between
as a balanced mix of weighted prediction errors (Allen and Friston, 2018), see also
Chapter 4.
In recent years, the more traditional understanding of perceptual and motor as
nearly independent processes as been put into discussion by different authors es-
pecially in neuroscience (Ahissar and Assa, 2016; Busse et al., 2017; Buckley and
Toyoizumi, 2018). It appears clear that many experimental set ups are limited in a
way that decisively affects conclusions that claim or just presuppose the separation
of perceptual and behavioural components (Krakauer et al., 2017), requiring new
and ethologically meaningful paradigms for an appropriate study of different as-
pects of living systems (Najafi and Churchland, 2018). In this context, we make an
attempt to propose some new ideas that could be used to drive future experiments.
This attempt is centred around a critical appraisal of LQG as a model architecture
for cognitive systems, focusing in particular on the assumptions made by the use
of Kalman-Bucy filters, central to these proposals (Wolpert, Ghahramani, and Jor-
dan, 1995; Todorov and Jordan, 2002; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, and Flanagan, 2011;
Chapter 7. Modularity, the separation principle and active inference 158
Franklin and Wolpert, 2011). One of the key requirements for Kalman-Bucy filters
to generate an accurate estimate of the hidden state of a system is to have access
to both all the outputs (the observations) and the all inputs (forces that affect the
state of a system). Such inputs include both motor commands, which in classical
forward/inverse models are identified using the idea of efference copy (Holst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950) (see for instance Kawato (1999), Wolpert and Ghahramani (2000),
and Todorov (2004)), but also external forces/signals from the environment that can-
not be accounted by an organism, i.e., a sudden change in weather conditions or
unexpected interactions with other agents.
The presence of the former has amply been put into discussion for decades,
mainly through the proposal of the equilibrium point hypothesis or its most recent
version, threshold or referent control (see some recent discussions in Feldman (2009),
Feldman et al. (2015), and Feldman (2016)). Supported by neurophysiological argu-
ments, the main proponents of this approach strongly advocate for a theory of motor
control that eschews the idea of efference copy, deemed to be inconsistent with ex-
perimental results (Feldman, 2016). In its place, referent control proposes moving
frames of reference that implement different equilibrium points, or trajectories in
more general terms, essentially shifting muscle activation thresholds based on dif-
ferent desired sensory consequences. While inverse models (Kawato, 1999) require
motor commands to be defined in an intrinsic frame of reference created through the
inversion of a forward model encoding cause-effect relationships accurately repre-
senting the physical laws underlying observations, referent control essentially works
at the periphery of an organism via the use of reflex arcs triggering different mus-
cle activations. Active inference largely follows arguments from threshold control,
explaining motor behaviour using a refined version of this hypothesis including a
mathematical formulation based on predictive coding (Adams, Shipp, and Friston,
2013). Agents (or their body parts, limbs, joints) are thus represented as mass-spring
systems whose equilibrium encodes a desired trajectory in the phase-space, see our
example or Friston et al. (2012). The debate over the role of efference copy remains
largely unsettled (Crapse and Sommer, 2008; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, and Flanagan,
2011; Feldman, 2016; Schwartz, 2016; Straka, Simmers, and Chagnaud, 2018) and
new investigations are necessary to definitely explain its importance. In this context,
new experiments to disambiguate the role of efference copy are necessary, requiring
also a deep clarification of the terminology, often still confusing (cf. efference copy
vs. corollary discharge (Crapse and Sommer, 2008; Schwartz, 2016; Straka, Simmers,
and Chagnaud, 2018)).
The presence of external unaccounted forces is often overlooked in many exper-
imental set-ups with fixed or predictable conditions (e.g., the classic and still dom-
inating two-alternative forced choice paradigm). In more realistic and ethological
scenarios, however, one should expect that external and unpredictable stimuli con-
stantly affect the behaviour of an agent (Krakauer et al., 2017; Najafi and Church-
land, 2018; Buckley and Toyoizumi, 2018). In this case, introducing (non-zero-mean)
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noise or varying experimental conditions may help in testing the robustness of LQG-
based architectures. In practice if some inputs are not known, one should expect
LQG to perform rather poorly until these inputs can be estimated and adaptation
(e.g., learning) to new conditions can take place. However, one should then explain
how such forces can be estimated in LQG since Kalman-Bucy filters cannot estimate
inputs (Kalman and Bucy, 1961; Chen, 2003), cf. DEM (Friston, Trujillo-Barreto, and
Daunizeau, 2008). More in general, if a system is instead well adapted to deal with
unpredictable stimuli, simple mechanisms such as integral control could be in place,
as shown formally in Sontag (2003) and in experiments on chemotactic adaptation
in E. Coli (Yi et al., 2000). More recently, some promising results were presented in
Ritz et al. (2018), supporting the idea that integral feedback control is a good model
for adaptation in environments with varying conditions. Integral control constitutes
the best linear approximation to problems of control with unknown forces affecting
the observations of an agent (Åström, 1995), providing a robust solution with fast
responses to problems that otherwise would require slower learning mechanisms
(Yi et al., 2000), which may be ineffective in fast-paced environments (Ashby, 1958).
7.6 Conclusions
In this work we proposed to ground a long-standing debate over the modularity of
action and perception (Fodor, 1983; Coltheart, 1999; Barrett and Kurzban, 2006) that
characterises some aspects of the feud between traditional and 4E accounts of cog-
nition (Van Gelder, 1995; Clark, 1998; Hurley, 2001; Wilson and Foglia, 2017) using
the separation principle from control theory (Wonham, 1968; Anderson and Moore,
1990; Stengel, 1994). The notion of modularity implies a formal characterisation
of perception and action as distinct and encapsulated processes, with limited inter-
actions mediated by higher order cognition in a purely sequential fashion. Other
definitions of modularity are often used to describe different physiological or func-
tional units within perceptual (Wolpert, 1997) or motor apparatuses (Flanders, 2011;
Zelik et al., 2014), but here we emphasised modularity as the functional segregation
affecting perception and action more in general. In control theory, the separation
principle advocates the optimal decomposition of estimation and control of a sys-
tem following a set of assumptions entailing mainly the linearity of the system to
control and full knowledge of its parameters and inputs.
In recent developments of cognitive science, estimation and control theory have
been proposed to provide mathematical descriptions of several hypotheses on the
nature of perception and action respectively (Knill and Richards, 1996; Knill and
Pouget, 2004; Doya, 2007; Körding and Wolpert, 2006; Wolpert, Ghahramani, and
Jordan, 1995; Kawato, 1999; Friston, 2010b). Our proposal thus entails extending
this formal description of cognitive processes by using more advanced notions from
control theory, in an attempt to further account for other ideas highly debated in
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the cognitive science community. It is interesting to note that the notion of sepa-
ration emerged also in econometrics, in parallel to control theory, as “uncertainty
equivalence” (Simon, 1956; Theil, 1957). The name is derived from the idea that the
regulation of a stochastic system can be achieved using a deterministic controller
after an estimation of the uncertain, hidden properties of the system (Stengel, 1994).
One of its main proponents, Herbert Simon, is also one of the fathers of (symbolic)
AI, known for its positions on near-decomposability (Simon and Ando, 1961; Si-
mon, 1991), an idea describing dynamical systems (physical, biological, social) as
hierarchical organisations of nearly independent modules. While no direct connec-
tion to Fodorian views has been made since Fodor focused more on aspects of the
mind, different authors have identified near decomposability as a concept related
to, if not indirectly inspiring the mainstream theory of the modularity of the mind
(Velichkovsky, 2005; Bechtel, 2009).
In this light, we claimed that cognitivist/computational ideas based on the mod-
ular architecture can be seen in analogy with the separation principle and in doing
so, we explicitly gave a list of requirements for the separation of action and percep-
tion, the ones used for the definition of the separation principle. This definition is
however extremely strict. The principle can be applied only to a small subset of sys-
tems (linear, with Gaussian noise, quadratic cost functions, known covariances and
known inputs). It is thus hard to imagine, on this view, how studies of brains and
minds could make such assumptions, suggesting then that non-modular 4E views
provide a more suitable framework for investigating cognitive and natural systems.
We then argued in favour of a recent proposal based on theories of estimation (or
inference) and control and with no explicit assumption regarding their separability:
active inference. In this framework, one of the five necessary requirements for sep-
arability, the idea of having access to all inputs and in particular to a copy of motor
signals and to (unexpected) stimuli from the environment, is dismissed (Friston et
al., 2010a; Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013). By rejecting such mecha-
nism, active inference effectively challenges classical architectures based on the sep-
aration principle and in doing so, we claimed, explicitly agrees with 4E views of cog-
nition whereby perception and action are seen as non-modular processes. Our work
provides thus support for hypotheses highlighting how active inference is more in
agreement with 4E theories than with traditional accounts of cognition (Clark, 2015b;
Bruineberg, Kiverstein, and Rietveld, 2018; Pezzulo et al., 2017).
As a final remark, to quote Kalman on an early intuition regarding the problem
of simultaneous estimation and control (perception and action in our interpretation):
One may separate the problem of physical realization into two stages:
computation of the “best approximation” xˆ(t1) of the state from knowl-
edge of y(t) for t ≤ t1 and computation of u(t1) given xˆ(t1).
(Kalman, 1960c)
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This may true for engineering but perhaps not for studies of cognition and natural
systems.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis constitutes an attempt to ground ideas developed under the free energy
principle (FEP) into embodied, enactive, embedded and extended (4E) cognitive sci-
ence using the mathematical frameworks of probability theory and dynamical sys-
tems/control theory. In particular I focused on active inference, one of the most
promising process theories implementing the minimisation of variational free en-
ergy proposed by the FEP. This minimisation is claimed to provide a general prin-
ciple of self-organisation in theoretical biology (Friston, 2012; Friston, 2013), and
accouts of perception, learning and action (among others) in neuroscience (Friston,
Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Friston, 2010b). While raising a lot of interest in differ-
ent fields of the natural and cognitive sciences, several aspects of the FEP have re-
mained obscure, with a proliferation of reviews by different authors (Bogacz, 2017;
Buckley et al., 2017; Biehl et al., 2018) attempting to shed light on some of the am-
bitious claims made by the FEP. This thesis differs from work by Bogacz (2017) due
to my focus on sensorimotor loops rather than purely perceptual accounts of cog-
nitive systems. Chapter 3 builds on Buckley et al. (2017), which develops a formal
mathematical derivation of the FEP in generalised coordinates of motion for non-
Markovian univariate continuous time stochastic processes in a hierarchical set up.
The following chapters however cover specific connections of the FEP to 4E theories
of cognitive science using a series of agent-based simulations to support my claims
while showing some of the more explicit connections to the field of control theory.
In Biehl et al. (2018) we find a general treatment of different theories of intrinsic
motivation: expected variational free energy minimisation, predictive information,
empowerment and knowledge seeking, with formal connections of the FEP to the
universal reinforcement learning framework. My focus is however different, and in-
trinsic motivation proposals are never fully discussed. Moreover, this thesis adopts
a different formulation of the FEP (minimisation of variational free energy vs min-
imisation of expected variational free energy), a different mathematical description
of state-space models (continuous time vs discrete time/(PO)MDPs), and has a dif-
ferent aim (connections of the FEP to cognitive science vs a unified formalisation
of different mathematical frameworks and a discussion of intrinsic motivation theo-
ries).
Using different agent-based models I provided:
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1. a series of experiments clarifying the implementation of the FEP for minimal
models of sensorimotor loops, with
2. concrete connections between 4E’s theories of cognition and the notion of vari-
ational free energy minimisation formalised through Bayesian inference and
control theory.
Specifically, in Chapter 4 I implemented an agent model that captures the main
features of the active inference proposal, focusing on the importance of action for
Bayesian models of cognition that otherwise often revolve around only perceptual
processes. In these simulations I also introduced two of the main constructs of this
process theory: precision hyperparameters, a set of weights, or gains, regulating the
minimisation of different prediction errors and priors, a set of probability distribu-
tions (or beliefs) encoding subjective preferences or credences of an agent. In doing
so I highlighted how, in order to trigger purposeful behaviour in an active inference
agent, the common and intuitive idea of correctly inferring properties of the world
is in fact misleading. Only by having high precisions on priors that are misaligned
with world states can an agent generate (proprioceptive) prediction errors for action
to resolve, generating what appears as purposeful behaviour (Wiese, 2016).
In Chapter 5 I built on this first example and proposed that generative models
representing active inference agents need not represent any objective property of
their milieu. Priors that create a strong coupling between and agent and its envi-
ronment can, in principle, be sufficient to enact complex behaviours as long as they
encode appropriate sensorimotor contingencies for the agent.
Chapter 6 proposed a general-purpose methodology following the idea of sim-
plified generative models introduced in the previous chapter, implementing a PID-
like controller in active inference. PID control is one of the most popular strategies
used by modern controllers in industry since it constitutes a simple but effective
mechanism of robust regulation in presence of external disturbances and noise. In
active inference, this method is equivalent to an “agent” implementing a generative
model in terms of first order linear (stochastic) differential equations. Strong priors
on a desired set trajectory to follow generate then prediction errors that the agent
tries to minimise by producing actions that can make the world behave according
to its target, achieving regulation by imposing its desired dynamics on the world.
The relevance of this formulation can also provide a direct connection between the
FEP and models of PID control used in biology and neuroscience to model different
behaviours, e.g., chemotaxis in E. Coli (Yi et al., 2000) or adaptation to unexpected
stimuli in psychophysics (Ritz et al., 2018).
In Chapter 7 I discussed in detail one of the fundamental ideas behind the imple-
mentation of active inference: the combination of perception and action into a uni-
fied process, challenging the more traditional idea of modularity between the two
(Fodor, 1983; Hurley, 2001). This idea has been inspirational for computational the-
ories of the mind, with a central tenet regarding perception and action as separate,
Chapter 8. Conclusions 164
informationally encapsulated functional modules. Perception and action are nowa-
days often described using estimation and control theory, upon which the FEP and
other frameworks are based. To try to formalise modularity I used the separation
principle of control theory, asserting that the estimation of a system and its regula-
tion can be solved as independent problems and sequentially implemented for the
control of partially observable systems. Using the separation principle I thus pro-
posed a mathematical connection between non-separable implementations of senso-
rimotor loops in active inference and 4E theories advocating for deeply entangled
perceptual and motor processes (Clark, 1998; Wilson, 2002).
8.1 The FEP - promises and deliverables
The FEP has attracted a lot of attention for its ambitious claims regarding the unifi-
cation of different mathematical frameworks (information, dynamical systems and
control theory) for the study of living organisms in the natural and cognitive sci-
ences (cognitive (neuro)science and biology) based on arguments from the physical
sciences (thermodynamics and statistical mechanics).
The combination of ideas from information theory and dynamics systems/(feedback)
control was proposed in the last century with influential insights and contributions
from Ashby (1958), Shannon (1959) and Kalman (1960c), among others. New devel-
opments have since then improved our understanding of the fundamental relation-
ships between these frameworks, showing the fundamental duality of the problems
of control and estimation initially formalised by Kalman (1960c), see for instance
Attias (2003), Mitter and Newton (2003), Todorov (2008), and Kappen, Gómez, and
Opper (2012). See especially Tishby and Polani (2011) and Beer and Williams (2015)
for discussions related to action-perception loops. In my work, I provided an exten-
sion of this combination in Chapter 6, where the control theoretical formulation of
PID control was derived from the minimisation of variational free energy for sim-
ple linear generative models. This implementation has also introduced an analytical
method to find the optimal parameters of PID controllers as a slower process of free
energy minimisation where, more traditionally, only heuristics and trial-and-errors
procedures exist.
Estimation and control have been used to account for perception and action in
cognitive and motor (neuro)science, becoming the dominant analogies and compu-
tational/algorithmic theories for these cognitive functions, e.g., Knill and Richards
(1996), Rao and Ballard (1999), Lee and Mumford (2003), Kawato (1999), Wolpert
and Ghahramani (2000), and Todorov (2004). These theories however still heavily
rely on linear models where perception and action have similar implementations
(Kalman, 1960c; Todorov, 2008). The FEP builds on these proposals, already provid-
ing mathematical hypotheses on the nature of cognitive functions (Todorov, 2009b),
by reinterpreting the role of action and behaviour using evidence from neurophysi-
ology supporting an even more unified vision of sensorimotor loops (Friston et al.,
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2010a; Friston, 2011; Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013). In this light, perception and
action are not only seen as co-dependent processes in agent-environment coupled
systems, they are thought to be more deeply intertwined if not almost undistinguish-
able in some important aspects (Pickering and Clark, 2014; Wiese, 2016; Pezzulo et
al., 2017). This notion differs from the idea of active sensing (Yang, Wolpert, and
Lengyel, 2016), relying on an intrinsic drive for an agent’s actions to gather more in-
formation in order to improve its perception of the world, and promotes regulation
of an agent’s variables (Ashby, 1960; Powers, 1973; Seth, 2014b; Engel, Friston, and
Kragic, 2016) as a better interpretation of its behaviour:
Its first characteristic is that its ultimate aim is not understanding but the
purely practical one of control. If a system is too complex to be under-
stood, it may nevertheless still be controllable. For to achieve this, all that
the controller wants to find is some action that gives an acceptable result;
he is concerned only with what happens, not with why it happens.
Ashby (1958)
(on operational research, although in my opinion this quote can also be seen as
representing his view on biological organisms as control systems)
These ideas strongly resonate with some of the core themes from 4E cognitive sci-
ence: agent-environment coupled systems and the importance of feedback, cognitive
offloading to body and environment and an emphasis on control and behaviour over
accurate descriptions and representations of the environment expressed in different
chapters of this thesis.
In this work, I largely overlooked the potential relationships between the FEP
and thermodynamics/statistical mechanics. These relationships are thought to be
based on the conceptual arguments regarding the state of low (thermodynamic) en-
tropy of living organisms (Friston, 2010b) as famously suggested by Schrödinger
(1944). Furthermore, more formal connections have been proposed with the Max-
imum Entropy principle by Jaynes (Jaynes, 1957a; Jaynes, 1957b), see for instance
(Friston, 2012). In both cases, the FEP relies on the relation between information
and its thermodynamic costs (Parrondo, Horowitz, and Sagawa, 2015; Kolchinsky
and Wolpert, 2018), and in particular between Shannon (information) and thermo-
dynamic entropy (Sengupta, Stemmler, and Friston, 2013; De Ridder, Vanneste, and
Freeman, 2014). The ambiguous use of “free energy” however, mostly derived by
work in machine learning (Hinton and Zemel, 1994), often suggests a physical rela-
tionship between variational free energy and Helmholtz free energy which has not
been formally shown1. In support of a possible connection between the two, Still et
al. (2012) showed that, under a set of assumptions, increasing the predictive power
1On the other hand, Ramstead, Badcock, and Friston (2017) claim that an indirect relationship ex-
ists, based on the idea that minimising variational free energy, on average, minimises thermodynamic
entropy.
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of a system from an information theoretical perspective is equivalent to minimis-
ing Helmholtz (thermodynamic) free energy. The assumptions are however quite
restrictive, mainly a system having no feedback from the environment, and the pre-
dictive power is measured using a different definition from the one used by the FEP
(i.e., model evidence, minimising surprisal is equivalent to maximising model evi-
dence, see equation (3.4)). Further connections may be found in the future, consid-
ering work on the thermodynamics of feedback control, see Kolchinsky and Wolpert
(2018) and references therein, clarifying for instance the connections between dif-
ferent information measures of predictive power and their implications (Sengupta,
Stemmler, and Friston, 2013). More generally, this aspect of the FEP remains largely
unexplored, and will need a thorough formalisation based on stronger arguments
for non-equilibrium thermodynamics describing biological organisms2.
8.2 Ideas for the future, Bayesianism and ways forward
The use of Bayesian methods for the analysis of data is nowadays ubiquitous (Rah-
nev and Denison, 2018). More interestingly, as I’ve argued in this thesis, these meth-
ods are nowadays used as analogies of different cognitive functions. Bayesian rea-
soning offers a fresh perspective on different aspects of decision making (Robert,
2007) and is even claimed to be an extension of mathematical logic (Jaynes, 2003). In
this section I’ll discuss two potential problems with the adoption of Bayesian reason-
ing that one should consider to gain a proper understanding of my work, suggesting
ways to interpret my contributions and possible future directions I’d like to explore.
One of the major risks is to over-generalise the use of Bayesian methods to de-
scribe different natural and cognitive phenomena, e.g., Bayesian inference in plants?
(Calvo and Friston, 2017). This often implies the presence of a strong form of Bayesian-
ism (Pearl, 2001), a tendency to claim “Bayes-optimal” computation here, there and
everywhere (although nowadays an increasing number studies attempt to compare
Bayesian and non-Bayesian, i.e., not reliant on sensory/process uncertainties, mod-
els (Adler and Ma, 2018; Acerbi et al., 2018)). This tendency is usually due to the
overly “generous” definition of Bayesian optimal processes and mainly to the pres-
ence of subjective priors (Jones and Love, 2011; Rahnev and Denison, 2018). It is
beyond the scope of my work to dive into a deep philosophical debate on the value
of this and possibly other constructs in the Bayesian formalism (see Jaynes (2003)
for some biased, but thorough discussion), but I’ll briefly discuss a few ideas ex-
plaining my pragmatism in this case. This thesis may appear as a canonical example
of the Bayesianism mentioned above and the reader may ask for example: 1) what
is the reason to implement a simple Braitenberg vehicle using the complicated FEP
framework (Chapter 5)? Or: 2) what can you gain from rewriting a PID control in
2At the same time I am writing this paragraph I attended a lab meeting in Friston’s group, where
the main discussion focused on a tentative and more coherent, unified description of biological organ-
isms from the perspectives of random dynamical systems, classical mechanics, information theory and
geometry, and especially non-equilibrium thermodynamics.
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terms of approximate Bayesian inference (Chapter 6)? In the first case, the rationale
was to extend existing pedagogical implementations of the FEP such as McGregor,
Baltieri, and Buckley (2015), Bogacz (2017), and Buckley et al. (2017) to topics of 4E
cognitive science. This example introduced a (hopefully) clearer perspective on em-
bodiment and the importance of situatedness and dynamic coupling over complex
models of the world within a Bayesian contest with parsimonious generative mod-
els (Seth, 2014b; Clark, 2015a). To answer the second question, it is important to
highlight the potential of recasting problems of control in terms of Bayesian infer-
ence (Doya, 2009; Friston, 2011), with prominent examples including for instance
Todorov (2009a) and Kappen, Gómez, and Opper (2012). The formulation I provide
in Chapter 6 includes, for instance, an analytical method for finding the parameters
of a PID controller based on the presence of simple priors. The tuning of these pa-
rameters usually requires ad-hoc trial-and-error procedures that cannot generalise,
as different books and chapters dedicated to such heuristics show (Åström, 1995;
Johnson and Moradi, 2005; Åström and Hägglund, 2006).
The second issue emphasises the “evidence-consistent-with”-problem3. As with
many other statistical accounts, most of the work presented under the predictive
coding/processing, Bayesian brain and FEP frameworks is correlational in nature
(i.e., the measures used can only describe correlations/associations), and supported
at the moment only by “evidence consistent with” these hypotheses. This has strong
repercussions on the idea that agents might be engaging in processes of Bayesian
inference. A major source of concern may thus emerge for scientists interested in,
for instance, counterfactual reasoning (Seth, 2014a). Even without considering the
issues with the FEP and the unimodal Laplace (Gaussian) assumption (Seth, 2014b),
not defining multiple outcomes and tackled with the expected free energy minimi-
sation framework (Friston, Samothrakis, and Montague, 2012a; Friston et al., 2015),
a potential risk is to think that the problem of counterfactuals is solved just with
the presence of spatially and temporally deep generative models (Friston et al.,
2017; Kirchhoff et al., 2018). These models lack the ability to retrospect and poten-
tially other defining features of counterfactual thinking (Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018).
For a better definition of counterfactuals we may instead wish to consider work
on causal models extending the traditional language of (correlational) probability
theory, for instance through the implementation of operations based on do-calculus
(Pearl, 2009). This framework is claimed to provide a more appropriate venue for
investigating counterfactuals and interventions on distributions (Pearl and Macken-
zie, 2018). Some of the most recent formulations of the FEP (Friston, Parr, and Vries,
2017) suggest that the framework adopted by active inference theories is, in prin-
ciple, compatible with the Bayesian network formulation of Bayesian networks in
Pearl’s causal modelling (Pearl, 2009), but further explorations will be necessary in
the (near) future.
3This line emerged from several discussions with Warrick Roseboom.
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